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The main aim of this study was to investigate which factors are likely to affect the 
probability that events of violent collective action are reported by the press in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The study hypothesised that the likelihood of violent conflict events 
being reported by the press is affected by certain characteristics of the events 
themselves, such as their intensity and size, and by the environment in which 
events occur, such as their physicai location and the prevailing political context. 
The study was limited to the KwaZulu-Natal province where levels of violent 
collective action have been the highest in the country over the past decade. This 
province is also home to many violence monitoring agencies, which constituted an 
important alternative source of information against which the reporting trends of the 
newspapers in the province could be compared. 
The main source of information used in this study was the Conflict Trends in 
KwaZulu-Natal project's database of collective action events, which comprises 
events reported by both the press and the monitoring agencies. Data on a total of 
3990 violent conflict events was analysed during 1987, 1990 and 1994, in the form 
of comparisons between the reporting tendencies of the press and the monitors. 
Interviews were also conducted ~ith reporters and editors of the daily newspapers 
in KwaZulu-Natal, as well as with selected monitoring agency staff members. 
These interviews provided valuable information about how these media operate, 
and the factors which constrain their violence reporting activities. 
The most support was found for the argument that the political context influences 
violence reporting by the press. Analyses suggested that in all three years studied, 
the press contribution to the database decreased as monthly levels of violent 
conflict increased. This was explained in relation to the prevailing political context. 
The results also showed that reporting trends changed over time. In the earlier 
years, the press did not appear to be more inclined to report events of larger size 
and intensity, or events which were close to the newspapers' base. In 1994, 
however, this trend was reversed. 
There also was no clear evidence that the States of Emergency impacted 
negatively on press reporting of violence in terms of the variables studied. In 
addition, the study concluded that both the press and the monitOring agencies had 
made important separate contributions to the database on violent collective action. 
It is, therefore, vital that systematic studies of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal 
make use of multiple sources of data. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
1. Introduction 
The study of collective action . and violent collective action in particular, has 
occupied scholars of political science and sociology throughout this century. In the 
1960s, protest events such as the race riots and student activities in both the 
United States and Europe provided a new impetus for research into the field of 
conflict activity. As interest increased, SO new and competin~eveloped 
which tried to explain the causes for these events. Researchers also became more 
sophisticated in the methodologies they applied in their work (Olivier and Louw, 
1995). 
One method of researching conflict involved quantifying events of collective action 
and recording information on a variety of event characteristics such as the location, 
sequence and timing of events, and the type of participants. Most of this type of 
research was carried out in the United States and some in Europe. One such study 
has been completed in South Africa and others are underway.1 For many of these 
researchers, including those in South Africa, public documents and especially 
newspapers, were often the only source of data on collective action events which 
were readily available. Much collective action research has consequently used 
newspapers, since official documents such as police records, are rarely accessible 
to researchers.2 
1 The research which was done abroad was by Tilly m..aI (1975), Tilly (1978), Jenkins and 
Perrow (1977), .McAdam (1982), Tarrow (1989) and Olzak (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1992). 
South African work is that of Olivier (1990, 1991). Louw and Bekker (1992) used this 
methodology, and research using this methodology continues at the Conflict Trends in 
KwaZulu-Natal project at the University of Natal, Durban, and HSRC in Pretoria. 
2 Studies in which newspapers were used include those by Chermesh (1982), Danzger 
(1975), Snyder and Kelly (1977), Spilerman (1970), Tarrow (1989, 1994), Tilly m..aI (1975), 
Olivier (1990, 1991), Olzak (1987, 1989a, 1992) and Olzak and Olivier (1995). 
1 
The reliance on newspapers as a data ·source means that the reliability of the press 
. \. reporting itself becomes a matter of crucial c~ncern . Indeed, vari.ous internati~nal 
-t-scholars have criticised research methods which rely on the media and espeCially 
I 
newspapers for information (Oanzger, 1975; Franzosi, 1987; Molotoch and Lester, 
1974; Snyder and Kelly, 1977). The most common criticism is that using the press 
means there may be systematic biases in the data. This may be in the form of 
selection bias - the media may be biased in its selection of events to be reported, 
description bias - the media may be biased in how it describes events which are 
• 
reported, and lastly, researcher bias - mistakes made by the researcher affect the 
reliability of the data (Franzosi, 1987; Olzak, 1989b; McCarthy W1, 1995). 
Of these, selection and description biases are the most difficult to deal with 
because they affect the sources, and cannot as a result be controlled by the 
researcher. These biases will, therefore, have the greatest impact on the nature of 
the research results. 
While research in South Africa which relies on the press as a data source has not 
been subjected to a systematic assessment regarding the internal reliability and 
validity of the data, researchers here have criticised the way in which the press 
reports collective action, and particularly violent action. Conclusions similar to 
those described above were reached. These criticisms point mainly to political and 
, 
racial reporting bias, underreporting of the number of events and the details about 
events, and publishing rumours. 
The extensive States of Emergency and other restrictive laws which were most 
severe during the final years of apartheid, also limited media reporting of violence. 
In addition, these laws distorted the flow of public information at the time, and 
undermined journalism generally. Since the election of a new government in 1994, 
and the protection of media freedom in the Interim Constitution, these laws are no 
longer a threat. But many problems still prevail despite this protection and the 
relaxation of most repressive laws. The press in South Africa has also had to deal 
with intimidation and 'censorship' emanating from civil society. 
2 
Political developments in South Africa during the 1980s such as the States of 
Emergency coupled with increased levels of conflict and violence, resulted in the 
development of other sources which were used by researchers.3 These are the 
independent monitoring agencies (which mushroomed in KwaZulu-Natal), and the 
daily Unrest Reports issued nationally by the South African Police to the media. 
These sources provided information on violent collective action, but did not 
diminish researchers' reliance on the newspapers, since the former were not as 
regular and accessible as the press. Some monitoring agencies only existed for a 
few months, others a few years, and some did not document their information 
regularly. The quality of information recorded by both the monitoring agencies and 
the police's daily Unrest Reports has been questioned. These issues will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The findings of foreign and local researchers, and the nature of South Africa's 
political history, suggest that for local researchers especially, the way . in which 
~
ewspapers and other sources report collective action and violence can be 
. problematic. This means that scholars using these media for research must 
ontinuously eva~te their sources in order to determine what effect their choice of 
sources may have on research findings. This is precisely the motivation and the 
task of the present study . 
....... This study is concerned with investigating selected sources which report violence 
in KwaZulu-Natal, and is particularly concerned with the issue of selection bias in 
the press. The question which this study seeks to answer is the following: wt'!at 
factors are likely t~ affect, the probability that events of violent collective 
action are reported by the press? 
There is a paucity of literature which can be drawn on to answer this question. Very 
few foreign studies have evaluated the sources used for collective action research , 
let alone the extent of selection bias present in the press. locally, .it would appear 
~ Examples of collective action and violence research using monitoring agency information 
IS that by Louw and Bekker (1992) and Aitchison (1993). The Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-
Natal project at the University of Natal uses the monitors' information on an ongoing basis. 
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that this will be the first attempt to systematically and empirically analyse the 
newspapers' violence reporting tendencies. 
The few studies that have identified factors which affect the likelihood that events 
will be reported by the press, were carried out in the United States. The social, 
economic and political environment in that country differ markedly from those in 
South Africa, but because these studies present the only comparable information 
on the subject, their findings must be taken into account. In addition, many of their 
conclusions were independently substantiated by local journalists and editors who ,. 
were interviewed as part of this study. 
The work of Snyder and Kelly (1977), Franzosi (1987) and McCarthyruI (1993 
and 1995), showed that different forms of conflict have different probabilities of 
being reported by the press. More intense ~vents, measured by their participant 
size and the numbers of people killed and injured per event were more likely to be 
reported. In addition, they found that press reporting was sensitive to the 
environment in which events occurred. The date that events happened, in terms of 
the prevailing political context, and the location of events, affected reporting 
probability. Events occurring in close proximity to the media headquarters were 
more likely to be reported than those further away. 
Following from this, the hypothesis of this study is: the likelihood that events of 
violent collective action will be reported by the press is affected by certain 
characteristics of the events themselves (namely event intensity and size), 
and by the environment in which events occur (namely the political context 
and physical location of events). 
The fact that there is often an absence of alternative data which reflects what 
'really' happened, makes testing this hypothesis difficult. If we had information 
about all events of violence which occurred over a period of time, this could be 
compared with the events reported by the newspapers. The conditions under which 
events are more likely to be reported by the press, could then be identified. 
4 
Although such records do not exist for violent collective action, information 
recorded by the monitoring agencies in KwaZulu-Natal, although not complete, 
presents a useful basis for comparisons with press reports. The origin, aims and 
functioning of the monitors are very different from the press. This means that the 
reporting biases which may exist in the newspaper industry would not apply to the 
monitoring agencies. 
Collective action is defined here as collective behaviour (involving two or more 
participants) in which a conflict of interests is expressed by groups protesting in 
public, in a peaceful or violent manner, about a given set of grievances. Collective 
action may be initiated by a variety of interest groups who mobilise around a wide 
range of concerns such as political differences, housing, access to land, ethnic or 
racial solidarity, women's rights, and so forth. 
The hypothesis presented above will be tested using both nd 
~tita~ethodOIOgies. Qualitative, open-ended interviews wi porters and 
editors of the daily newspapers in KwaZulu-Natal and the South African Press 
Association (SAPA), as well as with staff members of selected monitoring agencies 
will provide essential information about the processes which drive these sources. 
These interviews are important since little secondary information exists about these 
sources. 
The hypothesis will also be tested empirically, using statistical records of events of 
violent collective action recorded by the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project, 
located at the University of Natal. These analyses will establish the existence of 
any relationships between the events which occurred and the sources which 
reported them. Having access to a record of events and to a record of which 
sources reported those events, facilitates an assessment of some of the criticisms 
which have been made of these sources. 
~ The main aim of this study is to contribute to what is presently a small body of 
literature on the validity and reliability of the press as a source for collective action 
research. In addition, it also hopes to comment on the type of information which 
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has been made available by sources of violence reporting in KwaZulu-Natal. The 
political history of the country and of KwaZulu-Natal in particular, inspired this study t . 
and also lent relevance to the subject. 
The recent political history of KwaZulu-Natal has been characterised by intens~ 
violence and restrictions on the media. In addition, there have been criticisms of 
the way in which the press, the monitoring agencies and the police Unrest Reports 
have reported this ongoing violence. These political conditions have affected the 
flow of public information about violence, and this study can contribute towards 
fostering a better understanding of the nature of violence reporting in KwaZulu-
Natal. 
2. The importance of this study for South Africa and for KwaZulu-
Natal 
Two features of KwaZulu-Natal's political history over the past decade make this 
study important, over and above the contribution which it will make to the literature 
on the subject. The first is the extreme violence which is ongoing, and which has 
surpassed levels in any other area of the country. This is reflected in the statistics: 
from 1985 to JloIR9 1 ggS, 12 053 death L More people 
died here than in the entire remainder of the country, where 11 220 people have 
died in violent conflict over this decade (Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project 
and Race Relations Surveys). 
Politic~1 developments in the country since the first democratic election in 1994 
have not solved the violent political conflict in this province. Indeed, tensions 
between leading parties seem to have become worse. These developments will 
briefly be outlined below. 
The second feature of the province's recent history which makes this study 
important and which was not restricted to KwaZulu-Natal, was the implementation 
of the States of Emergency and other laws restricting the media and especially the 
6 
reporting on violence during the 1980s. These laws were in place for five of the ten 
years during which violence has continued in KwaZulu-Natal, and it is the effects of 
these restrictions which are important for this study. , 
Conflict, in the form of both peaceful and violent collective action, characterised the 
past four decades of apartheid in South Africa, and has continued since the first 
democratic election in 1994. The conflict has been dynamic, changing in nature 
over time. 
Three phases in the recent history of the country can be distinguished: the 
opposition to apartheid phase from the mid-1970s to the beginning of 1990, the 
transformation phase from 1990 to April 1994, and the consolidation phase from 
April 1994 to the present. Throughout each of these phases, conflict in KwaZulu-
Natal has continued, with its own intensity and distinctive characteristics. In the 
next section, a very brief sketch will be given of the salient features of each phase. 
i) The opposition to apartheid phase 
During the opposition to apartheid phase, both violent and peaceful protest actions, 
undertaken for the most part by black people, were directed against the 
government and its agencies, particularly the security forces. In 1983 the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) was formed, uniting hundreds of community organisations 
and trade unions opposed to the government and the proposed Tricameral 
Parliament. Tensions boiled over in 1984 when the 'government instituted the 
Tricameral Parliament, which attempted to coopt the coloured and Indian 
population into accepting a secondary role in government, to the exclusion of the 
African community. 
A wave of protest and violence ensued, fuelled by the African National Congress's 
(ANC's) (then in exile) strategies to destroy apartheid through rendering black 
communities ungovernable. This was to be done by targeting people labelled 
'collaborators' (such as black town councillors and pOlicemen). The youth also 
7 
played an important role by disrupting education in' black schools as part of the 
liberation strategy. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, this collective action had repercussions quite different from 
those experienced in the rest of the country. Conflict here was more extensive and 
more violent. From 1985 to the end of 1989, 3 212 people lost their lives in this 
province alone, compared with 2 871 fatalities in the rest of the country during the 
same period (Race Relations Survey, 1990/1; Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal 
project). This conflict also occurred mostly ~etween black political groups rather 
than between liberation groups and government forces.4 Jhis was lar el due 0 
the existence t the ti ELol.Jnkat~ the str n , sin Ie rulin~er 
Kwa ulu homeland. There is much disagreement about both the role of Inkatha 
and the UDF in KwaZulu-Natal during this time. 
Inkatha maintained that its non-violent anti-apartheid strategy clashed with that of 
the UDF: who wanted to destroy all alternative black parties in the liberation 
that I atha collaborated wit the 
at~~ sought com lete control 
"over tt!: pro~JLouw, 1995). These antagonisms unleashed cycles of violence 
which increased steadily from 1986 to 1990, while in other areas of the country, 
violent coll~ctive action subsided. 
\,,~~' 
~\.e.Il." t.. ;.~ , - ~ 'A """-
. ~~ 'OA(!,b or ",I"W 
The government responded to this collective action by unleashing severe 
repression in the form of a nationwide State of Emergency in 1985 which continued 
until 1990. The subsequent measures were far reaching, brutal and seemingly 
effective outside of KwaZulu-Natal, as death tolls dropped from 1 352 in 1986 to 
706 in 1987. In KwaZulu-Na"tal, however, events were characteristically different. 
Here the violence claimed more rather than less victims over this period, with 
fatalities increasing from 171 in 1986 to 644 one year later (Race Relations Survey, 
1990/1; Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project). 
4. It has, however,. since been proved that there were links between the government at the 
time a~d Inkatha, In th~ form of paramilitary training and finance. These joint activities 
were aimed at destrOYing the United Democratic Front (UDF) and other ANC affiliates in 
the province. 
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For the purposes of this study, however, the restrictions on the flow of information 
are important. The media and those concerned about the conflict had to rely on the 
limited and biased police Unrest Reports issued by the government's Bureau for 
Information. Through these reports, the government controlled the definition, 
~ 
recording and dissemination of all information relating to political conflict. 
Newspapers were forced to reduce violence coverage, journalists were harassed, 
newspapers and reporters were forced to register for official records, and 
information was centralised by promoting an official 'news culture' and monitoring 
media coverage (Tomaselli, 1988). During this time, and as a result of the severe 
restrictions on news about the conflict, monitoring agencies were formed in 
KwaZulu-Natal - the province where violence levels were most serious. 
ii) The transformation phase 
The transformation phase began in 1990 when, in February of that year, political 
parties such as the ANC were unbanned .. and Nelson Mandela was released from 
prison. The State of Emergency was lifted, although not in KwaZulu-Natal until 
October that year, because violence levels were severe in that province. The 
launch of the political transition process in 1990 and the prospects of a democratic 
election unleashed a violent competition for support between the main contenders 
for the vote of black South Africans - Inkatha and the ANC. During this phase, the 
death toll in KwaZulu-Natal increased even further. 
Clashes between Inkatha and ANC supporting groups continued unabated in 
KwaZulu-Natal. In mid-1990 this conflict spread to the Gauteng region, where 
violence claimed hundreds of lives between 1990 and 1994. This despite the 
Signing of the National Peace Accord between the major political parties in 
September 1991. More people lost their lives in violent conflict in these two regions 
during this period than during any other comparable time period in the country's 
history. Over 7 000 people died in KwaZulu-Natal from the beginning of 1990 to 
April 1994. Fractionally fewer lives were lost in the rest of the country, bringing the 
9 
country's death toll to 14 511 over this period (Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal 
project; Human Rights Committee). 
While supporters clashed on the ground, antagonism between political leaders 
flared throughout the complex process which began in December 1991 , of drawing 
up an interim constitution and preparing for the first election. The mistrust between 
the National Party (NP) government and the ANC reached breaking point when the 
ANC withdrew from the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in June 
1992 in protest against a massacre in BOipatong township, alleging that the police 
were involved. 
n effort to restart 
claimin the agreement secured the interests of the two parties concerned only. 
The ongoing violence in KwaZulu-Natal added to tensions and was a. constant 
source of hostitity between the IFP and the ANC. 
Constitutional talks resumed in March 1993, but the gains that were made since 
the l;>reakdown in June the previous year were dealt a blow after the date for the 
election was eventually set. Delegations from the Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
KwaZulu homeland governments, along with the Conservative Party and the IFP 
who had expressed their dissatisfaction with Codesa in 1992, left the process for 
the last time. Proceedings continued without these parties, and the Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC), which would govern the country until the new 
government took over, was proclaimed in November 1993. The exclusion of certain 
parties from the TEC was to become a source of tension. 
The transformation phase and the violence associated with it, created a climate of 
uncertainty and suspicion, in which propaganda and rumour mongering flourished. 
The increased politicisation of violent conflict was fuelled by lea.ders of political 
organisations making allegations and inflammatory statements about their rivals in 
public. This is reflected in a Goldstone CommiSSion of Inquiry into Public Violence 
and Intimidation report on violence in the East Rand in 1991 and early 1992, which 
10 
stated that: "At least some of the rumour is deliberately initiated as part of the 
power struggle and as a cover or to raise the level of suspicion and hence of 
polarisation ... " (Pereira, 1993a).5 
Although restrictions on the media no longer existed, the complexity and extent of 
the violence during this period made accurate repo'rting of the conflict difficult.6 
Reporters were no longer harassed by security forces, but increasingly, members 
of civil society and especially political party supporters threatened and attacked 
journalists. Witnesses of violence were silenced by the fear, intimidation and 
despair associated with years of violence. 
At another level, newspapers increasingly turned their attention away from violence 
to cover other important political events in the country. As a result of these 
developments, information about violence was not always considered reliable and 
comprehensive. This is Significant, since the intense violence of this period became 
a threat to national peace and development and was recognised as one of the 
country's most pressing problems. 
iii) The consolidation phase 
The final phase of consolidation began with the first democratic election in April 
1994. The months prior to the election were very tense. The IFP boycotted the 
process until eight days before the due date. At the last moment the party joined 
after laying .down sever~1 conditions which were agreed upon by the ANC and 
National Party. Other homeland governments and right-wing political parties also 
rejected the transformation process. 
5 The Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation became 
known simply as the Goldstone Commission. 
6 ~he complexity o~ the violence is illustrated by the various and overlapping explanations 
which have been given for the KwaZulu-Natal conflict. See Aitchison (1991), Louwand 
Bekker (1992), Ben (1990, 1993), Booth (1988), Kentridge (1990), Olivier (1992). and Zulu 
and Stavrou (1990). 
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In Bophuthatswana, the resistance of the homeland government to reincorporation 
with South Africa culminated in anti-government riots a month before the election. 
The 'assistance' provided to the homeland government by its right-wing allies 
escalated the violence, and the TEC eventually had to stabilise the situation by 
ousting President Mangope. The TEC's actions fuelled tensions in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The homeland government, which was still outside the process at that stage, 
threatened to resist any similar actions in KwaZulu. 
The election nevertheless proceeded remarkably peacefully .and successfully under 
the circumstances, with the ANC winning the vast majority of national votes. 
Tensions between political parties were diffused to the extent that violence levels 
decreased dramatically in the Gauteng region. In KwaZulu-Natal however, violence 
decreased less dramatically. However, the death toll did come down from the peak 
it had reached before the election. 
The IFP's election victory in KwaZulu-Natal did not, however, reduce conflict 
between that party and the ANC. At leadership level in fact, tensions have 
escalated since the election, fuelled by continuing violent clashes between 
supporters (Louw, 1995). The political situation in KwaZulu-Natal is the most 
tenuous of any province in the country, and this instability coupled with the 
potential for renewed, large scale violence, threatens the security of the whole 
country. 
The next major challenge in this consolidation phase will be the local government 
elections. In most parts of the country these took place in November 1995. In 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape provinces however, elections have been 
postponed due to political conflicts which have frustrated the process of drawing 
council boundaries. The local elections in KwaZulu-Natal may also be jeopardised 
by the IFP's threats to withdraw from the Government of National Unity if the 
conditions in terms of which they agreed to participate in the 1994 general election 
are not met as promised. 
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The greatest threat to future elections in this province, however, remains the high 
levels of intimidation and violence. Although fewer people are dying than before 
1994, political intolerance is rife and there is little freedom of speech, movement 
and association for many people in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Extensive progress has been made during the consolidation phase with the 
drawing up of the Interim Constitution and the Bill of Rights. But violent political 
conflict still threatens the country's economy, its prospects for development and. 
reconciliation and thus its security. These conditions must be addressed if South 
Africa's new democracy is to survive. The fact that sentiments expressed by 
Graham in 1990 are still applicable, shows that progress has been slow in regard 
to ending violence: 
"The rebuilding of a civil society with a growing economy and a respect for 
the institutions of democracy such as the rule of law, a free press, the right 
to associate and move freely, and the fundamental right to life - are 
dependent not only on managing the violence but on ending it and creating 
. the conditions under which its recurrence is not possible" (Graham, 1990: 
2). 
South Africa's transition to democracy has been, and may continue to b~ retarded 
by violence. KwaZulu-Natal has been the most troubled province in the country, 
and tensions between the ANC and IFP mounted throughout the three phases 
outlined above. Finding long term solutions is crucial. This requires an 
understanding of the problem,. which in turn depends on a good supply of reliable 
public information. 
Freedom of speech and information are essential for any democracy to succeed. 
Information enables the public to make informed decisions in their own best 
interests, and to monitor abuses of power by the state and other institutions in 
positions of power. Among other things, it thus enables the resolution of conflicts in 
a peaceful manner, which this discussion has showed is much needed in this 
country. The media is one of the central mechanisms for distributing information. 
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Steyn (1989: 6) makes this point well: "The three recognised pillars of a modern 
democracy are the executive, the legislature (Parliament, Congress) and the 
courts. To these must be added the fourth estate, the media. The media's 
traditional role is that of public informant and watch-dog over abuses of power in 
the other three estates". 
The role of the media, and other sources of public information about conflict, like 
the monitoring agencies and the police Unrest Reports, are therefore crucial. By 
examining these sources, this study will contribute towards these debates about 
their effectiveness. These sources and the criticisms which have been made of 
their reporting will be introduced here. It is after all, these very problems which 
inspired this study and illustrate its relevance in the South African context. 
3. The sources of violence reporting in KwaZulu-Natal 
i) The press 
The comments in this section apply to the daily English language newspapers 
published in KwaZulu-Natal, namely The Natal Witness, The Mercury and 12.aiI¥ 
News. 
These 'newspapers have made a valuable contribution to enabling communication 
between citizens, but they have been criticised for the way in which they report 
yiolence. The main criticisms cover four broad areas, namely: reporting bias, poor 
coverage of the extent of the violence, poor coverage , of the context and 'details of 
the violence, and the reporting of rumours about the conflict. 
Bias here refers to both the unbalanced coverage of white and black politics as 
well as the way in which the press reflected the political groups involved in the 
conflict. The press has been accused of not taking the conflict seriously enough to 
14 
warrant more staff and larger budgets to cover the subject consistently and 
extensively (Association of Democratic Journalists press release, 1990). It has 
been argued that these problems stem not only from restrictions imposed by the 
government, but also from the ideological stance and priorities of the newspaper 
owners and editors. 
Accusations of political bias include the criticisms by leaders of both the ANC, and 
its affiliates, and of Inkatha. The Association of Democratic Journalists (ADJ) 
alleged that the Daily News and The Mercyry were partisan in their favourable 
reporting of Inkatha and its leader in the 1980s, since they portrayed Minister 
Buthelezi as a moderate Christian leader (ADJ press release, 1990). 
The extra-parliamentary groups had always struggled to ensure that their role and 
their views of the conflict were accurately published in the press. This was partly 
due to th~ Emergency regulations but also, according to the ADJ, due to the 
political bias of the white owned commercial press which, until 1990, had 
effectively ignored the ANC aligned UDF and Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (Cosatu). 
The KwaZulu-Natal press was always accused of apportioning equal amounts of 
blame to each side in the conflict. In 1990, that changed as the ANC alliance 
began to attain the political high ground (Emdon, 1990). Simultaneously, the 
perceived dwindling political support of the IFP, reports of political intolerance in 
former KwaZulu, links with security forces and a determination to remain at centre 
stage in national politics, damaged the IFP's credibility (Bell, 1990). 
Gavin Woods, then director of the Inkatha Institute, claimed the whole press had 
become anti-Inkatha and that the monitoring groups which supplied information to 
the press were "all inside the ANC-UDF-COSATU camp" (Emdon, 1991: 193). 
Inkatha also contended that the monitors used the press to deliberately destroy the 
credibility of the IFP, by labelling Inkatha a "violent organisation" and portraying 
Buthelezi as a "megalomaniac directing the campaign of violence" (Smith, 1991). 
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Coverage of the extent of the violence 
Studies have shown that coverage varies, but that generally the conflict has not 
been fully reported by the press. An ADJ study (press release, 1990) and an 
analysis of the KwaZulu-Natai newspapers by Emdon (1991) showed that the 
Sunday Tribune, The Post and The Natal Witness published more complete, 
informed reports than other provincial newspapers. 
The ADJ accused the KwaZulu-Natai press of failing to adequately report the 
region's conflict (AOJ press release, 1990). Some journalists estimated that over 
the past few years about 60% of what was happening in the country (not only 
violence) did not reach the press (Executive summary, SAIRR, 1991). 
Coverage of the context of the violence 
The most common criticism of the press has been that reports often failed to 
publish details about incidents, let alone . their causes. The lack of investigative 
reporting and a concomitant reliance on press statements and the simplistic, 
politically charged South African Police (SAP) Unrest Reports was a major part of 
the problem. Critics claimed that investigative journalism was not undertaken by 
the press and that too much reliance was placed on statements issued by police 
and political parties (ADJ press release, 1990; Emdon, 1991; Mkhize, 1990). 
This was aggravated by the use of simplistic and often misleading terms like 'black-
on-black' violence. Many agreed that this description depoliticised conflict, reducing 
it to faction fighting (Emdon, 1991; Mkhize, 1990; Fair and Astroff, 1991). 
According to Mkhize (1990), even in 1990, when the State of Emergency was 
lifted, the commercial media increasingly reported conflict in terms of race and 
ethnicity. 
The SAP used terms like 'cultural weapons' which were uncritically adopted by the 
press. The SAP eventually stopped using such categories, but the newspapers still 
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carried headlines and reports about 'Zulus', 'impis' and 'kraals' in mid-1994. This 
stereotyping meant that the press failed to cover elements of the conflict like forced 
recruitment drives and the attitudes of rebellious UDF aligned youths (Emdon, 
1991). Most newspapers also ignored the role of the security forces in general 
(ADJ press release, 1990). 
The press effectively reduced an ongoing conflict to a series of unrelated incidents 
based on information from police. In doing so, the newspapers also failed to deal 
with ambiguities and contradictions in the conflict, settling instead for simplified 
explanations aimed at allaying the fears of readers (ADJ press release, 1990). 
The effects of the conflict were also not well covered, which further obscured the 
seriousness of violence in the region. The psychological and economic effects, the 
fate of ~he school going youth, the collapse of the legal system with the loss of faith 
in security forces and the court process, and the countless refugees left stranded 
by the ongoing · conflict have been neglected (Emdon, 1991 ; ADJ press release, 
1990). 
Publishing rumours 
When allegations about the causes of the violence are made and political battles 
are fought through the media, the facts are often uncovered too late if at all. 
According to Pereira (1993b), the allocation of culpability is often levelled before 
investigations occur. These may be inaccurate and if the rumours which result 
receive wide coverage, they can be accepted as fact and provoke tension and . 
violence. 
A Goldstone Commission report about violence near Mooi River in December 1991 
between ANC and Inkatha supporters stated that "inaccurate and unchecked 
information and rumours were disseminated by both ANC and IFP spokespersons. 
This was regularly reported in the newspapers. The commission recommends that 
political and other organisations take cognisance that inaccurate reports of violence 
in themselves frequently result in an escalation of violence" (Pereira, 1993a). 
ii) The monitoring agencies 
The monitoring agencies were created in the mid-1980s by academics, church 
people and political representatives in response to the soaring violence and the 
lack of public information about the emergent crisis. The monitors rely on various 
sources for information such as newspapers, police Unrest Reports, accounts from 
witnesses and victims of political violence and their relatives, reports from 
organisations and individuals such as lawyers, trade unionists, clergy and political 
activists, research publications, and affidavits. 
The four monitoring agencies which Tomaselli (1988) surveyed believed their data 
was much more representative than that published by official sources. The 
monitors' concentration on violence and their interventionist strategies suggest that 
their data may be more detailed and comprehensive than that of the press. 
Monitors are in the unique position to obtain first hand accounts of violence from 
victims and witnesses through established contacts and relationships of trust 
(Tomaselli, 1988). 
Monitors have, however, been criticised. The major criticism is that they are biased 
towards particular political organisations. In 1991 a workshop on monitoring and 
research into political violence was convened as a result of "a concern about the 
antagonism and perception of bias between various research/monitoring 
groupings. An investigation conducted among seven Natal groupings towards the 
end of 1990 confirmed a polarisation along ideological lines" (Report, 1991: 2). 
The most ardent criticism of monitoring agencies have been made by the IFP, who 
for example, labelled a report by the Natal Monitor as "nothing less than an 
attempt to give credence to ANC strategies and propaganda in NataVKwaZulu" 
(Hodgson, 1992). Inkatha has always been at odds with monitoring agencies which 
were largely aligned to the liberation movements before 1990. The effects of these 
perceptions are important. 
1R 
The origins of many monitoring agencies link them to particular political positions, 
and while some have evolved away from these over the years, their networks in 
communities and their reputations have, to a large extent, remained. While funding 
of these agencies can impact on their political direction, the IFP believed the 
compOSition of management boards, where these exist, has had a greater impact 
on bias. 
The IFP have drawn attention on many occasions to the ANC alignment of 
monitors' boards (Smith, 1992). Ironically, the chairman of the Inkatha Institute 
research centre's board of management was Chief Minister Buthelezi, leader of the 
IFP. These factors have important implications for the type of information which 
reaches the public, decision makers and researchers. 
iii) Official government sources 
In South Africa, official sources of .conflict information have not been considered 
reliable and usually provide fewer incidents of violence, or less detail about events, 
than do the press and monitors. In addition, obtaining police Unrest Reports for 
research purposes was difficult until 1994, ~nd efforts to gain access to other 
documentation from the police have been fruitless.7 For these reasons, 
government sources are not part of this study. Some brief comments will illustrate 
these problems. 
During the States of Emergency, the government provided information on violence 
through the Bureau for Information and police Unrest Reports. The Bureau was 
established in 1985 to liaise with the media and maintain the Directorates of 
7 Researchers from the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project made several 
unsuccessful attempts, as have colleagues at the HSRC's Centre for Socio-Political 
Analysis. Access seems to have been denied to most of the organisations and individuals 
comprising the network established by these projects. Since the election of a new 
government in April 1994, however, the situation has changed. Police information is now 
easier to obtain. The freedom of information clause in the Interim Constitution should also 
ensure better access to official sources of information. 
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Research and Publications. The aims of the Bureau were to monitor the national 
States of Emergency, undertake research and disseminate information. Despite 
these aims, very little was passed on to the public, and the publications were found 
to be poor sources of information (Tomaselli, 1988). 
The Unrest Reports were disseminated from the first State of Emergency in 1985 
by the Bureau for Information. From May 1987, the Police Division of Public 
Relations provided the reports, syndicated through the South African Press 
Association (SAPA) until 1993 when the reports were no longer produced. The 
problems which these reports presented for those monitoring and researching 
violence were that they provided very I.ittle detail about events, they were often 
obscure, and were found to be inaccurate when compared with eye-witness reports 
(Tomaselli, 1988). 
A typical example of an official Unrest Report published in the press reads as 
follows: 
"A woman burned to death and another person was seriously injured when 
their house was petrol-bombed at ImbaJi in the Pietermaritzburg area 
yesterday. According to the daily police Unrest Report, a group of blacks 
attacked the house and then hurled petrol-bombs" (Dailv News, 25 March 
1989). 
The Unrest Reports were also phrased to obscure any compassion by readers. 
'Boys' or 'children', for exampl~, were rarely reported as victims - rather they were 
described as 'men' or 'people' (Mkhize, 1990). The shortfalls of the Unrest Reports 
were more pronounced with regard to events in which deaths and serious injuries 
did not occur. In September 1987, The Natal Witness published a comment by a 
police spokesman in this regard: "We obviously do not report on every stone 
throwing because we do not want to give these people unnecessary publicity. We 
simply say it was between groups or factions." 
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The Unrest Reports also underreported fatalities, and in 1987 the Minister of Law 
and Order actually refused to provide statistics on deaths and injuries. These 
problems stemmed from the fact that data disseminated by official sources during 
the Emergency years in particular, was carefully screened to fit the state's 
constructed "narrative of unrest" and was therefore not impartial (Tomaselli, 1988). 
The information provided by the former SAP and Bureau for Information during the 
States of Emergency impacted greatly on the way in which the press reported 
violence. The restrictions on the flow of information meant that these official 
sources were the only sources during this period. The same did not apply for the 
monitoring agencies, which were formed largely to deal with this channelling of 
selected information by the government. The press currently relies extensively on 
information from the police as do some of the monitors. Police reports are now less 
politically charged, and provide more details such as the names and ages of 
victims. 
This discussion shows that the reporting of violence in KwaZulu-Natal by the press 
in particular, has been constrained by the political history and dynamics of the time . . 
This makes it especially important that researchers using the press assess this 
source in order to better understand the reporting biases which may exist, as well 
as whether any information has been overlooked. 
This study is a preliminary investigation into a field which is not well researched in 
South Africa. The findings can therefore only be described as tentative, and will 
hopefully suggest directions for further research. The study will be structured in the 
following way. 
4. Thesis outline 
Chapter Two extends the discussion of the 'statement of the problem' as outlined 
in Chapter One. It examines in more depth why information and freedom of speech 
are important for democracy, arguing that these are vital for democracies of all 
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kinds. In discussing the various models of democracy, this chapter also shows the 
congruence between the various theories of the media and the models of 
democracy. Chapter Two confirms the importance of this study, particularly for 
South Africa which faces the challenge of sustaining its new democracy. 
Chapter Three discusses the methodology for this study. This thesis is based on 
the use of two types of data. The first source of data is interviews conducted with 
journalists and editors of KwaZulu-Natal daily newspapers and with the staff of 
selected monitoring agencies. This data provided vital contextual information about 
how these sources operate, the constraints they face in reporting violence and their 
response to the criticisms of their violence reporting. 
The s~cond source of information for this study is the empirical data on violence 
drawn from the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project, located at the Cel1tre for 
Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal. This chapter includes a 
full account of the methodology employed by this project. This chapter outlines 
how, using this empirical data, the reporting patterns of newspapers and monitoring 
agencies will be compared in order to determine whether the factors outline in the 
hypothesis affected the probability that violence would be reported by the press. 
The findings of the international research which contributed to the formulation of 
the hypothesis will also be outlined in this chapter. 
Chapter Fo~r presents the results of the interviews with the newspaper reporters 
and editors. Their opinions are contextualised within a more detailed discussion of 
the restrictions on press reporting of violence as outlined in this, the first chapter. 
Chapter Four concludes with some comments about the validity of the criticisms of 
press reporting of violence, based on the interview results. 
Chapter Five discusses the results of the interviews" with the monitoring agencies. 
There is very little secondary information available about the violence monitoring 
process. "For this reason; the interview results form the basis of this chapter's 
discussion on the origins, fl:lnctioning, constraints and criticisms of these agencies' 
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activities. This chapter also includes concluding comments about the monitors' role 
as disseminators of violence information. 
Chapter Six reports the findings of the statistical analyses which compare 
reporting patterns of the newspapers and monitoring agencies. This chapter is 
central to this thesis, as it provides important empirical evidence for assessing how 
the press has fared in terms of reporting violence. 
Chapter Seven concludes the study. In this chapter, the aims of the study are 
revisited. The chapter then reports the most important findings of the analyses of 
reporting trends discussed in Chapter Six. The suitability of the press for 
quantitative violent conflict research is also discussed, as are the implications of 
this study's findings for future research. These latter discussions draw on the 
information gathered in the interviews with journalists and monitoring agency staff, 
which were discussed in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESS 
1. Aims of this chapter 
The discussion in the first chapter pointed out why this study is relevant. One 
aspect of this was that freedom of speech and information are essential for 
democracy. The aim of this chapter is to deepen that argument through a brief 
discussion of democratic theory. 
The relationship between free speech and democracy is widely recognised as 
important, but the ways in which it "is so are not obvious. This relationship is 
important for this study which is largely motivated by questions about the way in 
which the press reports violence, and the impact this has for South Africa's 
fledgling democracy. Violence is a problem which affects many ordinary people 
and government, and has the potential to derail this country's new democracy. A 
free flow of information about violent conflict is therefore vital. 
Free speech has two functions in a democracy. The first is to provide individuals 
with self-expression, autonomy and avenues for communication. The second is to 
enable participation in governing procedures through various mechanisms, most 
importantly, the media. 
Through a vigorous exchange of ideas and the pursuit of truth, government is 
made accountable to the electorate who are placed in a position to monitor its 
performance and to guard against abuses of power. Information enables the public 
to make informed decisions in their own best interests and to monitor abuses of 
power. Among other things, this facilitates the peaceful resolution of violent conflict 
- the lack of which has been the primary motivation for this study. 
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The media, such as newspapers, radio or television, is the main vehicle for 
communicating information among citizens, and between citizens and government, 
and is therefore essential for democracy. But the manner in which the media, and 
in this case the press, fulfils this task is critical. One feature of this critical role was 
discussed in Chapter One. Studying the press is, therefore, important not only to 
understand particular reporting tendencies, as is the case here with violence 
reporting, but also because the press has a responsibility towards democracy. 
The oint of this chaRter is to illustrate why -.!!:,eedom of speech and freedom of tb~ 
press are. impoltant f demooracy. This will be done by briefly discussing the 
\·~arious models of democracy, t~ implications of each for the press, l nd why 
freedom of speech is important in each. Several debates about the way the media 
works which can be linked to the debates about democracy, will also be discussed. 
It is important to stress at the outset that this study is not about which models of 
democracy are better than others. This study also does not intend to debate which 
models of democracy the media could make the best contribution towards. It is 
thus not the intention of this chapter to provide a comprehensive discussion of 
models of democracy or theories of the media. 
Instead, the aim of this chapter is to show that, despite major differences, theorists 
supporting the various models of democracy stress the importance of freedom of 
speech. Since the press is one of the most important vehicles for enabling free 
speech, its role is vital. Tha heorie of democracy can differ as much as they do, 
yet still regard freedom of speech as paramount, illustrates just how important the 
press is for democracy. 
2. Introduction 
Th~mod~ls of d~mocracy are many and _varied. For the purposes of this chapter, 
the models are distinguished i main categories. The first category consists , .. 
of those theorists advocating the liberal representative models. These argue that 
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democracy is achieved when citizens participate in periodic elections for leaders 
from an elite group. The winners then govern on behalf of their electorates. The 
second category consists of the ~particiPative models of democracy, whose 
supporters believe that good government depends on direct participation by the 
people in the affairs of government, rather than participation through periodic 
elections for leaders. 
These two c~tenhave b~en chosen because the~ represent th~ ~ai~ divisi~n 
in democratic ~ that IS between re resen Ion and artici atlSto This 
distinction is important for the present study, because despite their substantial 
differences, theorists of contrasting models acknowledge that a decrease in 
participation increases the need for free speech and communication, and thus for a 
free press. 
As the various models of democracy are outlined in this chapter, this inverse 
relationship between participation on the one hand, and the need for freedom of 
the press on the other, will be pointed out. 
Given the links between democracy and the media, it is perhaps inevitable that 
there should be similarities in the debates between -the models of democracy on 
the one hand, and debates about the media on the other. The media debates 
consider whether the press is a competent vehicle for delivering freedom of speech 
in the pursuit of democracy. Assuming that it is in principle, further questions arise 
about the proper relationship between the press and the government of the day. 
Theorists differ about which models of democracy are preferable, and thus about 
the nature of the government of the day. Debates about the relationship between 
the press and the government will therefore be shaped by the type of democracy 
which characterises the government in question. 
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3. Models of democracy 
\ I 
One definition of democracy is 'rule by the peo Ie' which suggests that people 
participate in the governing of their lives. The nature and extent of this governance 
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has been debated. Another definition of democracy is rule by elected leaders who -
represent the people. Held (1987) contends that these different positions derive 
partly from fundamental philosophical differences between theorists of democracy . 
For some, democracy should be a whole way of life. For others, it is simply a 
system of governing which best protects individual rights. 
Before discussing the liberal representative and participative models, Athenian 
democracy will be introduced. The political system of ancient Athens does not fit 
exclusively into one of the two categories which will be discussed, since it is widely 
believed to be the type of government upon which later models of democracy were 
based. For this reason, it is discussed separately, before the other-models. 
i) Athenian democracy 
The Athenian city state is important not only because it shows the · special 
conditions under which the concept of democracy began, but also because some 
theorists refer to democracy 'as a way of life', and in doing so, aspire to the values 
presented by democracy in this, its most original form. 
Democracy in Athens was centred on citizens' commitment to sustaining the 
'common good'. To be a citizen was to participate directly in the functioning of the 
state. The individual was not important, and was defined in terms of the 
community, unlike later models of liberal democracy which define the community in 
terms of the individual (Parekh, 1993). Democracy was thus an end in itself - a way 
of life rather than just a system of good government. 1 
1 Athenian d~~ocracy ~~s not .without its flaws. Certain features of the Athenian city state 
such as restnctlons of citizenship to exclude foreigners, women and slaves and the 
existence of the slave economy, facilitated this kind of democracy. ' 
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In terms of the implications for the press in this type of democracy, the fact that 
there was no separation between the state and civil society, no universal claims to 
human rights, and that there was direct participation in governing, meant there was 
little need for a press which could function as communicator between the 
government and citizens. 
ii) Liberal representative democracy 
Republican and early representative models 
Like Athenian democracy, citizenship in these early models involved participation in 
public affairs (Held, 1993). These models are distinct from Athenian democracy, 
however, in that participation was not advocated for its own sake. It was 
understood as a means for dealing with a more fundamental problem. Many 
Republican theorists were worried that leaders, or the majority of citizens, could 
become corrupt. Good government thus became the vital requirement for achieving 
the "good state", rather than just the participation of all citizens in the political 
process (Held, 1987). 
Fear of 'the many' characterised the Republican model, and participation was 
consequently limited to choosing leaders. Later proponents of the early 
representative model were motivated more by a fear of 'the few' (that is, the 
leaders). These concerns led to the separation of government powers into the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches, and the separation of state and 
ordinary citizens, or civil society (Dahl, 1989). 
Within this tradition, government came to be seen as a potential threat to 
individuals. This gave rise to ideas about individual rights, freedom and autonomy. 
Citizenship now meant that people not only had responsibilities to government, but 
rights, powers and liberties as well, which could be exercised against the 
government (Held, 1987). Locke, writing in the Seventeenth Century, pioneered 
these concepts, laying the foundations for liberalism. 
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Representative democracy was essentially a mechanism to protect individual 
rights, and the doctrine of liberalism played an important role in defining this model. 
Beetham (1993) points out that certain assumptions of liberalism, such as freedom 
of expression, movement, and association are vital for democracy in the nation-
states of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. 
In the subsequent development of the liberal tradition, the notion of equality came 
to prominence. The development of the international free market economy based 
on private ownership of property and free enterprise, resulted in inequalities of 
wealth between people. Theorists of the early representative models of democracy 
like Madison, Bentham and James Mill, believed that conflicts during this time were 
related to this unequal distribution of property. Democracy, these theorists 
believed, could keep this conflict under control by ensuring that government was 
accountable to all - both wealthy and poor - through the ballot (Held, 1987). It 
provided a mechanism for some measure of redistribution in order to alleviate the 
effects of inequality. 
The implications of these models for the press must be considered. Republican 
and early representative models of democracy represented theorists' first calls for 
limited participation in government by ordinary citizens. As participation decreased, 
the need to find ways to keep people informed and aware of government's 
activities, increased. The press's role in facilitating this communication was 
important. These models also marked the separation of the state and civil society 
and the development of liberalism. Freedom of information is one of the central 
aspects of liberalism, without which people cannot exercise their rights. The role of 
the press in providing information is crucial. The press was, therefore, already 
important for the early models of representative democracy. 
Contemporaey liberal representative models 
As liberal representative models of democracy evolved, tensions developed as 
theorists tried to balance democracy, liberalism and equality. The realities of 
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modern political behaviour meant that participation in government - which is the 
essence of democracy - was limited to the choice of leaders from elite sectors of 
society. The rights of individuals enshrined by liberalism meant that, legally, 
citizens had power over government. But this power was diminished by the 
inequalities of the market economy, which could potentially hamper poorer people's 
attempts to exercise their rights and freedoms. Although all citizens could vote, 
they were restricted in their ability to exercise their rights which were essential to 
make their votes meaningful. In essence, therefore, their participation in 
government was limited. 
Schumpeter, whose theory has been highly influential in democratic thought since 
World War Two, sought a model which took .these realities of modern democracies 
into consideration. He, like Weber before him, believed that the intellectual 
capacities of the average citizens were poor, and their interest in politics limited 
(Held, 1987). Schumpeter was consequently against the idea of increased 
participation by the average citizen, since this could upset the stability of the 
political system (Pateman, 1970). He believed that increased participation would 
result in irrational mass action. 
This represents a shift from writers sharing the liberal tradition. Locke believed 
people are free and equal because they are capable of reason. J. S. Mill believed 
that representative government was important not only for the protection of liberty, 
but also as a means of insuring rational policy. He had faith in the intellectual 
abilities of citizens, which he believed democracy would enhance. Liberalism on 
this view is fundamentally anti-paternalistic (Beetham, 1993). Schumpeter did not 
share these views, basing his opinions on empirical observations of Western 
countries. 
Democracy for Schumpeter was a method for making political decisions. 
Democratic participation was confined to the right to choose leaders from an elite 
group by means of elections. This required a "considerable amount of freedom of 
discussion for all", which meant both freedom of speech and of the press (Held, 
1987: 177). The implications of Schumpeter's democracy for the press are similar 
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to other models of democracy in which participation was limited. Although 
Schumpeter preferred as little public participation in governing as possible, the task 
of choosing the best leaders required that the public be informed. The press could 
playa central role in this regard. 
Another important point relating to the press which this chapter seeks to point out, 
is that as theories of democracy were debated, from the Republican and early 
representative models, to the contemporary models such as that proposed by 
Schumpeter, advocates increasingly called for less participation in government by 
ordinary people. And, as citizens were removed further from the business of 
governing, so more reliance is placed On the press as a means for citizens to exert 
some influence over how their lives are governed. 
Pluralism and Neo-Pluralism 
The pluralist model differs substantially from the previous models, in that pluralists 
believed that organised interest groups, rather than individuals or elites, played the 
most important role in the democratic process. These interest groups made up 
many centres of power which competed regularly for the electorate's vote. This, 
pluralists believed, would inhibit the development of powerful factions and an 
unresponsive government. Despite the differences between this model and 
previous models, Schumpeter's influence is nevertheless evident, in that pluralists 
like Dahl and Truman agreed that democracy is a method for selecting leaders 
from an elite who are better able to run the country than the apathetic and ignorant 
electorate (Held, 1987). 
One difficulty with classical pluralism is that theorists did not deal with the problem 
of equality in democracy. As noted earlier, tensions developed as liberal theorists 
tried to balance the requirements of democracy, equality and liberty. Pluralists did 
not pay attention to the possibility that certain interest groups might not have had 
access to the resources with which to compete effectively. Dahl and other pluralists 
accepted the criticisms that modern "corporate capitalism" produces social and 
economic inequalities which severely limit political equality, and thus . the 
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democratic process (Held, 1987: 202). All interest groups might not, therefore, 
have equal influence over ·government. Also, with the links between governments 
and the private sector, the state could not be regarded as a neutral arbiter among 
all interests. 
The neo-pluralist model was developed in response to these criticisms. The central 
issue for neo-pluralists was that up to this point, most theorists of liberal 
representative democracy had envisaged the democratic process as a means for 
protecting the interests of citizens and providing stability. Dahl, an advocate of neo-
pluralism, emphasised the need for political equality in this process. He expanded 
the notion of the democratic process to include several criteria which, if satisfied, 
would provide more equality. These criteria included effective participation, voting 
equality and the inclusion of practically all adults (Dahl, 1989). The most important 
criterion in the process, for the purposes of this discussion, was enlightened 
understanding. This required that people be educated and informed enough to 
make the best decision when voting. The role of the press for communication and 
for educating the public was, therefore, considered vital by' neo-pluralists (Dahl, 
1989). 
The implications for the press in the pluralist and neo-pluralist models are far 
reaching. Although the pluralist conception of democracy differs markedly from 
previous representative models, this does not diminish the important contribution 
which a free press could make. Communication remained essential for democracy 
to succeed, although in this case it would be between individuals, interest groups 
and government. 
Neo-pluralists' call for 'enlightened understanding' as an important requirement of 
the democratic political process. This implies a central role for the press. The need 
for education could, under different circumstances, be met through direct 
partiCipation in government, as occurred in ancient Athens. Because of the 
constraints of size in modern pluralist democracies, however, this role is best 
suited to the media. The neo-pluralists' concern with political equality also has 
implications for the press. The press has the ability to provide education and a 
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means of communication to all citizens in an environment in which inequalities of 
wealth may disadvantage some people over others. 
The New Right model 
This model differed from pluralist models in that advocates called for less 
involvement by interest groups in the governing process, and less emphasis on 
safeguarding equality through the democratic process. Supporters believed this 
had resulted in the growth of an expensive welfare interventionist state with an 
outsized bureaucracy. 
The New Right model, also referred to as Neo-liberalism or 'legal democracy' 
essentiaUy harked back to the classical liberal representative models. Theorists of 
both .the latter and former models believed that individual freedom and rights were 
paramount. Majority rule was seen as the process which best protected individuals 
from abuses of power by government. 
Key to this protection was minimal state intervention in civil and private life, and a 
free market economy. Proponents believed that it was only through the market that 
collective choices could be determined on an individual basis (Held, 1987). Political 
participation and equality were regarded as secondary to . liberalism, . and 
government involvement in the economy to promote equality was strongly 
opposed. 
Hayek (1984) developed the concept-of legal democracy, in which the law was the 
central mechanism for curbing the power of the state and protecting the liberty of 
individuals (Held, 1987). The press was central to New Right theorists because 
they regarded participation as secondary to liberalism, which meant that a 
mechanism was needed to keep people informed and involved, from a distance. 
The importance of liberalism for advocates of this model meant that the press also 
provided a vital means for checking the activities of government. New Right 
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moreover, that freedom of the press could 
ved if the press was privately owned, with no interference by government. 
The models of liberal representative democracy discussed above differ from one 
another, but all depend on a well functioning press sector which enables 
participation at a distance, education and good communication between 
government and citizens, and between citizens themselves. 
One of the most important aspects of liberal democracy for the press is that 
heorists prioritised individual liberty, and the rights which protect that liberty. 
Democracy was thus the political process which guarded these rights against 
abuses from government. The success of the democratic process in protecting 
rights requires a clear separation between citizens and the government. 
This separation provides the space in which mechanisms can be developed which 
check state abuse of power, such as: an "impersonal" structure of public power, a 
constitution to protect rights, and a diversity of power centres inside and outside 
the state (Held, 1993: 24). A free press is one of these power centres in the public 
sphere which provide people with the ability to monitor government activity . . 
The other important aspect of the liberal tradition which has implications for the 
press is the belief that civil society should dominate ·over the state (Gillwald, 1993). 
Liberals believe that this can be achieved through the free market. The market is 
the major institution of civil society because it is the one institution which all 
ordinary citizens have access to, and which can be independent from government. 
This means that for liberals, the market, rather than the state, is the preferred 
regulator of society's information needs. Liberals therefore believe that the press 
must be privately owned, and that any attempts by government to interfere would 
constitute an infringement on freedom of association, property and expression 
(Kelley and Donway, 1990). 
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This aspect of the liberal tradition is important because it represents the major 
point of difference from proponents of participatory models of democracy, in their 
thoughts about how the press works. 
iii) Participatory democracy 
Classical participative models 
In the Eighteenth Century, Rousseau revived the principles of democracy as 
practised in the Athenian city state. In the Nineteenth Century J. S. Mill, who 
actually favoured representative democracy, developed Rousseau's ideas, giving 
participative democracy its most liberal expression. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the most important element of Rousseau's city 
state model is that democracy meant active participation by individuals in 
government in order to secure the 'common good'. Advocates of liberal models by 
comparison, believed that individual autonomy was the greatest good. For 
Rousseau, the system of self-rule was an end in itself. He believed participation 
had a fundamental psychological effect which ensured a constant interrelationship 
between the opinions of individuals and the institutions in society (Pateman, 1970). 
The main aim of partiCipation was to educate people to enable responsible action 
in the political sphere. Participation also gave individuals a sense of freedom 
because they had some control over their lives (Pateman, 1970). 
The implications for the press of Rousseau's model are similar to those of Athenian 
democracy described earlier. In Rousseau's model, the direct participation by 
citizens in the legislative process provides communication and education, as well 
as a means of monitoring how government manages its executive function. In 
liberal representative models of democracy, by contrast, the press was the main 
vehicle for faCilitating communication between people, for providing education, and 
for monitoring government abuses of power. It is thus conceivable that the political 
system, as envisaged by Rousseau, could work quite well without the press, 
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(although this does not suggest that a press would not thrive in Rousseau's state). 
The same does not hold true for representative democracies in which participation 
was limited, and a free press was therefore, essential. 
John Stuart Mill's ideas were built on earlier ideas about liberal representative 
democracy and on Rousseau's model of democracy. Mill favoured representative 
democracy, but believed participation was equally vital for the development of 
individual's intellectual capacity and morals (Held, 1987). His movement away from 
justifying democracy in terms of the security it provided for individuals, common to 
representative heorists is evident in his belief that political institutions should be 
judged by the extent to which they promote the general mental advancement of the 
community (Pateman, 1970). 
Mill did not, however, share Rousseau's belief that political equality was vital for 
meaningful participation. He was critical of vast inequalities of wealth and power, 
but supported a free market economy, and favoured a well educated elite to lead 
government (Held, 1987; Pateman, 1970). This had implications for the press quite 
different from those of Rousseau's model. The press was important to ensure the 
accountability of the elected elite to the electorate, which was especially important 
to Mill. It not only kept the government in check, but furthered the education and 
participation of citizens in the political process of a large country. As such, the 
press would have the same effects for Mill's democracy as direct participation had 
for Rousse~u's model. 
The New Left: Contemporary participative models J{ 
Advocates of these models recognised that institutions central to liberal democracy 
like competitive parties and periodic elections, are necessary in a modern, 
industrialised participatory society (Held, 1987). But their justification for 
participatory democracy was similar to that of Rousseau: the self development and 
education of the citizenry. This, supporters believed, could only be achieved in a 
society in which people have political influence, and are concerned about collective 
problems. Citizens should therefore, be interested in, and knowledgeable about, 
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the governing process. Participation in this process, they thought, should extend to 
all institutions of society, including the workplace and the community. 
The notion that individuals need to be involved in all institutions rather than just 
government, was based on a rejection of the liberal conception of a clear 
separation between state and civil society. Advocates of participatory democracy 
argued, in the Marxist tradition, that the state is linked to capital and thus to the 
maintenance and reproduction of the inequalities in society. This means that 
citizens will not be treated as free and equal, and periodic national elections are 
inadequate to ensure the accountability of government. Participation must, 
therefore, be extended to all areas of life where power is exercised. 
The two crucial requirements for contemporary participative models have important 
implications for the press. These are meaningful political equality and an open 
information system. Participatory theorists argued that in modern liberal 
democracies, inequalities of class, sex and race limit the extent to which individuals 
are free and equal (Held, 1987). Good communication and information are 
essential for the development and education of people, and also promote equality. 
Gillwald (1993) stated that if social arrangements deprive sectors of society from 
making decisions, there cannot be political equality. An open ·and accessible media 
is vital for dealing with this inequality by making the same information available to 
all citizens, thus enhancing their capacity for equal participation. 
This chapter has argued that although models of democracy differ vastly, most 
B emPhasised the role of the media and also of the press in a democracy. 
The exceptions are the Athenian and Roussean accounts, which are not really 
applicable to vast modern polities. This chapter also pointed out that as direct 
participation by the public in government decreased, so the importance of the 
press increased. J Advocates of contemporary participative democracy l 
--acknowledged the role of political parties and periodic elections in modern 
democraCies, even though these do not provide the greater participation which they 
""' believe is important. These eorists elieved that as a result, the press is central 
for enabling the increased participation which they advocate. 
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Supporters of participatory democracy also stressed the importance of political 
equality, and believed the press could help achieve this also. These eorists were 
not, however, always satisfied with the press's contribution in this regard. They 
criticised the nature of the press in liberal democracies, particularly because 
liberals favour a privately owned media. Like Marxists, advocates of participatory 
democracy believed that the structural powers of the market limit the media's 
functions in a democracy. These criticisms of the liberal approach to the media, 
and the implications of the structural powers of the market for the press and 
democracy will be considered in the following section. 
iv) Criticisms of the liberal approach to the media. and implications of the 
structural powers of the market for the press and democracy 
Critics of liberal- media theory are divided in their approaches, and this section will 
attempt to indicate in broad outline, the major features of such approaches as they 
relate to the press. 
The criticisms of liberal theories of the media are based on Marxist criticisms of the 
media in liberal democracies. Indeed, Marxist critiques have largely shaped these 
debates, and will therefore be introduced briefly. Some Marxists see the press as 
an instrument of the capitalist class which reflects the interests of that class above 
others (Murdock, 1980). Structuralists like Althusser (1977) and Poulantzas (1969) 
emphasised the role of the state in the political economy. Agencies of the state, 
they believed, would intervene to ensure that the dominant capitalist ideology was 
adhered to by the media. Other structuralists developed the "political economy 
approach" (Murdock, 1980), arguing that this kind of intervention in the functioning 
of the media was not necessary, because the market would ensure that the 
product supported their interests. 
Thus, while liberals see the market as a mechanism for protection against state 
abuses of power, and thus the provider of liberty, Marxists see the market as the 
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very institution which enslaves individuals. Marxists would argue that under the 
control of the market, the press does not fulfil the requirements of democracy. This 
is because the ideals of equal accessibility and independence are often sacrificed 
for profits and advertising revenue. 
The liberal theory of the media is criticised because it misses the vital point that 
private power is as great a threat to liberty as public power (Holmes, 1990). 
Holmes (1990) points out that Locke conceived of rights not only as protection 
against government interference, but also against harm by third parties, or private 
oppressors. The formal rights of individuals to participate in collective decision 
making and to influence leaders is meaningless unless avenues for considering all 
the options and partaking in debates, are open. 
Liberals have responded to this criticism from the perspective of pluralist 
democracy as discussed above. Accounting for the way they operate, people in the 
British newspaper industry have argued that capital ownership is just one of the 
sources of power among the many independent interest groups competing for 
influence over the policy making process (Murdock, 1980). While this is an 
important power base, it is not considered dominant over others. Proponents argue 
that financial independence from the state and from political parties, and an 
absence of direct government control, guarantees the press autonomy from the 
interests of the state. 
Critics, however, maintain that being autonomous from state influence does not 
necessarily protect the press from the structural powers of the market. The effects 
of the market on the press are diverse, but critics believe all erode the press's role 
as one of the central guarantors of democracy. The privately owned media, they 
believe, do not distribute information equally, and are not equally accessible to all, 
as democracy requires. Instead, the media operates according to the demands and 
cycles of the market. 
The main problems that have been identified concern the concentration of 
ownership of news organisations, and the effect of the market on news content. 
39 
Sparks (1988, 1992) believed that the press market leads to a concentration of 
ownership, as does Lichtenburg (1990), who stated that this has had a deciding 
effect on the formation of public opinion. According to Lichtenburg (1990), most 
people receive the majority of news from a few large agencies, the extent and 
power of which enables the agencies to shape readers' worldviews and how they 
act politically. 
The other implication of the market relates to news content. Sparks (1988, 1992) 
argued that the media's function is not restricted to providing political information, 
although this is the vital role required for democracy. He explained that the press 
market consists of readers and more notably, of advertisers who want to reach 
people with disposable incomes and decision making power (Sparks, 1992). 
Newspapers with a more affluent readership can charge more for advertising, 
which means a greater revenue, and probably better coverage of political issues. 
The more down market press raises more. of its income through the cover price, 
and a wide circulation is therefore vital. This could mean that political reporting is 
diminished in favour of entertainment and other news. 
Some liberals might, however, argue that the issue of news content need not 
automatically be considered a problem for democracies. They argue that readers 
are not passive fools and can choose which newspapers they want to read and 
whether they want to be involved in the political process at all. The fact that 
readers choose the popular press cannot be blamed on the media, liberals might 
suggest. 
Sparks (1988, 1992) believed that while this is true, it does not change the facts 
about the nature of the popular press, or that this press plays an important role in 
political life. Sparks added that there are such social regularities in readership 
distribution that it is difficult to ~uggest that this is a product of individual choice. 
Readership patterns in fact relate to social stratification (Sparks, 1992). 
Participatory theorists who criticise liberal approaches to the media do not deny 
that in advanced democracies most people choose not to be well informed about 
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political and economic activities (Sparks, 1988). They argue instead that this says 
more about the social and political life in stable, liberal democracies, than about the 
nature of the press. For participatory theorists, this suggests that political and 
economic power is so far removed from most people that they have lost interest in 
monitoring how this power is managed. Ultimately, then, the nature of the .modern 
popular press is derived from the structural features of the capitalist state (Sparks, 
1988). 
The structural power of the market outlined above has important implications for 
the press in democracies. It suggests that the functioning of the press is not 
shaped by the requirements of modern democracies, but by the market forces in 
which the press operates. This does not change the fact that all theorists of 
democracy support a free press. Instead it suggests that advocates of democracy 
do not always believe that the press is fulfilling its role in the democratic process in 
the ways they envisaged it would. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this discussion has been to show that freedom of speech is vital for all 
kinds of democracy, no matter how vastly they may differ. The outline of the 
various models of democracy illustrates that as participation in the political process 
became less feasible or less desirable, the need for other avenues of participation 
arose. Simultaneously, the need to safeguard citizens from abuses of power also 
became central. The press is .therefore crucial for democracy, as it can facilitate 
both participation at a distance and the monitoring of government abuses of power. 
This chapter also aimed to draw attention to some of the debates about whether 
the press actually fulfils the role required by democracies. The debates stem from 
perceptions that in liberal democracies, the press does not guarantee freedom of 
speech and expression according to the democratic requirements noted above.2 
2 This is not a recent concern. Sparks (1988) notes that Habermas, looking back to the 
last century. argued that the commercialisation of the press around 1830 was a problem. 
Sparks continues that there is a long history of complaints that the press is becoming 
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Models of democracy try to balance state power, citizens' power and the power of 
capital within a democratic framework. Liberalism protects individuals' rights 
against infringements by the state and other individuals, but not against the effects 
of market forces. The question for theorists debating the role of the media, is how 
far the state can be allowed to intervene to ensure equal opportunity for all citizens 
to participate in the democratic process, without infringing on other rights. Those 
who oppose the government regulating the press, stress that this amounts to 
interference in individual rights and limits the valuable watchdog function of the 
media. These are the kinds of arguments made by theorists of the neo-liberal or 
New Right school. 
Those who believe some kind of regulation or corrective action is necessary, 
believe state excesses are not the only danger to individual rights, but that private 
excesses may pose a greater threat. These proponents call for the extension of the 
domain over which democratic government has control. They have a conception of 
a press uncontrolled by market forces. These are the kinds of arguments made by 
proponents of the New Left or participatory democracy school. 
These links between the debates about democracy and the role of the press 
illustrate "how fundamentally these concepts are related. Any discussions of the 
press in a democratic society must have as a starting point some more or less 
detailed theory of democracy. 
trivialised, from the 1890s in the United States press and from the 1930s in the British 
pres~. The problem has worsened in recent years with the increased concentration of 
media o~~ers, the boom of the broadcasting industry and related economic pressures on 




1. Aims of this chapter 
Having discussed the relevance of this study in the preceding chapter, this chapter 
outlines the methodology this study will use in answering the research question: 
what factors are likely to affect the probability that events of violent collective action 
are reported by the press? The research design will first be described, including the 
area and the time period which will be studied. This is followed by a discussion of 
the sources of information used to answer the question above, and to test the 
hypothesis. 
The data used for both the dependent variable (the reported events of collective 
action) and the independent variables (the source which reported the events, and 
the intensity, size, location and timing of events of collective action) will be 
discussed in this chapter. This chapter will also briefly discuss some of the material 
which was used to select the independent variables. The selection of these 
variables was based on: 
• The findfngs of international studies which have investigated the sources for 
collective action research. 
• The information gathered in interviews with journalists and editors of 
newspapers i'n South Africa, and more speCifically in KwaZulu-Natal. 
• Secondary sources which discuss reporting of violence in South Africa. 
This chapter will o~tline the findings of some international studies, since they made 
an important contribution to the selection of the independent variables. The findings 
of these studies were also part of the motivation for this study. Although the social, 
economic and political environment where the international studies were carried 
out differ markedly from those in South Afri~ their research constituted the only 
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studies which have assessed the press as a source for systematic conflict 
research. 
These findings were also considered relevant because this study is concerned 
more about methodologies for collective action research, than about the political 
dynamics surrounding the collective action. The fact that many of their conclusions 
were independently substantiated by South African journalists and editors, reduces 
the potential problems with using this data. 
2. Research design 
i) The area studied 
The area which this study will examine is the KwaZulu-Natal province. This 
province was selected for a number of reasons. First, the discussion in Chapter 
One showed that levels of conflict, and particularly violent conflict, have been 
higher here since 1986 than in any other region of the country. Because this study 
is concerned with the reporting of conflict, this province was an obvious choice. 
Second, the vast majority of monitoring agencies existed (and some continue to 
operate) in this province. These agencies have operated for much longer than their 
few counterparts which now exist in the rest of the country. The monitors' da~a is 
vital for this study, because without this alternative source of information about 
conflict, an assessment of press reports would have been difficult. Chapter One 
described problems encountered with the police reports on conflict, and why these 
were not used in this study for comparisons with newspaper reports. 
Thirdly, the availability of secondary information about violence reporting by the 
press also influenced the choice of study area. The South African work (such as 
Emdon, 1990 and 1991; Mkhize, 1990; Association for Democratic Journalists 
press release, 1990; Smith, 1991) on press reporting of violence, was carried out in 
KwaZulu-Natal, and referred to the newspapers located here. 
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ii) The time period studied 
The reporting trends of the press and monitoring agencies in KwaZulu-Natal will be 
compared during the years 1987, 1990 and 1994. These years were chosen for 
three reasons. First, they best enable a comparison of reporting during and after 
the States of Emergency were in place. The Emergency was declared in 1986 and 
was lifted in KwaZulu-Natal in October 1990. This choice of time period is 
important for this study because violence reporting was severely curtailed during 
the Emergency. 
Second, the literature as well as the interviews conducted with members of the 
press, suggested that the time period during which conflict occurs can affect the 
likelihood that events will be reported. The political context is, therefore, important. 
For this reason, the years 1990 and 1994 are particularly appropriate, since 
landmark events in the political history ,of this country occurred during these years. 
In 1990, Nelson Mandela was released, the ANC and other organisations were 
unbanned, and the State of Emergency was lifted. The year 1994 marked the 
country's first democratic election, which brought the ANC government led by 
President Mandela into power. 
Thirdly, monitoring agency material was most readily available during these years. 
The monitors 'started their activities 'at different times, and many closed down over 
the years. Material was also produced sporadically by some organisations. This 
meant that the contribution of the monitors was not consistent, and because their 
input was vital for this study, the years ,selected are those in which monitoring 
agencies' contribution were greatest. 
iii) The research process 
The research for this study was conducted in two parts, one qualitative and one 
quantitative. 
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The Qualitative process 
The qualitative process included collecting relevant information from secondary 
sources about the press and monitoring agencies' reporting of violence. This 
information complimented the interviews which form the main body of this part of 
the research. The history of South African newspapers and the legislation which 
curbed press freedom before and during the States of Emergency is well 
documented. There is, however, much less information available on the subject of 
violence reporting in particular, and few studies could be located which assessed 
press reporting of violence in South Africa. In addition, there is little secondary 
information about how the monitoring agencies operate. 
The interviews therefore made an important con'tribution to this section of the 
research process. Interviews were conducted throughout 1994 and the beginning 
of 1995, and provided the body of the information about how the press and the 
monitoring agencies operate. The monitors chosen were some of the main 
contributors to the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal database, namely the Human 
Rights Com_ .... m_itt_e_e __ H_R_C~, jhe Natal Monitor, the Inkatha Institute and the Unrest 
Monitoring Project. Although 
Group and the 6lacls Sash pre.s.sjo Monitorin Gro R also supplied extensive 
data, these monitors no longer operated at the time of this study, and interviewees 
were hard to I.ocate. 
Interviews with the press were conducted with a political reporter and an editor 
from each of the three daily newspapers in the province, namely The Natal 
Witness, the Daily News and The Mercury. The former head of the South African 
Press Association (SAPA) in Durban was also interviewed, as SAPA supplies the 
other newspapers, as well as the 'most frequently used monitor, the HRC, with 
information about violence, 
..jrhe interviews were conducted for the purpose of gathering qualitative information, 
and were, therefore, all open-ended, based on a structured set of questions. The 
interviews were extensive, lasting between one and two hours. The press and the 
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monitors were asked questions about how their organisations went about reporting 
conflict, the difficulties they faced in performing this activity, and their perceptions 
about the criticisms of both the newspapers' and monitors' reporting of violence. 
The selection of only one reporter from each newspaper was a function of two 
factors. First, the interviews did not constitute the only primary research for this 
thesis, but rather the background information to the problem being studied. Also, 
the newspapers generally only had one senior political reporter who was 
experienced enough to comment on these issues.1 The only other possible 
interviewees were the crime reporters, but since this study focuses on violent 
collective action which excludes events carried out for purely criminal reasons, this 
source was not pursued. 
These interviews provided important information about how these media operate, 
the difficulties they encounter, and their responses to criticisms Of their violence 
reporting activities. Given the paucity of secondary information on the reporting 
processes of the press in South Africa, and of the monitoring agencies, the 
interviews enabled a better understanding of these media. This is necessary for 
assessing their reporting tendencies. The results also lent credibility to the choice 
of independent variables. The results of these interviews and relevant information 
gathered from secondary sources are documented in Chapters Four and Five. 
The Quantitative process 
The quantitative part of the research process will consist of statistical analyses 
using the data collected by the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project. Details of 
this project and its methodology follow in the next section of this chapter. These 
analyses will compare the way the newspapers and monitoring agencies reported 
events which differed in terms of their size, intensity, location and timing in 1987, 
1990 and 1994. These results are documented in Chapter Six. 
1 This I was told by the reporters I spoke to, on asking if there was anyone else at the 
newspaper I should interview. 
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The rest of this chapter will discuss the data used in the quantitative part of the 
research process. These include the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project, 
which provided the data on both the reported events of collective action, and on the 
factors which, according to the hypothesis, will affect the probability that events will 
be reported. This is followed by a discussion of the research findings of 
international studies which influenced the selection of the above variables. 
3. Source of data on events of violent collective action 
Data used for measuring the dependent variable, namely the reported events of 
collective action, as well as the factors which might affect reporting tendencies, 
were obtained from the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project. This project, 
which the author of this thesis has been working on for five years, records events 
of collective action reported by the newspapers and the monitoring agencies. It is 
important to understand the methodology and aims of the Conflict Trends project, 
since data from this project formed the basis of this research. 
i) The Conflict Trends in KwaZylu-Natal project 
The project was started at the Centre for Social and Development Studies (CSDS) 
at the University of Natal Durban in 1991. It is a collaborative venture with the 
Centre for Socio-Political Analysis at the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) in Pretoria and the indicator South Africa at the University of Natal in 
Durban. 
The project was initiated as part of a wider study being undertaken at the HSRC 
which deals with collective action countrywide, as well as an international 
comparative project, researching ethnic collective action in the United States and 
South Africa. The various projects use the same methodology, and the databases 
can be merged and trends in the different areas compared. 
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The aim of the project is to contribute to analyses about the causes of collective 
action. The advantages of the project are that trends of conflict can be established 
over a long period of time, and the changing rates of collective action can thus be 
measured. This systematic approach enables the data to be tested against a wide 
range of variables which are believed to affect the rates of conflict. Examples of 
these variables are demographic data, the movement or migration of people, 
income distribution, employment levels and where measurable, actions taken by! 
the police (see Olivier...etal, 1995). 
Using this methodology, Olivier (1990 and 1991) tested the effect of the following 
variables on the rate of ethnic collective action in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging (PWV) region from 1970 to 1984: changing rates of internal migration; 
economic expansion; an increase in resources to the disadvantaged such as 
income, education and organisational advantages linked to strike behaviour; and 
acts of state repression. 
The scope of study 
The area covered by the study is the KwaZulu-Natal province. When violence 
began in South Africa in the mid-1970s, it was located mainly in the PVN area. 
This was to change dramatically in 1987, when violence escalated in KwaZulu-
Natal on a scale unprecedented in the rest of the country. High levels of conflict 
continued until April 1994 in this province, and since the election, political vi_olence 
continues to be a major problem for KwaZulu-Natal.. 
The violence in this province requires special attentio~ because the dynamics are 
different in this region, as the discussion in Chapter One illustrated. In addition to 
elements present in conflict in other parts of the country, this violence has been 
driven by clashes between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the United Democratic 
Front (and later the AN C) and its affiliates. 
Data was recorded on collective action from 1986. The project is an ongoing one, 
as levels of conflict increased up to mid-1994, and have continued up to the 
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present. Since the election, violence has decreased, but stability has not been 
secured and violence may escalate again. In KwaZulu-Natal particularly, with its 
legacy of clashes between the ANC and IFP, the future is unclear. This is one of 
only two provinces in the country where the ANC lost the national election, and a 
violent rivalry between the two parties continues. 
The subject of study and the sources 
The dependent variable of the Conflict Trends project is the changing level of 
collective action over time. In order to analyse and explain this, it is important to 
have information on the timing and sequence of events of collective action. Olivier 
eL.al (1995) argued that simply aggregating the number of events that occur, as 
Tilly ~ (1975) did, would not provide information on the timing and sequence of 
events but only on their occurrence. The event-history method is therefore used. 
This method of collecting information on events over an extended period of time 
means that events occurring before and after a major upheaval are recorded, 
instead of focusing on the uprising only. This is useful for studying how conflict 
spreads g~ographically and over time, as well as for examining cycles of conflict. 
This method also allows for the measurement and comparison of diverse forms of 
collective action. More information about the dynamics of the activi,ty is recorded 
using this method than studies which examine specific social movements or 
upheavals. , 
Event analysis also enables the use of statistical models which have been used in 
other studies (O,lzak, 1992; Olzak and Olivier, 1995). This ability to test hypotheses 
is particularly useful in South Africa, where most studies of 'conflict have taken the 
case study format. Case studies provide detail and historical background, but little 
systematic evidence which can be used for testing theories about the causes of 
violence. In capturing information over a time period not defined by particular 
events, event ana,lysis avoids sample selection bias, by including areas and towns 
where conflict has not occurred. 
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Data about events of collective action are collected from a variety of newspapers 
and monitoring agencies. The newspapers used most often are the provincial daily 
newspapers, namely The Mercury and the Daily News from Durban, and The Natal 
Witness from Pietermaritzburg. The alternative Durban weekly newspaper, ~ 
African, was used in 1990 and 1991 , and the Sunday Tribune is also used 
occasionally. In recent years, some use has been made of small newspapers such 
as the Zululand Observer and the Estcourt Midlands News. Events have on 
occasion been obtained from newspapers from other parts of the country like the 
Cape Times, Sowetan, ~, Sunday Times and Business Day. 
Data from a range of monitoring agencies has also been used. The monitors used 
most often include the Human Rights Committee, the Black Sash Monitoring 
Group, the Democratic Party Unrest Monitoring Action Group, the Natal Monitor, 
the Inkatha Institute, the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee's reports, the Unrest 
Monitoring Project at the University of Natal and the Pietermaritzburg Agency for 
Christian Social Awareness (PACSA). 
The monitors operated at different times and did not always produce accessible 
information on a regular basis. Information from these sources could not, therefore, 
be used conSistently. By 1994 the only monitoring agency source still supplying 
regular information to the Conflict Trends project was the Human Rights 
Committee. 
Data collection and processing 
The unit of analysis for the study is the event of collective action, rather than the 
actual reports collected from the sources. Collective action is defined here as 
collective behaviour (involving two or more partiCipants) in which a conflict of 
interests is expressed by groups protesting in public, in a peaceful or violent 
manner, about a given set of grievances. Collective action may be initiated by a 
variety of interest groups who mobilise around a wide range of concerns such as 
political differences, housing, access to land, ethnic or racial solidarity, women's 
rights, and so forth. 
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To be recorded, events must: be collective; occur in public, which means events in 
police or prison cells or regular scheduled meetings of organisations are not 
recorded; and events carried out for clearly criminal motivations are not recorded. 
Another important feature of events relates to their duration. Based on the work of 
Tilly (1'978) and Olzak and West (1987), Olivier (1990) took events in the same 
location, involving the same group and expressing the same grievances, with gaps 
of less than twenty four hours between them, as one event. Some events therefore 
last for quite a long time. If the activity resumed after a break of twenty four hours, 
the action was recorded as a new event. 
2 
Also following Olzak and West (1987), collective action events are divided into two 
types, namely conflict and protest events. Conflict events are those in which there 
is a violent clash of interests between parties. The group which is targeted may be 
only symbolicaUy present, as often occurs when property belonging to a particular 
group is attacked or destroyed. 
Events in which the threat of violence is used, such as intimidation, are also 
considered conflict events. Examples of these are attacks on houses or other 
property, attacks on people, clashes between the security forces and civilians, 
assassinations, attacks on taxis and buses transporting passengers, and 
ambushes of vehicles. Protest events are those in which a group of people gather 
in a public place to air a grievance or make a statement. There is no clash of 
interests between parties as in the case of conflict events, and these events are 
non-violent. Examples of protest events are protest marches, rallies, boycotts, sit-
ins and stayaways. 
For every event recorded, a range of details about the event are noted, such as: 
the duration of events; the type of events; the numbers and type of partiCipants; the 
2 T~is. is important if ~he data is compared with that of other sources, such as official police 
~tatlstlcs . Thes~ offi~lal figures would, for example, record six episodes of stone-throwing 
In the same reSidential block over the period of one hour, as six separate incidents. The 
Conflict Trends project would record these as one event lasting one hour. 
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affiliation of participants to any organisation or ethnic group if applicable; the race 
group of participants as far as possible; the reasons for events; the types of 
weapons used; the extent of property damage; the numbers killed and injured; the 
type of security force activity; and the source of information for the event. 
These details are recorded in a narrative form which tells the 'story' about each 
event. This information is then given numerical codes and entered into a computer 
for statistical analysis. 
4. Review of studies which assessed the press as a source for 
collective action research 
The studies reviewed below investigated different types of conflict activity in 
different areas. Nevertheless, these studies are referred to because they are 
among the few which assess the press as a source for systematic research on 
conflict. Moreover, the approach of Snyder and Kelly (1977) - the only study which 
is described in any detail - in assessing newspapers has guided that of this thesis: 
in that study the authors focused on the probability that events would be reported, 
rather than on the accuracy of the printed information. 
Also, their study hypothesised that the characteristics of events would affect the 
reporting probability, as would the broader political dynamics occurring at the same 
time as conflict. 
i) Studies which identified problems with the Press as a source 
Chapter One introduced the discussion about the problems which have been 
identified with the press as a data source. These will be addressed here in more 
detail. 
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Olzak (1992) reported that international studies of C?vents of collective action have 
relied on sources such as official archival records which include police and 
municipal records (Tilly~, 1975), annual newspaper indexes (Spilerman, 1970; 
McAdam, 1982; Burstein, 1985; Jenkins and Eckert, 1986), daily newspaper 
reports (Paige, 1975), published listings of events compiled from various 
newspapers such as strike data in the United States Bureau of the Census, 1975, 
and secondary historical accounts. 
Olzak's own work and other systematic studies in this field, both locally and 
internationally, have relied heavily on press reports as the sources for their 
research. According to Olzak (1992) this is because these sources can be followed 
as time proceeds, and because some researchers have found that newspapers 
provide the most complete record of events covering the widest sample over time 
and geographical space. For South African studies, the lack of adequate alternate 
sources can be added to this list. 
Internationally, the suitability of newspapers as a source for conflict research has 
been questioned because the data is believed to have systematic biases 
(Chermesh, 1982; Oanzger, 1975; Franzosi, 1987). 
These include selection bias, which means the media may be biased in its 
selection of events to be reported. Description bias means the media might be 
biased in the descriptions of the events they select to report, and lastly, researcher 
bias, which implies that the validity and reliability of data is compromised as a 
result of mistakes made by the researcher (Franzosi, 1987; Olzak, 1989b). 
Selection and description bias are the most difficult to deal with since they affect 
the data sources and cannot be controlled by the researcher. These biases can 
therefore, have the most significant impact on the validity of research results. 
Researchers using newspapers as a data source usually assume that any biases 
that do exist in data sources are not systematic (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989). 
The absence of alternative data sources makes it difficult to determine the extent to 
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which such an assumption is correct or to assess the extent to which selection and 
description bias exist. 3 
Several critics maintain that the press is not a valid source (Oanzger, 1975; 
Franzosi, 1987; Molotoch and Lester, 1974; Snyder and Kelly, 1977), particularly 
for multiple indicator analyses of coriflict.
4 
Little attention has, however, been paid to these problems and Franzosi (1987; 
1990) is one of the few researchers who has addressed this issue directly. 
Franzosi (1987: 5) stated that most quantitative research on collective action and 
violence has been based on data collected from newspapers, yet problems of'data 
measurement" have received little consideration.
s 
Oanzger (1975) also believed that although extensive work has been done on the 
problems concerning the validity of news reports, researchers ~n conflict have 
ignored this. Franzosi (1987) stated that there is a widespread belief among 
researchers that there is nothing they can do to overcome the effects of 
newspapers' reporting bias, and consequently testing the validity of sources for 
research projects is often neglected. 
Franzosi (1987) did state, however, that not all events are equally likely to be 
affected by reporting bias. He believed that newspapers generally report accurately 
3 Recent research by McCarthy m...al (1993), however, represents the first systematic 
attempt to address this problem. Their study in Washington DC suggested that only about 
10% of all permitted demonstrations were reported in the printed media. Nevertheless, the 
determinants for selection by the media were constant over time and across sources. The 
authors. concluded that ''The tip of the national print media iceberg, then, provides an 
amazingly stable portrait of a churning mix of protest forms, purposes and contexts ... . It. 
(McCarthy etal 1993: 36-37). 
4 These are studies which do not focus on a particular type of activity (such as strikes, for 
example), but analyse events of varying types and intensity, sometimes across different 
countries. The Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal is such a project. These analyses assume 
that there is an underlying dimension to their study, which can loosely be described as 
'conflict'. The motivation for using this method is that conflict relevant for other theoretical 
variables will be captured (Snyder and Kelly, 1977). 
5 'Measurement' for Franzosi (1987) refers to issues of validity, sample selection bias and 
the coding scheme design and inter-coding reliability. 
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on the type of event, its location and date, the general identity of participants, and 
whether people were arrested, injured or killed. Reporting of the reasons for 
events, or which groups were responsible for certain actions, is less likely to be 
consistent. When events are interpreted and discussed in editorials and perhaps 
include elements of 'hard' facts, bias is most likely to be a problem (Franzosi, 
1987). 
ii) A study which examined the press as a source 
Snyder and Kelly (1977) investigated the characteristics of events to establish 
whether the probability that conflict will be reported increased for certain kinds of 
events. They focused on the probability that conflict events in general would be 
reported, and their assessments of newspapers arose from a concern about the 
quality of the source data. 
Snyder and Kelly's (1977) model for assessing the validity of press reports as a 
source 'was based on the argument that intense events were more likely to be 
reported. Intensity was measured according to size (the number of participants at 
the event), violence (the degree of physieal damage to people and property) and 
the duration of the event. 
Their model did not, however, depend only on the characteristics of events. For 
Snyder and Kelly (1977), validity depends on the interaction between the intensity 
of conflict events and the sensitivity of the media reporting the events. Media 
sensitivity to conflict behaviour is determined by the "political climate" and 
contextual characteristics of conflict events (Snyder and Kelly, 1977: 113). The 
characteristics they refer to are those features of events which do not reflect 
intensity, such as the nature of their partiCipants, their loeational visibility vis-a-vis 
media sources, and the frequency of the event. These concepts will be briefly 
explained. 
56 
An example of the "political climate" would be the climate brought about by 
government legislation which suppresses the media. Indirectly, this "climate" may 
cause a single event to catch the public's interest even though this event is part of 
many similar events. Another example is the holding of important elections, as 
occurred in South Africa in April 1994. The election shaped the "political climate", 
which might have an affect on press reporting of conflict. In a certain "political 
climate" therefore, the probability proposed by this model that intense events will 
be reported, may not apply. 6 
Snyder and Kelly (1977) also believed the contextual characteristics of conflict 
events determine media sensitivity. The nature of the participants is one such 
characteristic. For example, the media are more likely to report events where 
coercive forces are involved or where the participants are public figures. The 
locational proximity of events to the media networks and to the wire servi,ces also 
increase~ the likelihood that events will be reported. 
Finally, with regard to the frequency of events, Snyder and Kelly (1977) believed 
that the more frequently an event occurs, the less likely it is to be reported by the 
media. E)(amples they cited are that small town newspapers are likely to report 
fistfights in a bar, whereas those in large cities are not. Also, industrial strike 
activity becomes less newsworthy as ,it occurs more frequently and becomes 
routinised. With racial disorders, underreporting is more likely in cities with past 
experiences of such conflict. 
In determining data validity, Snyder and Kelly (1977) thus looked at both the nature 
of the events themselves and the nature of the media which might report the event. 
The probability that an event will be reported increases with its intensity, while the 
more sensitive the media sources are, the more likely they are to report a wider 
range of conflict activity. The findings of Snyder and Kelly's (1977) research using 
this model indicated that the characteristics of events are important determinants of 
validity, and that conflict events are likely to be reported according to their intensity. 
6 Snyd~r and K~"y (1~77) add, however, that with few exceptions, they doubt that events 
of relatively low Intensity will remain newsworthy for long periods. 
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Also relevant for this study are Snyder and Kelly's (1977) findings on how 
geographic and temporal patterns of conflict events may be distorted by the press. 
They believed the locational proximity of events to the media networks and the wire 
services increases the likelihood that events will be reported. These authors found 
that few protests occurring in the Western cities of the United States were reported 
by the New York Times. This illustrates that coverage of national events by one 
particular newspaper may be biased, showing the importance of spatial factors in 
reporting conflict. 
Franzosi (1987) also stated that available evidence suggests that temporal and 
spatial trends of newspaper reporting do not reflect the actual patterns occurring in 
reality. He referred to the conflicting findings of Danzger (1975) and Snyder and 
Kelly (1977) on the effects of previous experiences of racial disorders on the 
reporting of conflict by the press. 
'Danzger (1975) argued that the probability that conflict is reported is higher in cities 
with past disorder experience, while Snyder and Kelly (1977) argued the opposite. 
Despite these conflicting theories, this indicates that the geographic distribution of 
events may be distorted by newspaper reporting. Franzosi (1987: 8) also cited Tilly 
(1969), who found that on comparing events reported in newspaper and other 
sources, the press reported the highest number of events, and that the main bias 
was toward overreporting of incidents in big cities. 
5. The relevance of these studies for KwaZulu-Natal 
This discussion provides valuable methodological inSights into the problem which 
motivates this study. These methods and findings must, however, be considered in 
the South African context, and more specifically with reference to KwaZulu-Natal 
which is the province covered by this study. 
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The literature summarised above reaffirms the motivation for this study. Many of 
the authors do not regard the press as a valid source for quantitative research due 
to the existence of systematic bias in newspaper reports. According to Franzosi 
(1987) and Snyder and Kelly (1977), this is particularly so in the case of multiple 
indicator analyses of conflict. 
The criticisms which these authors make of the press deal with the problem of 
systematic bias. For Danzger (1975) this . concept includes inaccuracies and 
distortion of facts, claims of bias towards a particular 'side', and suppression of 
information. While the reasons for these criticisms may differ, they are similar to 
those levelled at the press regarding violence reporting in this country. The 
criticisms of the KwaZulu-Natal press included the problem of bias, the poor 
coverage of the extent and the context of the violence and reporting rumours. 
Inadequate coverage of the extent and context of violence can be likened to the 
suppression of. news~ while inaccuracies of fact are the product of problems such 
as bias and reporting rumours. Danzger (1975), however, believed that of these, 
the only valid criticism was that information was suppressed. He did add, however, 
that inaccuracies of facts were. likely to arise in two particular situations. These are . 
where access to the event is limited or dangerous, and where the activity is so 
spread out or unpredictable that it cannot be adequately covered everywhere by 
several reporters. 
Both these conditions are common in KwaZulu-Natal, and pertain to conflict in both 
the violent urban areas and remote rural areas of the province. Insufficient 
reporting of details was a problem during the States of Emergency when the only 
source supplying information was the police, and even since the Emergency, this 
still occurs. Possible reasons for this state of affairs are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The main theme of Snyder and Kelly's (1977) work is that different types of events 
are dealt with in varying ways by the press, and are reported with varying 
frequency. There is little reason ' why this should not also apply for South African 
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newspapers given that similar problems have been identified with reporting 
patterns. Snyder and Kelly (1977) argue that . more intense events have a greater 
likelihood of being reported than less intense ones. Intense events are 
characterised by their size, degree of violence and their duration. 
Snyder and Kelly's (1977) concept of "media sensitivity" is relevant in the South 
African context. According to the authors this "sensitivity" is affected by the 
"political climate", and a local example is the legislation implemented under the 
States of Emergency. 
In terms of more indirect effects of the political climate, an example can be taken 
from events in the build up to the election in April 1994. During this time, reporting 
violence became a priority to newspapers, as this conflict was interpreted as 
"election related violence", even in cases where the origins of the conflict preceded 
the politics of elections, or were totally unrelated.? This is an ex~mple of how 
events can catch the public's interest even though many similar events have 
occurred before, which Snyder and Kelly (1977) refer to as an indirect 
manifestation of the political climate. 
The contextual characteristics of conflict events which, according to Snyder and 
Kelly (1977) also affect the sensitivity of the media to reporting conflict, are also 
relevant here. The nature of participants, the locational proximity of events to 
media networks and the frequency of events (which can sensitise readers to 
violence) can all be applied to the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. Journalists interviewed 
believe that events involving important public figures are more likely to be reported. 
Also, events occurring far from the newspaper's base are less likely to be covered 
in detail due to a lack of staff and resources. Reporters and editors of newspapers 
in KwaZulu-Natal also stated that readers were tired of reading about the local 
7 This issue was raised during an interview conducted with the assistant editor of ~ 
Natal Witness, on 1 July 1994 in Pietermaritzburg. 
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violence, and consequently these events were not reported as frequently, or in as 
much detail, as when violence levels were lower.s 
The findings of these studies can be very generally applied to South Africa. In this 
country, the reporting of conflict is unique due to the effects of the States of 
Emergency and other government legislation on newspapers. The criticisms of 
press reporting of violence discussed in Chapter Four deal with the effects of the 
Emergency. Since the Emergency was lifted, problems have persisted, and while 
some of these may be remnants of this era, others may be the result of the news 
production process in general. This consideration of the studies by Snyder and 
Kelly (1977) and others, suggests that the problems facing South African 
newspapers are not completely different from those abroad, and that the States of 
Emergency here probably added to these problems, rather than changed them. 
6. Conclusion 
The aims of this chapter have firstly been to outline the methodology used by this 
study to test the hypothesis that the likelihood that events of violent collective 
~~----------------------~-~--~~~~~ --.--
ac ·on.wiU b.e.J:eported by the press will be affected by characteristics of the events _. 
and b e environment in which events occur. Secondly, this chapter also sought 
to discuss the data used for testing this hypothesis. 
The methodology used by this study is divided into two parts. The first is 
qualitative, and reports the conclusions of secondary sources which discuss 
violence reporting by the. press and monitors. The second and main contribution to 
this part, comes from interviews conducted with relevant people from newspapers 
and monitoring agencies in KwaZulu-Natal. The results of this qualitative part of the 
research process are reported in the next chapter and in Chapter Five. 
8 ~hese views were recorded in interviews with five political reporters and editors of the 
Dally News, The Natal Witness and The Mercury in 1994 and 1995. 
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The second part of the methodology for this study is quantitative. Statistical 
analyses are used to compare, over time, how the press and monitors' reported 
events which differed in terms of their size, location, intensity and timing. The 
results of these analyses are reported in Chapter Six. 
Data for both the dependent and independent variables was obtained from the 
Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project. The methodology of this project was 
explained in detail in this chapter. International studies which have assessed the, 
effects of press reporting on conflict data were also referred to. The problems 
identified by these studies were part of the motivation for this study, and made an 




REPORTING VIOLENT CONFLICT: THE PRESS 
1. Aims of this chapter 
This chapter is one of the first which presents some of the results of this study. The 
aim of this chapter is to attempt to understand the way 'in which the press in 
KwaZulu-Natal reports violent conflict. Chapter One outlined some of the difficulties 
which researchers have encountered with the manner in which the press reports 
violent conflict in this province. This chapter will discuss and assess these 
criticisms, based on the results of interviews conducted with political reporters and 
editors of local newspapers. These opinions are framed within a discussion of the 
factors which affect and restrict violence reporting by the press. A very brief history 
of the English language press introduces this discussion. 
The previous chapter argued that freedom of speech is vital for democracies of all 
kinds. South Africa is no exception, particularly since violence in parts of the 
country threatens our new democracy. Freedom of speech is especially important 
in a climate of political violence for two reasons. Firstly, information about violence 
is prone to suppression, manipulation and misinterpretation. Secondly, information 
is the , essential ingredient without which long term solutions to violent conflict 
cannot be found. 
The press can make an important contribution towards understanding violence, but 
the extent to which the press in KwaZulu-Natal fulfils this role has been questioned. 
Understanding the nature of the material about violence which the press 
disseminates is crucial for researchers using the press as a source of information. 
This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of how the press goes about 
reporting violent conflict, and about the factors which have affected, and continue 
to affect this reporting. These factors are: 
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• The legislative restrictions imposed by the previous government, particularly 
during the States of Emergency. 
• Daily journalistic practices and the functioning of the newsroom. 
• The demands of market forces and the influence of newspaper ownership. 
• The reporting environment outside the newsroom. 
Before discussing these factors, some background to the debates about the 
reporting history of the English language press will be considered. This discussion 
does not offer a comprehensive commentary on the history of the press in South 
Africa. 1 Many of the comments about reporting in general apply to violence 
reporting as well, and serve to contextualise the problems which are currently 
experienced. 
2. The English language press 
Historically the English press has been described as the voice of British ' capital and 
mining interests and until recently, the ownership of these newspapers reflected 
this legacy (Pollack, 1981). Up to 1994, two powerful groups had a monopoly of 
ownership over the English press. These were Argus Holdings and Times Media 
Limited, companies which are linked by shareholdings and contracts, and which 
are effectively owned by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa and the 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company (JCI) (Heard, 1991). 
In 1994 the situation changed when the Irish Independent Newspaper Company 
bought majority ·shares in Argus Holdings, thereby gaining control over most of the 
country's English dailies and some weekly newspapers. The Natal Witness and to 
an extent the Daily Dispatch remain the only independent daily newspapers in the 
country. Before these changes in ownership, the press in KwaZulu-Natal was faced 
not only with a monopoly of ownership, but with a situation where one company, 
Natal Newspapers Limited, dominated the publishing and printing of most 
1 This has been carried out in depth by various authors, such as Hachten and Giffard 
(1984), Pollack (1981), Potter (1975), and Tomaselli ~ (eds.) (1987). 
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newspapers in the province.2 
The ownership structure of the English press has been an important factor in 
debates about the ' quality of their reporting. These newspapers have been 
regarded by some as the mainstream Iiber·al press in South Africa, actively 
opposed to apartheid. For others, however, the fact that the English press has 
historically been a commercial venture, backed by financial, commercial and 
mining concerns limited its rejection of apartheid (Potter, 1975). The latter have 
described the English press's opposition to apartheid as a role attained by default 
rather than by ideology (Potter, 1975; TomasellieLa1, 1987). These critics argue 
that the 'black' press could not articulate the views of apartheid's opponents due to 
government restrictions, and the Afrikaans language press promoted exclusive 
Afrikaner culture and the politics of the ruling National Party. The English press 
was the least hostile towards black people and thus became perceived as the anti-
apartheid voice. 
The position put forward by Tomaselli ru.t (1987) and to a lesser extent Potter 
(1975), corresponds with the neo-Marxist critique of the liberal press. This critique 
disputes two claims about these newspapers. The first is that they displayed a 
strong opposition to apartheid, and the second is that the liberal press is in 
principle a neutral reporter of important events, with commentary and opinions 
limited to the editorial pages (Phelan, 1987). 
Tomaselli ill1 (1987) examined the political economy of the press in South Africa, 
and argued that the mass media, despite the English press's anti-apartheid stance, 
articulated the ideology of apartheid. Apartheid, these authors believed, was not an 
irrational ideology based on racial and cultural distinctions, but an expression of the 
class struggle in a capitalist society historically divided by race. The English press, 
being owned by 'white' capital, was consequently limited in its opposition to 
apartheid. (The only exception is the Rand Dajly Mail, which was considered the 
2 Natal Newspapers runs the Sunday Tribyne, Daily News, The Mercyry, The post, 
Zylyland Observer and eight suburban newspapers. Mandla-Matla Publishing Company 
owns !langa. Natal Witnes~ Pty Ltd owns The Natal Witness. UmAfdka and New African 
are/were small independently owned newspapers. 
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most liberal English newspaper.) Given its ideological position, the English press 
could not present a serious threat to social and economic relations in South Africa, 
but its resistance to government policy nevertheless engendered severe 
repression. 
A similar argument has been made by members of the 'black' press. These critics 
did not distinguish between the English press as 'oppositionist' and the Afrikaans 
as 'establishment', as is usually the case. Instead both were regarded as lacking 
credibility and were viewed as one industry serving the interests of the ruling 
classes. The English press was perceived to have accepted the status quo without 
questioning the political system as a whole (Phelan, 1987). In doing so, these 
newspapers served white interests exclusively, as opposition to government policy 
was only voiced to the extent that it did not threaten the advantaged position of 
white South Africans (Qwelane, 1992). 
A statement hy P .W. Botha shortly after becoming Prime Minister in 1979 is 
revealing. Botha announced to the country that there was a"'Marxist drive which 
aims at contrOlling the subcontinent', [and] he needed the assistance of the private 
sector to fully support the government in establishing national security" (Phelan, 
1987: 44). The role of the press in this regard was crucial, and resulted in the 
Steyn Commission of Inquiry. 
There are strong arguments which opposed these critics, arguing that the English 
press defied apartheid actively and with determination. The government regulations 
on the media were perceived as having had the greatest impact on the publication 
of news by the liberal press. The Nationalist Government imposed curbs on the 
English press as early as 1948 whereafter these newspapers were never allowed 
to undermine the control and policy of this government. Pollack (1981: 2) for 
example, stated that "more than any powerful force in the country [the English 
language] newspapers stand almost alone between the Afrikaner government and 
totalitarian darkness". He agreed that the financial concerns of the English press 
owners limit newspapers' political expression, but does not regarded this as 
significant. 
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Whatever ideological or commercial position newspapers may have adhered to, 
there can be little doubt that the States of Emergency regulations of the 1980s 
severely constrained the flow of information regarding civil unrest in the black 
townships. Even Potter (1~75) and Tomaselli rul (1987) conceded that despite 
the vested interest of the English press in maintaining the status quo, opposition to 
the government was consistent. 
Phelan (1987) also believed the neo-Marxist critique is flawed. He proposed that 
both the mainstream and alternative press were opposed to apartheid, although the 
latter criticised apartheid not only from a racist perspective, but also as an element 
of the capitalist exploitation of labour. The most serious limitation facing the 
mainstream media according to Phelan (1987) is a technical one. In order to 
manage the costs of advanced technology, greater outputs, higher ratings and 
broader readerships are needed. Objectivity in this context is not an e ideal 
but rather a tool which extends the readership beyond that of a more partial press . ....~
by not offending large groups of readers. 
Phelan (1987: 81) warned that this demand for a broader spread of readership 
means focused commuriity issues are sacrificed for an artificially created set of 
"media community issues and people". Under these conditions news becomes a 
highly artificial commodity, supplying information which bears little relation · to 
reality. Phelan (1987) suggested that the problem facing the mainstream press 
arises out of financial constraints which are the product of modem technology. 
Phelan (1987) further argued that some actions of the large newspaper companies 
cannot be dismissed as merely a pursuit of the profit motive. The determination of 
the Argus Publishing Company to continue publishing very critical papers staffed 
by black journalists who the government sought to silence, illustrates this point. 
"Critical articles and scathing editorials certainly cause more trouble than they 
generate sales, where sex-sin-soccer have worked just fine" (Phelan, 1987: 73). 
He stated that this proves that at some level these newspapers sought to maintain 
a free press in the interests of democracy. 
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This broad discussion shows some of the issues in the debate about the position of 
the English language press in reporting events, particularly of a political nature. 
This background is important for understanding not only the effect of government 
restrictions, but also other factors which affect reporting, and the extent to which 
these might influence coverage of violence. The problems of the South African 
press, particularly relating to violence reporting, are usually explained in terms of 
the restrictive legislation. This would suggest that since the lifting of the States of 
Emergency and the decline in prosecutions in terms of the remaining laws, 
violence reporting will have improved accordingly. 
3. Restrictions on the press 
The lack of press freedom in South African was an extension of the lack of 
democracy in the country in general under the previous government. Any 
newspaper will be shaped by the market forces in which it operates and the related 
financial considerations. In this country, however, the press has also had to deal 
with extensive laws which sought to suppress opposition to the government and 
promote a favourable image of South Africa to its white citizens, and to those 
countries abroad which provided foreign investment. In 1990, the route to 
democracy was cleared, and in April 1994 the first democratic elections were held. 
The climate of continued violence and intolerance, however, threaten the prospects 
of achieving genuine democracy. One of the victims of this political climate has 
been the media, which . until the elections, had to operate in an environment 
characterised by intimidation and threats. This environment affected violence 
reporting most severely. In the sections which follow, the factors which impede a 
free media will be discussed. These are legislative restrictions, the newsroom 
process, the demands of the market on commercial newspapers, and the effects of 
the reporting environment on violence coverage. 
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i) Legislative restrictions 
Opposition to the English press by the Nationalist Government has a long history 
which has been traced back to the formation of the Purified Nationalist party in 
1934 (Hepple, 1974). Accusations against the ·press ranged from publishing lies, 
hatred of the Afrikaners, and incitement of blacks, to defaming the country abroad. 
In 1949, Dr Malan described the English press as the most undisciplined in the 
world, and called for a register of all journalists so that their conduct could be . 
controlled. The government's dissatisfaction with the press since then escalated, 
culminating in the over one hundred laws, most of which can still today be invoked 
to restrict the media (Stander, 1991/2).3 The purpose of the legislation will be 
considered before reviewing the laws themselves as they were implemented from 
the 1950s. 
Some of the laws were designed to subtly force the mainstream ·press into self-
censorship, rather than openly censoring the political content of newspapers. This 
enabled the government to maintain an appearance of press free~om, necessary 
for international credibility (Potter, 1975). That laws posed a threat to journalists but 
were not always fully invoked, illustrates this point. Their most Significant purpose, 
however, was to achieve the larger political goals of the government, namely to 
limit the activities of black groups opposed to the state, and stop the diss~mination 
of information about political conflict (Tomaselli e.ta1,.1987). 
To do this, communication had to be suppressed at three levels: the spread of 
news overseas regarding th.e popular uprising from 1984 and the offiCially 
sanctioned police brutality which this unleashed, the spread .of ideas and goals of 
the oppressed and the alternative organisations to all sectors of society, and the 
links between organisations which maintained the liberation movement (Merrett, . 
1990). The increased suppression of the alternative media in the mid-1980s 
suggests that the perceived threat to the white oligarchy in South Africa came not 
from the white electorate but from the "rising militancy of the ·voteless black 
3 Articl~ 15 (1) of ~he Interim. C~ns~itution d?e~. however. protect freedom of the press. 
and actions perceived to be Infringing on thiS right could be contested in the Constitutional 
Court. 
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masses", who were supported by most of the international world (Hepple, 1974: 6). 
The government needed a press which would present apartheid as a favourable 
system. 
After the 1976 uprisings, infamous laws restricting the press such as the Internal 
Security Act were passed, which paved the way for the imposition of the nation-
wide State of Emergency in 1986. Many restraining laws were, however, instituted 
before 1976. The regulations sought either to suppress criticism of the government 
or to restrict the sources of information about opposition movements, or both. The 
Suppression of Communism Act (1950) served both functions in its aim to control 
the spread of communism and prevent the publication of statements of banned 
people. This Act could be used against any political opinion which opposed 
government. The Riotous Assembly Act (1956) also served both purposes. 
Publications which the government thought could instil racial hostilities could be 
banned according to this Act. People could also be banned and prohibited from 
attending public gatherings. 
The following acts aimed to crush opposition to the government. The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act (1953) prohibited criticism of laws in case this encouraged 
someone else (such as a reader) to break the law. The Public Safety Act (1953) 
enabled the government to declare a State of Emergency in times of unrest, which 
allowed for the publishing and dissemination of any material considered subversive 
to be banned (Potter, 1975). The Prisons Act (1959) restricted the publication of 
pictures and stories relating to prisonefs, prisons and their administration. When 
the Rand Daily Mail published a series on prison conditions in 1965, the editor and 
journalist responsible had their passports revoked and were given a sman fine and 
suspended sentence respectively. The legal costs, however, were very high. 
The Official Secrets Amendment Act (1965) and Defence Amendment Act (1967) 
similarly prohibited the publication or possession of any information relating to 
official secrets, defence and police, and atomic energy. By 1968 there had, 
however, been no convictions under the first act (Louw and Tomaselli, 1991). 
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The establishment of the Press Board and Press Code of Conduct aimed to subtly 
suppress censure of government by forcing the press to discipline itself. The 
Newspaper Press Union (NPU), formed in 1882, established a Press Board of 
Reference and an internal code of conduct in order to avoid the 1963 Publications 
and Entertainment Act. After further threats by government, the NPU then 
transformed the Press Board into a Press Council in order to delay the creation of 
a statutory press council by the government (Louw and Tomaselli, 19~1) . In 1977, 
of the 253 complaints filed with the Press Council, only ten were ultimately placed 
before the council for hearing and the most severe penalty imposed on a paper 
was a reprimand (Pollack, 1981). 
Legislation which targeted the sources of information included the Criminal 
Procedures Act (1955) which forced witnesses to provide information if requested 
to do so by the police. Journalists similarly could be forced to reveal their sources. 
Although this law was not often used and journalists were not held for long, it is still 
being invoked (Potter, 1975). From September 1990 to 1992, nine subpoenas were 
issued against journalists in terms of Section 205, two of which resulted in prison 
sentences (Stander, 1991/2). This Section was used thirteen times against 
journalist~ in 1992 (Angamuthu, 1993). The General Law Amendment Act (1962) 
also restricted sources, by disallowing the publication of speeches and comments 
of banned people. 
After 1976, the government had to deal with a declining economy and the 
resurgence of popular resistance. The state tried to buy into the English language 
press (Louw and Tomaselli , 1991) to control news from the inside, but this proved 
unsuccessful. The Citizen was formed instead, in opposition to the Rand Daily 
Mail. More coercive tactics followed which sought to stop the spread of information 
about unlawful activities by government agents. 
The Police Amendment Act (1978) prevented the press from publishing any 
information about the police that was untrue, and the onus fell on the journalist to 
prove that the report was accurate. There have, however, been relatively few 
convictions in terms of this Act. The Eastern Province Herald was the only paper to 
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be prosecuted, although cases against other newspapers were investigated. In 
January 1992, the relevant section of the Act was scrapped amid moves by the 
government to lift restrictions on press freedom (The Mercury, 15 January 1992). 
The Advocates General Bill (1979) passed after the Information Scandal, 
performed a similar function as it prohibit the reporting of matters under formal 
investigation by the Advocate General (Tomaselli e1.ID, 1987). 
The findings of the Steyn Commission (a state enquiry into the mass media in 
1981) also limited journalists' access to the Commissioner of Police to discuss 
'sensitive' issues (Louw and Tomaselli, 1991). Police could not only chose which 
journalists to talk to, but editors and the NPU were furthermore being co-opted by 
the government to monitor reporters. This pressure on the media to perform self-
censorship became a trend of government repression which began with the 
formation of the Press Council in the 1960s (as discussed above). In the early 
1980s, the Minister of Interior threatened to institute a statutory Press Council, with 
a register of all journalists with the power to fine and ban reporters. 
The second Steyn Commission supported .these proposals which were attempts to 
restrict the free flow of information and essentially the publication of the truth (Louw 
and Tomaselli, 1991). The NPU set up a Media Council which replaced the Press 
Council to c,?unteract these proposals .. Although the Press Council was created in 
order to maintain press freedom, subtle cooption and exploitation meant that 
freedom was in no way secured (Louw and Tomaselli, 1991). Even in the late 
1980s when restrictions were most severe, the . government did not appear to 
directly interfere with the press. Instead it sought to increase tensions between 
management and editorial sections of the commercial newspapers. Under the 
circumstances, management chose self-censorship which was in line with 
government intentions (Tomaselli and Louw, 1991). 
For most of the 1980s the government appeared more determined to control the 
establishment media than the left-wing media, as the former reached the 
government's white support base. The findings of the Steyn Commission indicated 
that this was to change. While the Commission acknowledged the need for political 
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tolerance and expression of black grievances it accused the black press (such as 
Sowetan) of "fomenting discontent and lacking loyalty" (Phelan, 1987: 64). The 
restrictive press legislation imposed during this time was felt more by black 
journalists than by any others.4 The Newspapers Amendment Bill (1980) was a 
direct attack on the alternative media, as it made provision for all newspapers to 
pay a deposit of R40 000 to the government. The alternative press lacked major 
capital funds and struggled to meet this demand, often failing to meet it at all. 
The perceived internal war and the 'total strategy' adopted by the government in 
response to the crisis of .the 1980s resulted in more stringent restrictions on the 
flow of information. The media was identified as an important site of the struggle 
against apartheid with the potential to cause a revolution. The Internal Security Act 
reintroduced in 1982, made it illegal to circulate and publish matters relating to 
alternative social, political and economic policies for South Africa (Tomaselli e1...a1, 
1987). The State President could close newspapers which contravened the Act 
without explanation and several were silenced in this manner. 
The Bureau of Information was formed in 1985 and its principle aim was to control 
the flow of information. The Bureau became the only commentator on South 
African issues, particularly the violence, and sought to propagate an"official news 
culture" enabling the government to monitor the presentation of political news by 
the media (Louw and Tomaselli, 1991: 84). The publication of official police Unrest 
Reports on a daily basis was part of this "news culture". Despite these restrictions, 
resistance to the apartheid state increased in the 1980s. 
The national State of Emergency in 1986 was the government's answer to this 
increased resistance. The government's concern shifted during this time from the 
mainstream to the alternative press possibly because the former had imposed self-
4 Up to 1987, no Afrikaner journalist had ever been detained. From 1976 to 1981 there 
we~e less than 250 mainstream black journalists and 3 500 white journalists. During this 
penod, fifty black journalists were detained for up to 500 days, ten were detained more 
th~n once, ten were banned and one was arrested and sentenced to seven years in 
pnson. In the same period one white journalist was detained, one banned and one 
sentenced to six years in prison (Phelan, 1987). 
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censorship and had consistently adopted a conservative and cautious approach as 
the government hoped it would (Louw and Tomaselli , 1991). The alternative media 
had also expanded despite state attempts to eliminate it, and although the state 
vowed it would crush the alternative press, serious action was not subsequently 
taken (Tomaselli and Louw, 1991). 
By 1987 it became clear that any left-wing press was considered 'subversive' , but 
as the government had no clear definition of this category, all opposition was 
rejected. Many regulations restricting press freedom were obscure, which 
complicated the journalists' task even more. The government defined as 
revolutionary "any attempt to change South Africa away from a racially ordered 
society and any call for a more equitable distribution of wealth ... " (Tomaselli and 
Louw, 1991: 181). This meant that opposition to capitalism was also illegal and 
demonstrated the links between apartheid and capital in South Africa's 
government. 
After 1987, restricting the press became a totally subjective affair, punishable by 
closure and/or censorship. The Registration of Newspapers Amendment Bill was 
invoked on the New African when it opened in 1989 in the form of a R20 000 
deposit. The newspaper was given a warning even before its first edition, and the 
state's threat to retain this deposit enabled extensive control over what was 
published. By September 1989, twenty four cases were being heard regarding this 
issue, illustrating that the courts were increasingly being used as censorship tools 
(Louw and Tomaselli , 1991). Harassment of this nature was common, and was 
accompanied by intimidation of reporters through arrests and seizure of footage 
throughout 1989. 
ii) Effects of legislation on violence reporting 
The States of Emergency and the preceding regulations were aimed directly at 
contrOlling news about conflict and violence in South Africa. Violence was a direct 
expression of opposition to the state by the liberation movements and the 
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government wished to restrict this information. The role of the security forces in the 
violence on the side of the government, and the state support of black groups 
against the extra-parliamentary movements are also issues which the government 
wanted to conceal. This had far reaching effects on violence reporting. 
The most obvious implication of the laws is that they obstructed reporting on 
violence, let alone the other normal activities of reporters. Journalists were 
prevented from: 
• Gaining access to affected areas. 
• Adequately checking the facts of their stories particularly if this required 
verification from the authorities. 
• Quoting the opinions of people involved if these contravened Emergency 
regulations or if the people themselves were banned. 
• Commenting on action taken by security forces (Robbins, 1988). 
The press restrictions assaulted the most vital aspects of reporting, namely access 
to information and to sources. " Not only the normal reporting routine was affected, 
however. The journalists themselves had to deal with constant confusion about 
legislation as well as personal danger. 5 
Journalists faced detention, banning, assault, disrupted meetings, they suffered 
attacks on their premises, and were increasingly forced to reveal their sources in 
court. Newspapers were threatened with suspension and some were forced to stop 
publication. As time passed, the Emergency restrictions became more 
comprehensive, to the extent that it was "de facto illegal for journalists to concern 
themselves with that which is normally newsworthy!" (Louw and Tomaselli, 1991: 
87). The definition of a 'publication' and of 'subversive' material was expanded, and 
the press could only publish stories which were compatible with official reports. 
These reporting conditions had three broad effects on journalism in South Africa 
and on the reporting of violence: 
5 See Mkhize (1988) for an informative account of these issues. 
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Lack of sources 
The lack of access to sources and the subsequent reliance on the state Bureau of 
Information had implications for reporting. During interviews, the political reporters 
at The Natal Witness and The Mercury said that the State of Emergency laws 
made journalists lazy as they became accustomed to the police "handouts" in the 
form of the Unrest Reports. The assistant editor of The Natal Witness confirmed 
this, saying that the Emergency suppressed the investigative culture of reporters 
and elevated the police to the position of journalists. This problem still prevails 
according to these sources, with reporters doing their jobs using the telephone 
rather than speaking to people on the ground.6 
The lack of access to sources and reliance on the Bureau of Information also 
meant the term 'black-on-black' was widely used by the local and foreign news 
media to describe and explain the violence in South Africa. This simplification of 
the violence depoliticised the problem, totally obscuring the central role of the 
government and apartheid in the conflict. Apartheid was limited to the "quaint 
traditional customs of the Afrikaners" (Fair and Astroff, 1991: 72). Mkhize, (1990) 
criticised the press for adopting the Bureau's terminology and for reporting the 
conflict as racial and8 He pointed out that these shallow distortions. of events 
have affected international perceptions of the violence. These problems gave rise 
to the criticism of the press referred to in the introduction, that the causes and 
consequences of the violence was not accurately covered. 
According to the political reporter at The Natal Witness, the problem of editors 
uSi(egrminology still exists. The assistant editor confirmed this, adding that 
one of his tasks is to rid the newspaper of these tendencies. Reporters at ~ 
Mercury and Daily News also said the use of this kind of language still occurs, 
although with more black staff in the newsroom, this is changing? 
6 Interviews with ~~e political reporter and assistant editor of The Natal Witness in July 
1994, and the political reporter from The Mercury in February 1994. 
7 Interview with the Daily News political reporter, February 1994. 
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Self-censorship 
The second effect of the restrictions was that journalists were forced to protect their 
interests, which they did by limiting their rights and options. Reporters became too 
cautious and self-censorship was encouraged (Armour, 1987; Emdon, 1990). 
These practices, once established, are not easily shaken off. Ken Owen, editor of 
the Sunday Times, commented that "The virtual destruction of South African 
journalism - the terrible loss of skills - is now exacting its toll" (Heard, 1992). 
This caution was exercised particularly when dealing with the political activity of 
extra-parliamentary movements (Armour, 1987; Hepple, 1974). The press could 
not easily get access to leaders of banned organisations and their views, and these 
groups received poor publicity during the Emergency as a result. This created the 
perception that the mainstream media was biased against these groups. This has 
been cited as the reason for the press in KwaZulu-Natal giving Minister Buthelezi 
and Inkatha extensive coverage in the 1980s. After the other political groups were 
unbanned in 1990 this changed. Bias is one of the criticisms levelled at the press 
which was mentioned in the introduction to this study. 
Only two of the political reporters interviewed agreed that self-censorship still 
occurs as a result of the State of Emergency legislation. The SAPA reporter said 
that being detained during the Emergency had made him reluctant to venture out to 
obtain new information, adding that reporters are sometimes still reluctant to 
confront policemen at the scene of violence. 
The Mercury editor believed that self-censorship might still be occurring, but that 
the situation is now far better than it was during the mid-1980s. His counterpart in 
the Daily News agreed that the problem is still a factor. These comments suggest 
that the current situation among KwaZulu-Natal newspapers is somewhat better 
than that described above.8 
8 Inte~iews with the SAPA reporter in July 1994 and the editors 9f The Mercury and ~ 
~ In March 1995. 
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The extent and intensity of violence was not reported 
The third implication of the press restrictions was that the ongoing violence was 
removed from the public sphere as a result of the daily difficulties in disseminating 
news and the limitations mentioned above (Phelan, 1987). The extent and intensity 
of the conflict was concealed frqm all those not residing in the black townships 
where the violence was occurring. (This inspired one of the major criticisms of the 
press coverage of violence referred to in the introduction, namely that the extent of 
the violence was not well reported.) The township residents developed an intense 
dislike for the press, for not reporting the violence in their communities. The 
implications of the Emergency regulations on the press were not always fully 
understood, and the newspapers were consequently blamed for restrictions which 
originated with the government and police. 
Many daily experiences of people went unrecorded and large portions of our 
history remain unknown. A study in the United States (US) found that when the 
Emergency began in 1985, US networks ran sixty stories in August on the daily 
news. By November this was down to twenty and later none at all. Thus for the 
international world and more so for South Africans, the continuing incidents "might 
as well not have happened" (Phelan, 1987: 37). Throughout the decades of 
apartheid, the media failed to disseminate news about the activities of black 
people. 
While the Emergency shielded the realities of apartheid from those who benefited 
from the system and concealed the truths about the methods used to sustain 
apartheid, this had always been the practice in South Africa (Merrett, 1991). When 
asked how many events could not be published due to the Emergency restrictions 
in 1987, then news editor of The Mercury, Joe Mulraney said "The Mercury never 
was a great crusading newspaper for black rights as say, the Rand Daily Mail. So 
quite probably there is a lot of copy which we wouldn't have used anyway" 
(Armour, 1987). 
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One positive implication of the Emergency regulations according to Merrett (1991), 
is that some journalists were forced to challenge the law and conquer restrictions 
on press freedom. Loopholes in the Emergency had to be discovered (and were), 
and reporters had to find alternate sources of information about restricted subjects 
such as security force activity. The severity of the Emergency increased the skills 
of journalists and their determination to achieve freedom of expression. These 
qualities could prove useful for the future in South Africa. 
iii) Restrictions related to the newsroom process 
The newsroom process, which is often shaped by the demands of the market and 
the daily production schedule of the newspaper, also affects violence reporting. 
This process will be discussed, drawing largely on information obtained during 
interviews with political reporters and editors from KwaZulu-Natal's daily 
newspapers. 
The newsroom process is driven largely .by the decisions taken by editors and 
reporters about what issues will be covered and by whom, which are reported on, 
and the form of the final product for publication. Emdon (1991) believed these 
issues are relevant to the way the press deals with violence in KwaZulu-Natal 
because the commercial press is dominated by white males with few black 
journalists being trained or hired.9 
In the case of the alternative newspapers, the staff were dominated by younger 
black males. These exclusive groups make almost all the decisions about which 
news will reach the public. Emdon (1991) also contended that newspapers in 
KwaZulu-Natal have adopted their practices from the Fleet Street tradition of British 
newspapers with few modifications to suit the local circumstances. 
9 Emdon (1991) put his material together in 1990. By 1994 when this study was being 
researche~, the number of young black reporters had increased dramatically. This was in 
tu~, perceived as a problem because many lacked the necessary skills. Amongst the 
editors and managers, however, there were still very few black staff members. 
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The activities in the newsroom include the editors, and to some extent the 
reporters, deciding what constitutes news, how this news will be interpreted and 
thus what the public should be informed about. More specifically, the news editors 
in consultation with the editors, decide what reporters should focus on and which 
reporter should cover the story. The reporters then gather and select the material 
which they believe is appropriate. The copy tasters decide whether the report 
should be used and how long and on which page it will appear. 
The news editors, chief sub-editors and editors may at any point in this process 
change the focus or position of the news item (Emdon, 1991). This process can be 
influenced by many factors such as: the ideological position of the reporters, 
editors and newspaper owners; the resources available to the newspaper; the 
demands of producing the publication by the end of the day; and obstacles to 
obtaining and publishing information. 
As a result, many theories have been developed which try to explain the 
determinants of this process and its manifestations. Some theories suggest that 
certain events are more newsworthy than others, or that a happening is only 
newsworthy when it becomes an event. Other explanations focus on how the 
newsroom is organised and what determines how reporters and editors make their 
decisions. Still other theories examine how information is filtered in the process, 
which is also known as 'gatekeeping'. 
The theory of 'consensual bias' by contrast, argues that the whole process of news 
selection is shaped by a prevailing ideology which is never articulated, but is 
learned through the relationships in the newsroom (Tomaselli eL.a1, 1987). 
Whatever the causes, it has been argued that this newsroom process affects 
violence reporting, not only in terms of deciding what is newsworthy, but also with 
regard to information about events being omitted or altered in the editorial process 
and the choice of headlines and terminology. 
The opinions of journalists from KwaZulu-Natal newspapers about the ways in 
which journalistic practices influence reporting will be considered. Although these 
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are the views of a small group of people in the newspaper business, their opinions 
are relevant because this study used only these newspapers as sources. The roles 
of reporters and editors in deciding who will cover violence stories, which topics to 
cover and what constitutes newsworthiness, and the sources of information and 
how this information is handled, will be discussed. In addition, the perceived 
limitations to violence reporting as a result of resource and time constraints and the 
'gatekeeping' process, will also be covered. 
The roles of reporters and editors in the newsroom process 
The daily task of violence reporting is fairly standardised, resting with the crime 
reporter in all three newspapers, namely The Natal Witness, Daily News and The 
Mercury. All the newspapers had, during times of widespread conflict, appointed a 
special 'unrest reporter', but this position has since fallen away. The political 
reporters (who were the subjects of the interviews) only become involved in 
violence reporting if a background article or an investigative piece is to be done. 
The Daily News reporter said that if violence becomes extreme, any reporter can 
be used to cover events. 
The editors have little direct interaction with the crime reporter in terms of the 
latter's violence reporting task. Editors generally are concerned with planning the 
daily contents of the newspaper, discussing the headline and lead stories and their 
placing in the newspaper, and the editorial sections. All this is done in consultation 
with staff in other editorial positions. Both editors of the Daily News and ~ 
Mercury pointed out that since the takeover of the Independent Newspaper 
Company, their roles include taking more responsibility for the commercial success 
of their newspapers than before. 
Responding to the question of influence by the newspaper owners and managers 
over their activities, the Daily News editor was adamant that any interference on 
editorial issues is offensive, and that this never happened. The Mercury editor 
agreed, saying the owners are more involved in the marketing position of the 
newspaper, deciding what kind of newspaper to publish, the relevant target market, 
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and how much advertising space the newspaper will need to remain profitable. 
Once these decisions are taken and an appropriate editor is employed, there is no 
further editorial interference. Despite the editors' opinions, these kinds of 'market' 
based decisions by owners could be interpreted as determining the general scope 
of topics covered, and the way in which the newspaper covers them. 
Decision making and 'gatekeeping' 
Decisions about who will undertake investigative reports on violence are made 
either by the news editor alone, or in consultation with the relevant reporter. The 
news editor in tum reports directly to the managing. editor whose task it is to inspire 
the news editor, who should, in tum inspire his/her staff of reporters. The Mercury 
reporter noted that this process is not systematic and depends on constraints of 
time, space and resources. The SAPA reporter and the assistant editor of Ib.e 
Natal Witness pointed out that the news editors are often not particularly 
concerned with violence and do not encourage reporters to investigate further, 
being satisfied with telephone journalism and body counts. 
Gatekeeping refers to editors' decisions about articles submitted by reporters. Most 
reporters were dissatisfied with the performance of sub-editors in particular. The 
assistant editor of The Natal Witness also believed that the sub-editors are the 
most powerful people in the newspaper because they adhere to a "subs culture" 
(which advocates "responsible" reporting, for example) which is often difficult to 
change, and which often causes problems for reporters. Reporters poioted out that 
most sub-editors are whit~, middle-aged men who are largely conservative, and 
who perform important ta~ks such as writing headlines and deciding on the length 
and placement of articles. The Mercury reporter said that bias is often worse at this 
level because the "subs" are not overseen by anyone, as are reporters by the news 
editors. 
The editors of the Daily News and The Mercury argued that while subs are largely 
white, middle-aged men they tend to be the more experienced journalists. Ib.e 
Mercury editor acknowledged that subs tended to be politically more conservative 
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than reporters, but that they were discouraged from making political statements in 
their choice of headlines. He acknowledged that the problems with sub-editors 
might affect violence reporting in particular because it is hard to persuade sub-
editors who believe that no one wants to read about violence, that violence is 
actually important. Both The Mercury and Daily News editors stated that there is 
friction between reporters and sub-editors in newspapers throughout the world. The 
latter also believed that the presence of white middle-aged men in editorial roles is 
also common throughout the world, and that this is an issue rather than a problem 
for newspapers. 
The journalists at The Natal Witness were more concerned with the news editor's 
role as opposed to that of the sub-editor, and raised some points which none of the 
other interviewees mentioned. The news editors are still largely white and both the 
reporter and assistant editor said these editors relate more easily to a white farmer 
being murdered, than for example, to black people dying· in the townships. They felt 
that black people are seen as inferior by news editors, who are detached from 
these communities. This has a negative impact on violence reporting, because 
although news editors do not stop a reporter covering political violence, they do not 
encourage it. 
The reporter said that the major limitation for violence reporting is that 
management and editors believe black journalists ·are all politically aligned, and 
consequently do not believe some of the stories they write. As a result, the 
reporters chose not to cover certain events, particularly if the events concern the 
political party the reporter is beUeved to support. The reporter did believe, however, 
that The Natal Witness is a better newspaper than the other provincial dailies since 
senior reporters attend the main management meetings where they can challenge 
most of the decisions that are taken. 
What constitutes newsworthiness 
Reporters' and editors' opinions about which events are chosen for reporting or 
follow-up investigations, and thus · what constitutes news and newsworthiness , 
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differed. There was, however, some consensus about conventional understandings 
of newsworthiness. Reporters from all the dailies and from SAPA said "news 
value" is characterised by large numbers of people being killed or injured in events, 
the involvement of women and children, the presence of well known people, the 
broader political climate at the time of the event, and generally any events which 
are new or different from the normal trends. Reporters' personal opinions about 
how they decided which events to write about or investigate, differed. 
The Natal Witness reporter said that curiosity or a hunch often indicates which 
events to follow up. The assistant editor echoed this, saying he encourages this 
sort of reporting to counteract the conventional newsworthy requirements. The 
reporter did not believe that the public are tired of reading about violence as a 
subject, but instead they are tired of the manner in which violence is reported. The 
assistant editor however, was of the opinion that readers, both white and black, 
want to read about other issues. The "h~adcount" reports of conflict events 
continue to be published, he said, because the news desk feels obliged to inform 
the public. 
The Daily News editor shared some of his counterpart's sentiments. He said that 
while the issue of newsworthiness is an ongoing debate in his newspaper, 
journalists are tired of the violence and are not eager to cover its course. He was 
adamant, however, that news cannot be manipulated and that all events of 
violence which can be verified are reported, although it is unlikely that such reports 
would be a focus or a lead story. He acknowledged that newsworthiness is the 
main influence on what is reported, but that this often translates into a difference in 
emphasis rather than exclusion. He noted that news value is a perception often 
leading to decisions made according to a "gut feel" under extreme pressure to 
produce three editions a day. 
The Daily News reporter also commented that newsworthiness is important, and 
that it is often subjective decision making. She added that in previous years when 
violence levels were higher, events with just two deaths would automatically be 
investigated, but now these events receive small mentions. 
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The Mercury editor had different thoughts about the issue. He said that 
newsworthiness depends on the position adopted by the newspaper and on its 
readership. The Mercury's new direction is that of an "upmarket" newspaper, and 
consequently it has a different focus to the Daily News which is now a more 
"middle market" publication. This means that The Mercury focuses on "issues", 
and one murder is therefore unlikely to receive much attention.The Mercury has to 
differentiate itself from the Daily News to remain in business, and this requirement 
has the greatest effect on what is newsworthy. 
Sources and their reliability 
The newspapers generally rely on similar sources for regular information about 
violence, namely the South African Police Service (SAPS) and political party 
spokespersons. All the newspapers and SAPA are in daily telephone 
communication with the SAPS and in some cases the KwaZulu Police (KZP), or 
receive a daily fax listing events. Other sources include, with varying regularity, 
political parties, monitoring agencies and contacts in communities. The Mercury 
reporter noted that the newspaper does not have a good network of sources in the 
black communities where most of the violence occurs. Both The Mercury and 
Daily News editors identified the issue of sources, and in particular their accuracy, 
as an important problem for violence reporting. 
Thoughts on the reliability of these sources differed. The Natal Wjtness and SAPA 
reporters found the police information unreliable and both said they often hear 
about events before the police do. The SAPA reporter said that channels of 
communication with the police ought to be more professional and established. ~ 
Natal Witness reporter preferred to approach political parties for comments after 
events, as opposed to obtaining new information from them, as they are also not 
very reliable. These two reporters also seemed more proactive in gaining 
information, citing local residents, civic committees and community structures as 
sources. 
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For The Mercury and the Daily News, the police are the most regular source of 
information (although the police are also not considered particularly accurate), 
followed by political party spokespersons. Although all interviewees mentioned the 
monitoring agencies, it does not appear that monitors information is regularly used. 
Most reporters said the events have usually been published by the time the 
monitors' reports are received. 
All reporters agreed that the verification of events is vital before they can be 
published. Allegations of political parties committing crimes can only be reported 
along with the response of the other party. According to The Mercyry reporter, . all 
reports from political parties or people on the ground have to be confirmed by the 
police, despite the fact that police reports themselves are of a poor quality and 
often have to be checked against political party statements. He considered the 
monitoring agency reports to generally be more accurate than those of the police. 
At the Daily News a similar process was followed, except the reporter said that 
events are only verified if the reporter or the news editor thinks the details are 
problematic. The reporter thought the sources are generally accurate, but the editor 
described their sources as "dicey", explaining that there is a problem confirming 
some events, particularly from monitors with political leanings, and sometimes from 
the police. 
On the same issue, The Natal Witness reporter said that information supplied by 
reliable contacts is used without verification. Unknown individual's reports have to 
be confirmed with other sources in the relevant area before publication. At the time 
of the interview; police reports were being printed unchecked because violence 
levels were low, although in the past, the crime and political reporters and news 
editor would meet daily to decide which police items needed to be substantiated 
with other sources. SAPA also said that unverified reports are used if the source is 
considered reliable, although a note would be published that police cannot confirm 
the details. A problem expressed only by The Natal Witness reporter is that of 
editors not believing reporters sources and subsequently not using their stories. 
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Resource constraints 
The problem of limited resources, in the form of money, staff, vehicles and 
computers was raised by all the journalists interviewed. According to The Natal 
Witness reporter, these limitations mean that events in far off places such as 
Zululand, are not well covered because The Natal Witness does not circulate in 
this area. There is thus a reluctance to spend money on events here. 
The Mercury and Daily News reporters also believed that rural areas are not well 
covered, attributing this to a lack of resources and to newspaper sources which 
generally are more accurate about urban violence (including the police). The 
editors confirmed that the costs, in terms of money and staff, of reporting on these 
areas outweigh the gains, especially since their readerships do not extend to many 
of these areas. The Daily News reporter did add, however, that if violence flares up 
in a remote area, a reporter might be assigned to that area, as occurre~ in 1991 
when violence soared in the Richmond area. 
The Mercury reporter mentioned the shortages of vehicles and computers in 
particular. At the time, two reporters were sharing one computer. All the reporters 
said that the staff shortages encouraged telephone journalism, as investigative 
reporting and follow-ups are impossible under the circumstances. This means that 
often the details and context of events are not reported. The Mercury editor also 
stressed the problem of staff shortages, particularly since his newspaper had 
experienced drastic cuts after the Independent Newspaper Company takeover. 
The Daily News editor was more accepting of the problem, saying that staff 
shortages is a universal newspaper problem, and that topics for coverage have to 
be prioritised as a result. 
Time constraints 
The target of producing one newspaper (or more) a day imposes constraints on 
reporting practices. The Natal Witness reporter said that this also limits the 
reporting of events in distant locations, because to complete a story on the same 
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day that it occurs is difficult, and if they wait too long the news quickly becomes 
"old". This type of constra·int, in conjunction with resource limitations, results in 
~elephone journalism, and means that the extent and full context of the violence is 
not well covered. The editors of the Daily News and The Mercury confirmed this, 
although the former did not think it was a major problem. The Mercury and SAPA 
reporters added interesting comments, saying that to complete a full story about 
violence requires a lot of time, and the final product is often less newsworthy than 
other less time consuming stories. As a result it might not be prioritised. 
iv) Restrictions related to market dynamics and the ownership of 
newspapers 
Most commercial newspapers operate according to the demands of the market. 
This has advantages and disadvantages. Those relying on grants .or donations, 
such as the alternative press in this country, can never be fully independent in the 
way that commercial newspaper are, and constantly face the threat of withdrawal 
of funding. These newspapers cannot afford the advanced infrastructure used by 
commercially viable newspapers, and competition is therefore difficult. 
Yet the commercial press in turn faces limitations which escape the non-profit 
newspapers. The editors and staff work under varying degrees of direction from the 
newspaper owners and managers who may adopt particular positions which 
constrain normal journalistic activity. In addition, the constant battle to attract 
advertiSing and expand the newspaper's readership imposes more restraints. 1o 
Newspaper articles must avoid alienating large groups of readers and must also 
reflect issues which the public like to read about. 
10 These restraints were also discussed in the preceding chapter on democracy and the 
press. The main Criti?ism .w~ich supporters of partiCipative democracy make of the way the 
press works deals with thiS Issue. The market place distorts the operations and product of 
new.s~ap~rs , . which means the media do not properly fulfil their role of enabling equal 
participation In the democratiC process. 
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In South Africa, the overconcentration of newspaper ownership by white-owned 
companies in the mainstream press is a well known and widely debated issue. 
Only two daily provincial newspapers and six alternative weeklies are presently not 
owned by some of the five newspaper and magazine companies or the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The monopoly of ownership also 
extends to the distribution and printing business, and has affected both the 
mainstream and alternative press. 
The dangers of monopolies in the newspaper business are similar to the problems 
inherent in any monopoly. The lack of competition affects the quality of the product, 
and there is little variation between available products. The newspaper monopoly 
may result in several newspapers having the same reporting style and editorial 
outlook, which may limit the publication of alternative views, favour certain types of 
news over others, neglect the activities of certain groups of people, and result in 
'grey' reporting. The mainstream press in this country has in particular, been the 
subject of these criticisms, as the discussion at the start of this chapter illustrated. 
In addition to the issue of who owns the press, there are other economic 
considerations which affect reporting tendencies. These are often related to 
ownership patterns, since the very high costs of setting up and running a 
newspaper limit owners to wealthy, established business concems and also limit 
the number of owners in the industry. Most newspapers are commercial, which 
means they operate, like any other business, according to the demands of the 
market. For the commercial press, revenue is derived from the sale of newspapers 
and advertising space, in varying proportions for different newspapers. 
The more popular and in some cases, tabloid newspapers derive most of their 
income from the sales of their publications, which tend to be more affordable. This 
formula is based on the assumption that the spending power of these readers is 
lower, and thus companies are less willing to pay large amounts to advertise in 
these newspapers. The converse is true for the more upmarket, 'issues' 
newspapers, which tend to be more expensive, and whose revenue largely comes 
from selling advertising space. Operating in a market environment means that the 
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work of reporters and editors is constantly affected by the resources available to 
the newspaper, the demands of expanding the readership base in order to attract 
advertising and sales, pressure to avoid alienating existing readers and of simply 
producing a newspaper each day. 
v) The implications of these issues for reporting: the journalists' opinions 
According to Karon (1991) the lack of competition as a result of the ownership 
monopoly makes newspapers "grey and dull". Fewer opinions are published in the 
mainstream press, and there is a greater inclination towards control and internal 
censorship and the manipulation of information. Emdon (1991) added that editors, 
who determine newsroom and production procedures, are hired and fired to the 
extent that they conform to the value system of the company. 
In addition, the popular perception that the English press serves mainly white 
interests is aggravated by the lack of diversity amon'g newspaper owners. The 
mainstream press has to evolve to reflect the interests of the whole population, but 
economic constraints will slow down these efforts. Most of these newspapers rely 
extensively for advertising revenue on a white readership who cannot be 
immediately replaced by those from other groups whose environments are 
characterised by unemployment, poor education , and in some cases, radical 
pOliticisation (Patten, 1991). 
The closure of the Rand Daily Mail illustrates how central these issues are to a 
newspaper's survival. Tomaselli m...ID (1987) believed the newspaper had financial 
and managerial problems and had lost market appeal. Owen (1993) stated that the 
Rand Daily Mail alienated its advertisers and white readers as the editorial policy 
was "too radical". 
The deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail argued that the newspaper had lost 
credibility due to unbalanced reporting, which alienated readers from across the 
spectrum. In order to increase advertising and change the newspaper's financial 
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position, the readership had to be maintained, and the paper had to have a good 
reputation. This meant changes in editorial policy, which the Rand Daily Mail 
would not undertake and subsequently was closed. This shows that a newspaper 
must be marketable in order to survive. According to Owen (1993) the mainstream 
press has neglected its social and political functions since witnessing the Baru1 
Daily Mail's demise in its determination to make profits. 
According to all the journalists interviewed, the monopoly of newspaper owners 
affects reporting, but not of violence in particular. The Natal Witness reporter had 
never felt pressure from the newspaper owners with regard to violence reporting, 
but believed that quality is affected by a lack of diversity. In addition, having only 
one news agency (SAPA) was thought to exacerbate the problem as the same 
stories are used by different newspapers and have a similar format and content. 
The Mercury reporter said that while he can generally. write about anything as long 
as he has evidence to support his work, a "middle-of-the-road, moderate, liberal 
theme" prevails in the newspaper. 
Editors agreed that owners have an effect on newspapers in so far as they select 
the editors, who are thus likely to be of the same ilk, and who will probably produce 
newspapers of a similar kind. They were adamant, however, that management and 
owners . never interfere with editorial policy, although with the Independent 
Newspaper Company takeover, the message was that newspapers either operate 
at a profit or close down. The Mercury editor believed this policy has "massive" 
implications for the newspaper, which has run at a loss for many years, being 
sustained by the other newspapers at Natal Newspapers. 
One indication that t~e monopoly does affect violence reporting was The Mercury 
editor's comments about the coverage of violence in outlying areas. He explained 
that one of the reasons why his newspaper does not cover events in these areas 
well, is becaus~ the lack of competition means there is no threat of another 
newspaper covering the story before The Mercury does. The Daily News editor 
had a more positive view of the monopoly issue, saying that this tendency in South 
Africa is changing and will continue to change in the future. He added, however, 
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that the highly capital intensive nature of the newspaper business means there will 
never be large numbers of owners in the mainstream media. 
Moving to the implications of market demands, all journalists interviewed thought 
the issue of advertising is crucial. This is not only because of the pressures to 
attract advertisers, but also because adverts take up valuable space which could 
contain news articles. The editor <;>fThe Mercury attributed the closure of the Baru1 
Daily Mail to that newspaper's attempts to shift its readership, which caused the 
advertisers to drop off as they did not favour the paper's new ang'le. He added that 
because substantial revenue comes from advertising, newspapers cannot afford to 
annoy advertisers who are very powerful in the industry. 
Related to the question of advertising is the debate about covering issues which 
customers wish to read about in order to sell the newspaper. This concerned all the 
journalists interviewed, particularly the fact that the readership of all three 
newspapers is overwhelmingly white, which some believed does influence 
reporting. 
Journalists acknowledged that the commercial viability of newspapers is linked to 
the readership, and that this cannot be ignored. The Mercury editor pointed out that 
his attempts to broaden the focus of the newspaper to include all race groups and 
religions did not alter the fact that the staff and the public still perceive the 
readership to be white. 
The question of newsworthiness was also raised by reporters and editors, who said 
that if readers (and even reporters themselves) are tired of reading ~md covering 
violence, this has to be taken into account. As a result, in the Daily News, events 
of violence are documented, but more time and space cannot be spent on the 
subject. The Daily News and The Natal Witness editors nevertheless stressed that 
although readers' preferences are important, they cannot be applied narrowly, and 
news cannot be manipulated. 
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vi) Restrictions related to the reporting environment and 'unofficial 
censorship' 
The reporting environment refers to factors other than government restrictions and 
market constraints. The press has been constrained in its reporting of violence by 
physical factors such as the poor standard of roads, the absence of telephones 
and of press networks, and in some areas the distance of the events from the 
newspaper base. These problems apply particularly to coverage in rural areas. 
This means that many incidents go unreported and that by the time they are 
reported and investigated, they have lost their newsworthiness. 
'Unofficial censorship' describes the situation whereby violence and intimidation 
make the victims and witnesses of violence, as well as reporters, reluctant to talk 
and write through fear of reprisals (Robbins, 1988). This unofficial censorship 
affects coverage of violence in particular. The rise in indiscriminate violence and 
criminal activities puts the lives of reporters in increasing danger. The difference 
between a journalist being hit by a stray bullet and actually being targeted for 
attack is significant, and has seriou~ implications for conflict reporting. This is not a 
problem specific to South Africa. The year 1991 was marked as the worst year of 
violence against journalists by the International Federation of Journalists, who 
noted with grave concern the increased attacks directed at press members ahe 
Joyrnalist, March 1992). 
What has been described as "probably the most under reported story in South 
Africa" (Williams, 1991) is the intimidation and harassment of the press by 
"unofficial sources". This began in the mid-1980s and takes the form of death 
threats, arson and assault, and has been regarded as ,the media's most preSSing 
problem (Laurence, 1993). The harassment experienced during the States of 
Emergency is no longer a problem, and intimidation now stems more commonly 
from elements in white and black communities. These risks for reporters increased 
from 1990 to the April 1994 elections. Indications are that this problem is no longer 
as serious. 
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The role of political organisations and political affiliation 
Intimidation has been perpetrated by parties from across the political spectrum. 
Some senior black journalists have contended that this intimidation and censorship 
comes from left-wing activists (Mazwai, 1991). Kaizer Nyatsumba (1991) of~ 
smr said that censorship from the 'left' is much worse than from the government, 
since government pressures are overt, while intimidation from the left is concealed 
and the censors remain unknown. According to him, the consequence of these 
pressures on journalists is that news published in the press is about 40-50% 
accurate, with the remaining 50% consisting of propaganda. 
Mathiane (1990) recalls how since 1987 she along with other black colleagues, 
constantly remained silent about the abuses and murderous activities of the 
liberation movements in their own communities. Injustices committed by white 
people were reported with ease, and journalists were prepared to be impr!soned as 
a result. The fear of being 'necklaced' as enemies of 'the people', however, kept 
them silent about the atrocities which were destroying the fabric of their own 
societies. She states that this has not changed in recent times and that: 
"Blacks are once more silent and sitting on the fence, dependent on their 
white colleagues to expose abuses of power. And the liberation movements 
tum around and accuse black journalists of being inefficient and lazy. Now 
that's a strange irony if ever there was one" (Mathiane, 1990: 31). 
Journalists in the alternative and mainstream press in KwaZulu-Natal have 
identified similar problems with regards to Inkatha. Reporters were threatened if 
they sought access to Inkatha sources, and at Inkatha press conferences, 
journalists from UmAfrika were insulted and abused (Emdon, 1990; Williams, 
1990). In 1992 three journalists from The Natal Witness were intimidated, verbally 
abused and had their car stoned by a group of youths carrying an IFP flag. This 
incident happened shortly after a senior IFP leader stated that ANC supporting 
journalists should identify themselves as such, "so that they can be attacked and 
shot if necessary" ahe Natal Witness, 8 April 1992). Unofficial censorship is not 
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restricted to any particular party, and whoever uses it demonstrates a contempt for 
press freedom and human 'rights - two of the pillars of democracy. 
The South African Union of Journalists (SAUJ) observed an increase in the number 
of threats of violence and actual violence exercised against members of the media, 
and particularly black journalists (Heard, 1992). In July 1992, the SAUJ held a 
seminar on the problem which resulted in a pledge by representatives of the ANC, 
Democratic Party, IFP, NP, South African Communist Party (SACP), Cosatu and 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) to "respect and promote the physical safety of 
journalists" (Stander, 1992). 
The Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB) and Conservative Party (CP) declined 
to attend, and the Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo), who attended the 
seminar, did not endorse the pledge as the group believed it was unnecessary. If 
the intolerance of freedom of speech stems from supporters of political groups, the 
pledge had little effect, as fifty nine journalists were attacked in the country over the 
first four months of 1993, according to figures released by the SAUJ. These can be 
compared with forty six attacks in the whole of 1992 and thirteen in 1991 (o.ail¥ 
~,28 April 1993).11 
The view has been expressed that journalists are not altogether innocent in this 
process of unofficial censorship. According to Qwelane (1992), journalists have 
identified with political organisations or parties in the past, and this has been a 
direct cause of harassment. This encourages people to believe that members of 
the press are part of the political process and can therefore be intimidated into 
serving a specific purpose (Qwelane, 1992). The SAUJ cautions that journalists, 
like other citizens, have the right of political association but that these beliefs 
should under no circumstances be allowed to affect professional conduct (Stander, 
1991/2). 
11 For an in-depth account of such events see Stander (1991/2) and The Journalist, 
November 1990. A list of forty five incidents since June 1990 is provided, documenting 
cases of verb~I. abuse, intimid~tion, assault and murder of press members by people from 
across the political spectrum, Including the pOlice. 
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Intolerance the root cause 
The origins of the problem point to some of the limitations which will face press 
freedom in the future and which will continue to impact on the use of the press as a 
source for violence research. 
The lack of tolerance which the attacks on journalists suggest, has historical roots 
in South Africa. Four decades of apartheid and repression , and the poverty and 
poor education which accompanied it, have not engendered respect for other 
points of view. The social and political violence which grew out of these conditions 
has become routinised and the total lack of tolerance of different political opinions 
is a problem afflicting all political organisations. It has, nevertheless, been argued 
that intolerance is directly linked with the period between 1984 to 1986 when the 
ANC started the culture of 'people's war'. This meant that everyone had to be seen 
as ideologically homogeneous, which discouraged differences of opinion (Kane-
Berman, 1993; Molusi, 1991). 
At the grassroots level, press freedom is disregarded by some activists from both 
the left- and right-wing because they believe it is unnecessary or simply a lUxury 
sought by privileged groups. Freedom of expression is not a deciding factor in the 
right-wing's battle for white power. On the left, activists see press freedom as 
unimportant when compared with the imbalances between white and black media 
generally, not to mention the poor education and literacy levels in black 
communities (Stander, 1991/2). 
The press is not innocen~ in this process, however. The black community does not 
perceive the mainstream media as reflecting their society, as they have always 
been cut off from the media. Instead the press is seen as working against the black 
community (Stander, 1992). At the other end of the spectrum, the press has been 
accused of being sympathetic towards the liberation movements for many years, 
and these groups are consequently unaccustomed to harsh criticism. 
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The press in the new South Africa thus has to deal with intolerance borne from the 
legacy of apartheid which finds expression both in political movements and in 
styles of press reporting itself. In addition, some leaders of political groups have yet 
to show their full commitment to press freedom. Their lack of tolerance encourages 
intolerance among supporters across the political spectrum. While legislative 
restrictions are infrequently invoked against the media, other obstacles now facing 
the press are equally daunting. 
The journalists' opinions 
This problem of intimidation and "unofficial censorship" seems to have subsided, 
and the views of reporters and editors support this. This does not, however, d~tract 
from the fact that this problem had severe effects for violence coverage up to the 
1994 elections, with implications for violence research based on press information 
during this period. All the journalists interviewed agreed that intimidation has at 
some time been a serious problem for them in their coverage of violence and 
politics. 
At The Natal Witness this was a serious difficulty up to 1990, when . armed 
perpetrators of violence and their supporters would invade the newsroom and 
threaten journalists. Now that people understand the reporting process better, this 
is no longer a problem. In the past, intimidation had the effect of forcing reporters 
to censor themselves, or write a story which would not upset the political groups 
involved. The assistant editor, however, commented that the general ethos of 
intolerance and the cheapness of life is the greatest constraint on violence 
reporting. 
Reporters at the Daily News and The Mercury thought intimidation a serious 
problem which has increased since 1990. In the violent months before the 
elections in 1994, reporters were promised bullet-proof vests, car telephones and 
safety courses in order to safeguard against attacks. The problem at the time of the 
interview for the Daily News reporter was so severe that she was unable to cover 
events organised by a certain political party because her life would be in danger. 
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The reporters agreed that this situation causes insecurity amongst reporters and 
self-censorship. The editors of these newspapers, interviewed some time after the 
reporters, did not think intimidation is still a problem, although The Mercury editor 
did note that it could resurface again. 
4. The journalists' assessment of the criticisms of press 
reporting of violent conflict 
The issues discussed here, namely legislative restrictions, the newsroom process, 
the demands of the market on commercial newspapers, the monopoly of 
newspaper ownership, and the reporting environment, affect newspapers' reporting 
of violence to varying degrees. These are also the issues which have led to the 
kinds of criticisms of the press referred to in Chapter One of this study. These 
criticisms of bias, of failing to cover the extent and context of the violence, and of 
publishing rumours must be considered against the background of how 
newspapers operate. The opinions of reporters and editors about these criticisms 
of press coverage of violence are also important. These opinions will be discussed 
first. 
i) The perceived importance of violence reporting 
Interviewees were asked how important they thought violence reporting was for 
their newspaper and what role, if any, newspapers should have in this regard. The 
various editors responded quite differently to the latter question. The assistant 
editor of The Natal Witness believed that it is the press's role to investigate the 
sources of the conflict. He added that newspapers have a mediatory role and 
should therefore inform the public in a balanced way and correct misperceptions 
about the violence. He did not think that the press's role is to provide body counts 
of those killed and injured, explaining that newspapers do this because they feel 
obliged to print something about the conflict. 
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By contrast, the other two editors did not believe that the press has any formal role 
in reporting violence. The Daily News editor said that newspapers should be driven 
by news, rather than by particular stakeholders. He stressed that newspapers are 
under no obligation to report anything, and that in terms of social responsibility, 
journalists are usually motivated by their desire to report social problems. He said 
that while publicly owned media may have responsibilities to the public, the 
commercial press does not. 
In his response, The Mercury editor suggested that the commercial press does not 
have an obligation to the taxpayer, but that it does have a duty to the market, which 
is to make money. He said that different newspapers have different reasons for 
being in the business, and in the case of the commercial press, this is to make a 
profit. This aim governs how the newspaper operates, what type of reader it targets 
and thus what type of news it will report. He did say, however, that he believed his 
job is to r~f1ect what happens in society, whether it is "nice" or not. 
Notwithstanding these views, it is interesting to note that all those interviewed 
thought that violence reporting is important for their newspapers and should not be 
ignored. They said that the requirement that stories be newsworthy often 
diminishes this importance. Some also mentioned that the importance of violence 
reporting has changed over time, and that since the elections in April 1994, the 
emphasis and interest is no longer on the politics of force and violence, but on 
negotiation .and reconstruction. 
The Natal Witness reporter said that violence was not important enough for that 
newspaper, whereas it had been in the past. She attributed this to the issue of 
newsworthiness. The SAPA reporter also said that the media has an important role 
in reporting violence in order to encourage problem solving. The Mercury reporter 
said that newspapers feel they have a social responsibility to report violence, but 
that newsworthiness is an obstacle because readers are bored with the endless 
statistics. 
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The editor of The Mercury echoed this, saying that the subject is important, but that 
it is ,very hard to sustain because it has continued for so long. He added that the 
priorities of the newspaper have changed over time. During the Emergency, more 
daily events were reported because at that time it was a new phenomenon and a 
central issue in the country's politics. Now that there is dialogue between political 
leaders, those still using violence are regarded as renegades. 
The Daily News reporter expressed similar thoughts to those above, saying that 
violence is important as long as it is newsworthy. At the time of the interview, 
violence levels were high, and therefore an automatic part of the newspaper's 
routine calls. She added that the judgement of news value is subjective and 
depends on who covers the events. 
The Daily News editor, like his colleague in The Mercury, said the salience of 
violence has diminished over the years, which he attributed to a weariness on the 
part of reporters and readers. He cautioned, however, that no policy was taken in 
this regard . He also mentioned the changed political situation which had resulted in 
a shift in focus away from violence. 
ii) The accuracy of newspaper coverage of the extent and details of the 
conflict 
The majority of those interviewed did not think the press accurately represents the 
conflict in the province, although many added that this is not necessarily the 
newspaper's fault. Rather, reporters believed it was the result of a shortage of 
resources and the consequent need to prioritise news items. The Mercury reporter 
expressed this opinion, explaining that the lack of experienced staff, the inability to 
do investigative reporting, and time constraints are all contributing factors. He 'did, 
however, say that the extent of the violence, in terms of figures, is well presented, 
even if this consists only of body counts. 
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The Mercury editor shared these thoughts, adding that the constraints mean that 
reporters' rely on secondary sources, and often the newspaper do not have the 
resources to validate these sources' information. He mentioned again the problem 
that readers' preferences cannot be ignored, and consequently violence receives 
less priority, which adds to the problems already mentioned. Although he conceded 
that his newspaper may be guilty of neglecting violence, he stressed that while this 
has been attributed to racism by critics, underreporting is not a racial issue, but 
occurs for commercial reasons. 
The Daily News reporter did not think any newspaper can present an accurate 
picture of the conflict due to the difficulties in obtaining appropriate information. 
She did, however, believe that the rep.orting is as accurate as it can be, and that 
the extent of the violence in terms of the numbers is well covered and a vast 
improvement on previous years. The Daily News editor also mentioned problems 
with sources, saying that news about violence is often received a day late, or 
reporters cannot reach the scene on time. Both editors felt the situation was bad, 
but did not know what could be done to rectify it. 
The Natal Witness reporter was more critical of that newspaper's position than the 
other journalists were. She said that an accurate picture is not presented, since 
much violence is not covered, and that this even applied to reporting tendencies a 
few years ago whe'n violence was more prevalent. She added that stories that are 
investigated are accurate, but that these are few and far between. She suggested 
that this lack of interest by the newspaper may be due to racism, as the victims are 
mostly black, while the readers are largely white. 
iii) The problem of bias in violence reporting 
All the journalists consulted believed that it is unrealistic to expeqt anyone to be 
objective, and that fairness and balance are preferable values. Most did not think 
that their newspapers or their own reporting is biased in favour of a particular 
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political party. Several, like The Natal Witness reporter, stressed that a lack of 
information often contributes to impressions of partial reporting. 
She said that reporters often struggle to find information of equal intensity about all 
sides in the conflict, and that stories are sometimes not published as a result. This 
is unsatisfactory because events are omitted and because all groups do not always 
deserve equal coverage. The assistant editor was more fatalistic about the issue, 
saying that newspapers reflect cultural realities, and that consequently a divided 
society is bound to encourage bias. 
All the reporters said that accusations of bias are subjective judgements made by 
political parties because newspapers publish stories which offend them. The ua.il¥ 
News reporter said that this reaction is borne out of the culture of intolerance. 
Reporters also mentioned the problem of sources. 
The Mercury reporter explained that when the IFP was the only representative, 
unbanned and thus accessible black organisation, it received much coverage, and 
the IFP consequently supported the newspapers wholeheartedly. When the 
political situation changed, and more information was available, the IFP became 
dissatisfied and accused the newspapers of bias. The SAPA reporter also related 
that at times, especially in the past, there was often no alternative information to 
balance news stories against. 
iv) Publishing rumours about yiolence 
Journalists associated this criticism with their attempts to appear unbiased and with 
problems of source reliability. The Natal Witness reporter said that this criticism 
stems from the use of political party spokespersons in an attempt to appear 
impartial. She explained that reporters are pressurised to publish statements which 
are often not factual, inaccurate and are simply rumours. At one time, she said, the 
newspaper was receiving five statements per day from each political party, and 
there would not always be time to check these, particularly as some arrived at 
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16hOO. The Mercury reporter expressed similar sentiments, saying that rumours 
are sometimes used if there is no alternative reliable sources. He believed, 
however, that violence is more the result of society's intolerance that of the press's 
publication of rumours. 
The assistant editor of The Natal Witness by contrast, did think that rumours can 
cause violence, but that such stories can also pre-empt clashes. He said that if 
reporters publish a rumour that an attack is imminent, all the ensuing publicity may 
prevent it from happening. Both the Daily News and SAPA reporters believed that 
rumours should only be reported if it is in the public's interest to do so. They added 
that such stories should be sourced and the status of the report made clear. 
The most serious type of limitation for press reporting of violent conflict, namely the 
legislative restrictions, along with restrictions presented by the reporting 
environment, no longer affect the press as .much as they did in the past. Many of 
the criticisms of the way the newspapers report conflict were made when these 
restrictions affected reporting most severely. In recent years, however, the press 
has been criticised for reporting as though these restrictions still apply. Although 
these limitations no longer concern the newspapers, the effects thereof, as well as 
other factors like the newsroom process and the demands of the market, could still 
shape violence reporting. Reporters and editors were asked what. they thought the 
future might hold for reporting violent conflict. 
5. Obstacles and opportunities ahead: the journalists' views 
South African editors agreed that the press is freer than before. Newspapers can 
no longer be banned under the Internal Security Act, arid need not register under 
the Newspaper Registration and Imprint Act. Sections relating to the press have 
also been removed from The Police Act and Prisons Act. Many regulations, 
however, remain on the statute book, and section 205 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act which forces journalists to reveal their sources of information has been invoked 
in recent years (Heard, 1992). 
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The reporters interviewed were guardedly optimistic about the future of the media 
under the new Government. The Natal Witness reporter expressed confidence in 
media freedom in the future, adding wryly that the new Government will not have to 
curb journalists because "they have become so lazy". For the other reporters, the 
acknowledgement that the situation has improved was qualified by the knowledge 
that any government is theoretically a threat to the press, particularly because a 
vigorous and active press should offend the government. The editors noted that all 
the laws restricting the press are still on the statute books. They believed that the 
media is presently experiencing a period of unprecedented freedom which will not 
last, as resistance to criticism and attempts to control society inclines governments 
to control the media. 
These sentiments are not unfounded because the press is still affected by more 
subtle pressures such as threats of legal action from government departments. 
Since 1990, a media union official and a radio announcer have been detained, 
newspaper premises have been searched and material removed (Stander, 199112). 
The unofficial censorship discussed above is perceived as one of the most serious 
problems now facing the press. 
Despite the lifting of the Emergency and the relaxation of laws restricting press 
freedom, the state of the media since 1990 has been described as "appalling" 
(Ko·ckott, 1991; Karon, 1991). The press has often been criticised for reporting as 
though the restrictions were still in place. Ken Owen, editor of the Sunday Times 
commented that "The space for journalists has widened faster than their capacity 
to use it. We still report in the dogged, defensive style of the past; reporters lack 
aggression; we all lack the flair" (Heard, 1992). For some, the media has not 
changed much since official restrictions were lifted and in this 'pre-post-apartheid' 
era, news is still partisan and obscure. 
When asked about reporting since 1990 when the State of Emergency was lifted, 
journalists from KwaZulu-Natal newspapers agreed with some of these comments. 
The Natal Witness reporter noted that the Emergency made violence unimportant, 
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and that this impression still prevails among newspaper management and the"news 
desk. 
In addition, the self-censorship inherited from the Emergency days remains a 
problem for individual reporters. The assistant editor of The Natal Wjtness added 
that the desk-bound, telephonic type of journalism which began during this period 
still prevails, and shows reporters' lack of commitment. 
The Mercury reporter believed that violence reporting has not changed since 1990, 
although he and the SAPA reporter noted that the police are now more 
approachable and easier to work with . Echoing the words of Ken Owen above, the 
Daily News reporter said there is now much more space in which to operate, which 
most journalists have yet to take advantage of. 
The Mercury editor thought that once journalists develop a style of writing this style 
is hard to break, but that reporters should be far more confrontational than they are 
presently. The Daily News editor was more positive, saying there is some truth in 
the accusation that press reporting has changed little since 1990. He added, 
however, that journalists have not been beaten into submission by the Emergency, 
even though these years of restrictions took their toll. 
The future of the press in South Africa is not certain. The media face potential 
challenges to freedom of expression from both civil society and government. 
Journalists themselves will actively have to ensure that freedom of expression and 
reporting the truth is upheld in the future. Although the first step towards a 
democratic society has been taken, press freedom is not guaranteed. There are 
few indicators that the majority of South Africans do not see freedom of expression 
as a political priority or as a fundamental requirement of democracy. 
Freedom of expression and of the media must be accepted as desirable norms and 
must be constitutionally guaranteed if a culture of political tolerance is to be 
fostered (Stander, 1991/2). While the Interim Constitution does protect freedom of 
speech, it has, however, been difficult for the press to contribute towards this 
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process while journalists were the very target of the intolerance which threatens 
society. 
Leaders of political parties which Laurence (1993: 48) calls the "New Nats" , the 
ANC, PAC and IFP, condemned the restrictions of the former government and 
declared the virtues of press freedom, while unofficial censorship continued. Before 
coming to power, the ANC stated, that their government would defend the press's 
right to criticise the organisation, and that media rights and independence should 
be entrenched in a Bill of Rights (Minnie, 1992). This holds promise for the press in 
the future, but the experiences of other African countries has shown that Bills of 
Rights alone are no guarantee of press freedom. 
In the past, the National Party government always declared its belief in a free press 
while restricting this very freedom with numerous regulations and threats. 
According. to Heard (1992), editors of local newspapers are pessimistic about a 
free press in the future, and about the adequacy of constitutional guarantees al,one. 
Indications are that journalists and society as a whole will continuously have to 
fight to ensure that these rights are upheld. Suggestions for securing press 
freedom include instilling tolerance in what has been an intolerant society, uniting 
journalists in order to increase their influence, entrenching freedom of expression in 
the constitution, and receiving support from the international press community 
(Heard, 1992). Members of the media and of society will have to be more vigilant 
than ever with regard to their rights to free expression, now that a new government 
is in place. 
6. Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter regarding the factors which affect violence reporting 
will briefly be recapped. Legislative restrictions undoubtedly affected what 
newspapers published and also limited the press's sources of information about 
conflict. This was acknowledged by those interviewed, as were the long term 
effects, which suppress the investigative culture, encourage telephone journalism, 
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limit the coverage of the extent of the conflict, encourage self-censorship by 
journalists, and lead to a simplification of conflict 'story'. The latter two outcomes 
are probably less of a factor now than they were in previous years. 
These problems explain to a degree, the accusations that newspa~ers are biased 
in their coverage of violence, and that their reporting of the details, the full extent 
and the broader context, is limited. Reporters and editors said that perceptions of 
bias are often the result of a lack of information and the use of unreliable sources. 
These factors, they said, also contribute to the poor coverage of extent and details. 
Many of the problems related to the newsroom process are valid. Decisions about 
what constitutes news are made by the editors and reporters, as are decisions 
about the final printed product. This is how the newsroom operates, and cannot be 
criticised in itself. The quality of the final product is, however, affected in varying 
degrees by: the ideological position of reporters and editors, the resources of the 
newspaper, the demands of daily production in terms of time constraints, the 
pressure to publish newsworthy material, and problems of sources and obtaining 
reliable information. Interviews indicated. that these problems are the central 
reasons for the poor coverage of events of violence and of the details surrounding 
these events. 
These criticisms should be made with circumspection, however. Interviews 
revealed that while some editors did not believe newspapers are obliged to report 
conflict, all respondents believed violence is an important subject which should not 
be ignored by the media. They believed that several features of the newspaper 
industry make full reporting difficult. It seems unlikely that details of violence are 
purposefully omitted due to racism or bias on the part of reporters or editors, or due 
to editorial policy. Instead, the lack of resources, demands of production and of 
newsworthiness, which affect all subjects and indeed most newspapers, are more 
likely causes. 
No evidence could be found that owners or management directly interfered with 
editorial decisions regarding violence reporting . Indirectly, however, management's 
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decisions regarding the newspaper's position in the market, its target readership, 
and the consequent budget and staff allocations, do affect violence reporting. 
Shortages of staff and resources, in addition to the limited time period in which to 
produce a daily newspaper, were often attributed to the poor quality of violence 
reporting by those interviewed. 
While a monopoly of ownership affects reporting in general, it does not seem to 
have implications for violence reporting in particular. The demands of the market 
on commercial newspapers, by contrast, appear to have important implications for 
violence coverage. In practical terms, advertisements limit the space available for 
articles. More importantly, the pressure to attract advertising and readers shapes 
the criteria for newsworthiness. The requirement that events be newsworthy affects 
violence coverage to a great extent. Both reporters and re~ders are allegedly tired 
of the subject, and it consequently receives less priority from editors and reporters, 
and as a result, fewer resources and less time are dedicated to violence coverage. 
In terms of the effects of the reporting environment, intimidation of journalists had 
important implications for violence reporting prior to the elections in April 1994, 
after which it seems to have subsided. However, intolerance, which was identified 
by reporters as the cause for intimidation, is still widespread. This means that 
threats and attacks on reporters could resume under changed circumstances. 
The most important conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis of the 
factors which affect violence repo~ that our press is undoubtedly' operating 
with the baggage of legal restrictions from the past. In addition, newspapers face 
all the pressures of the newsroom process and market demands common to 
newspapers throughout the world. In this period of transformation and economic 
strain, it seems the most pressure will come from the requirement that newspapers 
remain commercially viable and produce newspapers which people want to read, 
and which advertisers wish to sponsor. This has had, and will continue to have, 
important implications for violence reporting. 
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In addition, the reporters, editors and the public are reportedly tired of violence. 
Violent conflict is also no longer a central factor in the country's political repertoire, 
and is therefore, less newsworthy. Already, violence reporting is largely limited to 
short 'headcounts' with no clues as to the causes of events, let alone investigative 
reporting. It is likely that the press does not report all events of violence, but 
certainly, newspapers do not provide the details and analyses of the violence 
which are essential for understanding the problem. Researchers using the press as 
a source for violence studies must, therefore, do so bearing in mind these 
limitations and the gaps in the information. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REPORTING VIOLENT CONFLICT: THE MONITORING 
AGENCIES 
1. Aims of this chapter 
This chapter, like the preceding one, will present and discuss some of this study's 
findings. The general format of this chapter is similar to that of the previous 
chapter. The aim is to understand the way in which selected monitoring agencies 
go about collecting and presenting data about violence in KwaZulu-Natal. As yet, 
there is very little secondary information available about violence monitoring. For 
this reason, the results of interviews with people working for these organisations 
form the core of this chapters discussion on the origins, functioning, constraints 
and criticisms of the monitoring agencies' activities. 
The monitoring agencies publicise and disseminate the information which they 
gather, but are not under as clear cut obligations as the press is, to keep the public 
informed and provide channels for communication and participation in public life. 
Consequently, the monitoring agencies are not affected by the same constraints as 
the newspapers are. These constraints were the subject of discussion in the 
previous chapter. Although they do not publicise news on the scale of newspapers, 
the monitors have the potential to make an important contribution to knowledge 
about violence through their supply of information to the press, to researchers, to 
policy makers and to the public. 
Apart from their general importance, the monitoring agencies are significant for this 
study because the information from selected monitors in KwaZulu-Natal will be 
used for comparing reporting tendencies with those of the press. The way in which 
these agencies have carried out their operations have, however, not escaped 
censure, and have resulted in accusations of political bias. Like the previous 
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chapter, this chapter aims to understand more about the monitoring process, and 
to assess these criticisms. 
The monitoring agencies which will be discussed in this chapter are those which 
made the most significant contribution to the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal 
project (which is the source of the statistical data which is analysed in Chapter Six 
of this study). These monitors are: the Natal Monitor, the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) (KwaZulu-Natal branch), the Unrest Monitoring Project (UMP) at the Centre 
for Adult Education at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg, and the Inkatha 
I nstitute. 1 
This chapter will begin by considering the history of the monitors, followed by their 
aims and functions. This section also includes a discussion of workshops which 
have been convened by monitoring agencies to debate their methodologies and 
activities. The chapter then covers the process of collecting data~ the limitations 
facing the monitors, and how these affect the information they record. The 
responses of the monitors to the criticisms of their activities will also be presented. 
2. Origins, structure and methodology of monitoring agencies 
The reasons for monitoring violence have determined the type of information which 
is collected and the methodology which is used. The term 'monitoring' has been 
used to describe a variety of activities. These activities include observing events in 
the field, mediating conflict in ·the field, recording and analysing data, legal work, 
mediation and negotiation. Some monitors undertake more than one of these 
functions, although it would be impossible for one monitor to perform all these 
activities. 
1 Of these. fou.r m~nito~ng ~gencies, the UMP and Inkatha Institute no longer operate. The 
~atal ~omtor IS stili active In the field, but its monthly reports are no longer regularly 
disseminated. The HRC's monthly bulletins are still produced and disseminated every 
month. 
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Monitors in KwaZulu-Natal were set up at different times, with varying resources at 
their disposal. The Natal Monitor and UMP began in the late 1980s. The HRC was 
monitoring human rights abuses in the country from its inception in 1988, but the 
KwaZulu-Natal office was only established in 1992. The HRC took over the 
database on violence in KwaZulu-Natal set up by the Black Sash in 1991 . The 
Inkatha Institute included monito.ring in its research activities in 1990, and data was 
sporadically made available from 1991. 
The types of operations set a....-4ioft'r-tn.l . ;;..s:.~Q  onitoTs were determined by the 
~~:ti'IIiio.... The Natal Monitor and 
UMP can probably be cons~te.OL.W~Tli 
and also the most under-funded. Both were se in universities by individual 
academics. There was no formal funding, and money came in sporadically from the 
university and from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The monitors were 
each staffed on a part-time, voluntary basis by about three members or less. 
The Inkatha Institute by comparison, had direct links to Inkatha and the KwaZulu 
government. The Chief Minister of former KwaZulu, leader of Inkatha, and currently 
a member of the Government of National Unity's cabinet, Minister. Buthelezi, 
chaired the Institute's board. The violence monitoring was steered to a large extent 
by Inkatha's Information Centre. The Institute's funding changed over time, and 
included money from foreign organisations, the business sector, the IFP, and 
during the last years of its existence, the former KwaZulu government. The Institute 
had more staff at its disposal for violence monitoring than the other monitors, with 
at least three full-time employees and backup staff for emergencies. Before its 
closure, however, the Institute had a total of only eighteen staff, down from forty in. 
1989. 
The HRC's KwaZulu-Natal branch maintains a fair amount of independence from 
its head office. Its major responsibility is to deliver fortnightly reports to the head 
office. The activities of the branch are overseen by commissioners and a 
management committee. Funding is obtained from foreign organisations and 
governments, and the KwaZulu-Natal office is staffed by two full-time employees. 
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The aim of monitoring in general is to reduce violence, and monitors have agreed 
that their activities are necessary for reasons similar to those of most research: 
information gathering and recording; making sense of events by establishing the 
facts; and facilitating change through analysis and disseminating the information 
(Education Policy Unit and Career Information Centre, 1988). The aims of violence 
monitoring in KwaZulu-Natal rel,ate closely to the political climate which has 
prevailed in the region since the mid-1980s. Five reasons for pursing this activity 
can be drawn' from those cited by the four monitors who were interviewed for this 
study: 
• The violence escalated rapidly in KwaZulu-Natal from 1986. All the monitors 
realised that a crisis was looming and that action needed to be taken. The HRC 
for example, had the very broad aim of eradicating apartheid, and the violence 
throug,hout the country and particularly in KwaZulu-Natal was perceived as a 
product of the apartheid state. 
• To provide information for the public through recording and disseminating 
details about violence. The Natal Monitor and the HRC were particularly 
concerned about the information vacuum created by the States of Emergency 
from 1986 to 1990, and the effects this had on press coverage of violence.2 All 
the monitors believed the press coverage of violence was problematic, although 
in varying degrees and for different reasons. The Inkatha Institute's formal 
monitoring, as opposed to its research, began in response to a perceived lack 
of information in the press about Inkatha victims. There were also fears that a 
propaganda .war was being waged against the party by the media and the other 
monitoring agencies. 
• To intervene in the conflict in order to end the violence. For most of the 
monitors, documenting and publicising their information in itself was an 
important step in this direction. Interventions to save lives, assisting with 
2 Various authors on violence monitoring also refer to this, namely Collins (1988), Sutcliffe 
(1988), and Sitas (1988). 
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humanitarian and legal aid, and pressurising the police to act were not 
necessarily stated aims, but monitors were often called upon to take such 
action in times of need. In the case of the Natal Monitor and UMP, those 
involved had prior connections with NGOs, community organisations and 
individuals. These connections motivated the monitors to intervene, and gave 
them assistance in their work. 
• For the LIMP and Natal Monitor, the presence of academic staff encouraged 
monitoring for academic and research purposes. While not academic, the 
Inkatha Institute's violence monitoring activities developed out of its violence 
research which began in 1985. 
Monitoring agencies in general are not homogeneous in nature and their activities 
do not follow set procedures. It is therefore, difficult to describe the methodology or 
process of monitoring in a generalised fashion. Aitchison (1993: 29) believes that 
few monitoring agencies have been explicit about their methods, probably because 
the circumstances under which monitoring occurs are "not exactly conducive to 
carefully planned research". The subject of methodology has been raised on 
several occasions by people in the field. 
In 1988, the Education Projects Unit and Career Information Centre at the 
University of Natal hosted a talkshop on how to conduct monitoring research, 
attended by thirty organisations. The aim was to bring together various 
organisations, individuals and units to share expertise on monitoring research and 
methodology, and develop more efficient methods for the future. In addition to 
violence monitoring, the talkshop also dealt with monitoring of issues pertaining to 
labour and the state. 
Also, in June 1991, the Centre for Intergroup Studies in Cape Town hosted a 
workshop in Pietermaritzburg on the monitoring and research of political violence. 
The workshop arose out of "a concern about the antagonism and perception of bias 
between various research/monitoring groups". A study conducted at the end of 
1990 among seven KwaZulu-Natal monitoring organisations had confirmed a 
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polarisation along ideological lines. The workshop aimed to discuss and evaluate 
methodological issues, information sharing and ways to cooperate, as well as how 
to deal with bias.3 
In 1992 there were two more attempts to encourage cooperation and to improve 
monitoring capacity in the country.4 These, according to Aitchison (1993), were 
partly in response to the government's recognition that international monitors in the 
country were necessary. These initiatives resulted in the formation of the Network 
of Independent Monitors (NIM) and the Ecumenical Monitoring Programme in 
South Africa (EMPSA). Both had stated objectives and codes of conduct which 
members were to use as guidelines. When the Network of Independent Monitors 
(NIM) was finally constituted, it consisted of fifty organisations from across the 
country, fifteen of which are located in KwaZulu-Natal. 
NIM's aims reflected not only the . objectives expressed above, but also a 
recognition of the problems which faced many monitors by 1992. NIM's objectives, 
cited in Aitchison (1993: 19) are as follows: 
• To improve the effectiveness of independent monitoring through strengthening 
the recognition, identity and status of monitoring. 
• To heighten awareness and understanding of violence. To uncover the truth 
and to generate and encourage effective investigation that will result in the 
prosecution of the perpetrators of violence. 
3 The workshop was not considered a great success. Many of those invited did not attend, 
most notably the Inkatha Institute, which sent an observer instead. Other important parties 
in violence monitoring and research which did not partiCipate were the HRC, the South 
African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) and the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC). PartiCipants also disagreed on the proceedings, given the different types of the 
groups present with their differing aims and methods of collecting and acting upon 
information about violence. 
4 These included: the Norwegian Government/Institute for a Democratic Alternative in 
Sout.h Africa (IDASA) initiative that resulted in the formation of the Network of Independent 
Momtors (NIM); and the Ecumenical Monitoring Programme in South Africa (EMPSA) 
sponsored by the South African Council of Churches/South African Catholic Bishops' 
ConferencelWorld Council of Churches/Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace. 
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• To build capacity of monitors by assisting in the provision of required resources 
and services. 
• To harness existing experience and resources. 
• To establish an effective communication network between monitors. 
• To encourage coordination of information. 
• To collect and disseminate resource information needed by monitors. 
• To liaise with the international community and their monitors and refer 
information and cases to the relevant commissions/groups, etc. 
• .To identify sites of violence and to attempt to have these monitored. 
• To assist in building the capacity of community based monitors. 
The monitors which are discussed in this chapter began their activities some time 
before these objectives were formulated by the Network of Independent Monitors. 
In several cases, their day-to-day monitoring was shaped largely by the resources 
at their disposal, rather than by goals such as those laid out by NIM above. These 
processes are discussed in the next section. 
3. The monitoring process 
i) The type of information recorded 
Generally, the monitors recorded information on 'political' violence. This concept is 
problematic, as opinions about which events are indeed 'political' vary. This 
definitional question has resulted in sometimes substantial differences in violence 
statistics between monitoring agencies. Since the April 1994 election particularly, 
the distinction between political and other types of violence has become harder to 
make. The police have tended to describe many events as criminal, and in some 
cases, people on the ground de-emphasised political aspects of incidents. 
With the exception of the UMP, exact definitions of the type of information recorded 
was not provided by the monitors. Generally, their records included activities 
relating to political parties or the government, as well as conflict which becomes 
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political or is related to political dynamics. The HRC adhered closely to party 
political issues, while the Natal Monitor interpreted 'political' in its broadest sense, 
to include most faction fights, people's courts and taxi feuds, for example. These 
represent incidents which result from the general breakdown in the criminal justice 
system, which is, in turn , a product of this country's. political history. 
The following definition delimited the events which the UMP monitored: 
. «All acts of political violence and intimidation that would be generally 
accepted as illegal in most societies, whether performed by the state, its 
supporters or its opponents, whether organised by groups and parties or by 
individuals. 'Unrest' therefore includes illegal acts performed by the police 
and army ... A/so, acts clearly contrary to the regulations of the 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989 and 1990 State of Emergency declarations (such as 'illegal 
gatheringsJ" (Aitchison, 1993: 7). 
Criminal acts are excluded by all monitors, although they agreed that the distinction 
between criminal and political violence has become increaSingly difficult to make. 
More queries relate to this distinction than to broader definitional issues. The 
Inkatha Institute's database of assassinated leaders, for example, has frequently 
been criticised by other monitors for including many people killed under non-
political circumstances.5 
When the UMP and Natal Monitor began their activities, their monitoring covered 
specific geographical regions. Coverage was restricted by resource limitations, but 
in both cases, the rese~rchers were familiar with their areas of focus before 
monitoring began. Up to that point, violence had also occurred mostly in the areas 
covered by these two units. Inkatha Institute, with its more substantial resources, 
could cover the whole of KwaZulu-Natal. In 1990, violence began to spread, which 
meant an accurate portrayal of the conflict would have to include the entire region. 
5 Interview with John Aitchison from the UMP on July 5, 1994 and Mary de Haas from the 
Natal Monitor on February 22, 1994. 
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The Natal Monitor broadened its scope accordingly, and when the HRC began 
monitoring in 1992, a regional focus was also adopted. 
All the monitors agreed that rural areas were not covered adequately, although 
having contacts in these areas diminished the problem. Monitoring an area the size 
of KwaZulu-Natal was described as difficult, given the small staff numbers. A high 
reliance was consequently placed on contacts and sources throughout the region. 
Monitors sometimes experienced problems with these contacts even in the more 
urban areas. Along the North Coast, for example, certain police stations and 
political party contacts were found to be unreliable or uncooperative.s The Natal 
Monitor found that many good contacts were forced to flee their areas as a result of 
violence, with detrimental consequences for coverage of those regions. 
ii) Sources of information 
The monitors draw on a variety of sources. The feature which distinguishes these 
organisations, and which makes their work both valuable and controversial, is their 
contact with individuals and groups in conflict-ridden communities. · Good 
community links and the credibility of the organisation in the eyes of the 
community, have been identified as vital for monitoring in a violent . situation 
(Aitchison and Leeb, 1988). 
Both the UMP and Natal Monitor's staff had extensive personal networks in black 
communities, and considered . themselves experienced researchers with a ' good 
knowledge of the areas covered. Along with personal contacts, other sources 
included political parties, other monitoring agencies, peace committees and 
National Peace Accord structures, church members and organisations, lawyers, 
human rights groups, newspapers, radio broadcasts and reports from the SAPS 
and KwaZulu Police (KZP). 
6 Interview with Gavin Woods from the Inkatha Institute on February 22, 1994 and Linda 
Mclean and Sarah Kearney from the HRC on February 11 , 1994. 
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The monitors used information from some of these sources in different ways, and 
placed more or less emphasis on certain sources. The HRC was the only monitor 
which had parameters on the use of sources, in that information provided by an 
individual could not be included unless that person was speaking on behalf of an 
organisation. 
As well as having their own contacts, the HRC and UMP used the press and police 
reports more than the other monitors, while the Inkatha Institute and Natal Monitor 
relied more on contacts in communities.7 According to the latter two monitors, 
these contacts in communities were often politically active. Inkatha Institute, being 
clearly linked to the IFP, gained access to individuals largely through this affiliation. 
iii) Processing the information 
Unlike the other monitors whose staff were occupied by other full-time activities, 
the HRC focused exclusively on monitoring violence. This organisation 
consequently had the most structured system of data collection and processing. 
The Inkatha Institute, with their full-time staff and the necessary resources, also 
maintained a daily routine in terms of accessing data. The UMP had a routine for 
two years when finances allowed for the employment of a part-time person to scan 
and enter press reports into the unit's computerised database. 
The daily routine for these monitors involved scanning the press and listening to 
radio broadcasts to find out where violence had occurred. These would then be 
cross-checked and collated with reports from the police, which came in on a daily 
basis. The events reported by these sources were then followed up by telephoning 
or visiting contacts and relevant organisations in the areas concerned. The HRC 
had a list of contacts throughout the region who they telephoned twice a week to 
ascertain if any violence had occurred in that area. Where time and resources 
7 Gavin Woods of Inkatha Institute stated that 90% of their information came from "the 
ground" (interview on February 22, 1994). 
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allowed, monitors visited violent areas themselves. In some cases, people 
contacted the monitors to volunteer information. 
The Natal Monitor operated on a more ad hoc basis, using the press and police to 
a lesser degree than the other monitors. Most of this monitor's information came 
from contacts who related details of events over the telephone. When time allowed, 
contacts were phoned for upda,tes on the situation in their areas. Once this 
information had been gathered, extensive follow-ups would be conducted with the 
police. This process was identified as the most time consuming for the Natal 
Monitor. For the UMP similarly, the "cross-checking, editing and 'cleaning-up' of the 
database was a time consuming and skilled job" (Aitchison, 1993: 23). 
All the monitors emphasised the importance of verifying reports received from the 
press, the police and personal contacts. This process often depended, however, on 
the availability of time and staff. Monitors had a sense of which sources were 
reliable, although even these sometimes provided inaccurate information. 
Assessing the reliability of information was largely guided by experi~nce in 
detecting untruths or exaggerations. 
The Natal Monitor and HRC were inclined to seek information from more than one 
source about a particular event, although both said this depended on the reliability 
of the source providing the information. Sources such as investigating police 
officers and senior representatives of organisations were d~ribed as "usually 
reliable", although no definite rules could be applied. 
The Inkatha Institute and HRC entered information firstly on incident reports which 
was then transferred to a computerised database. All the monitors interviewed had 
access to computers for recording information. The HRC, Natal Monitor and 
Inkatha Institute aimed to produce monthly violence reports, although the HRC has 
proved the most reliable in this regard. The Inkatha Institute's report was produced 
sporadically and was not freely available to the public. The UMP did not have the 
capacity and resources to deliver a regular bulletin, although a useful resource 
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document was complied, which listed all the events from the database from 1987 
to 1989. 
4. Constraints on violence monitoring 
Two issues represent broadly, the problems faced by monitors, and were 
mentioned by all those monitors Who were interviewed. These are a shortage of 
resources and the problem of the reliability of sources. 
i) Resources 
Insufficient resources, which essentially means finances, limited the number of 
staff and the infrastructural capacity of these organisations. One of the biggest 
problems stemming from this was the lack of time available to investigate reports of 
violence adequately, and to visit areas to speak to the people involved. 
The geographical area which could be covered was also limited by the availability 
of staff and money. The quality and reliability of the monitors' data were adversely 
affected by these constraints. Also, as in the case of the UMP, this meant that the 
information collected could not be disseminated on a regular basis in the form of 
monthly bulletins, for example. 
The Natal Monitor had a different perspective on this issue, as a lack of funding 
was not the central problem for this monitor. Extensive energy was not devoted to 
raising money, and the preference was to keep the staff numbers down. This, the 
interviewee believed, would ensure a small, trustworthy and competent group of 
people who had established ties with communities, which new members could not 
easily acquire. The lack of time for monitoring was perceived as the major 
drawback for the Natal Monitor, particularly as this limited the capacity to follow-up 
and cross-check events. For this monitor, increasing staff numbers was not, 
however, the best solution to this problem. 
121 
ii) Reliability of sources 
All the monitors interviewed expressed a great sensitivity to, and awareness of, the 
problem of the reliability of their sources. In terms of personal contacts, monitors 
were constantly alert to the possibility of rumours and the exaggeration of events, 
even by contacts they considered reliable. If contacts were politically active, it was 
acknowledged that the information they supplied would be 'their' side of the story, 
and efforts were made to find other versions. The Natal Monitor said it placed the 
most reliance on information from non-political, first hand accounts. Most monitors 
stressed their attempts to validate and cross-check information. The UMP, after 
checking the information from its non-press sources, found that they were reliable 
and could be believed (Aitchison, 1993). 
In terms of contacts being affiliated largely to one political group, the HRC, UMP 
and Natal Monitor acknowledged that most of their sources did not include Inkatha 
supporters. The Inkatha Institute, in tum, had mainly IFP sources. This one-
sided ness was considered most problematic by the HRC and the Inkatha Institute. 
The Inkatha Institute and Natal Monitor both said . they had nevertheless 
established some contact with people from the ANC and IFP respectively. 
The UMP did not believe that this problem affected their records of fatalities, but 
perhaps the detail surrounding deaths of Inkatha people. The UMP believed there 
were few Inkatha supporters in the area which it monitored at the time. The UMP 
also felt . that the police reports covered most events which included Inkatha 
casualties, and that in 1987 and 1988 comparisons with Inkatha's figures showed 
that the UMP had actually recorded more Inkatha deaths than Inkatha itself had. 
On the whole, the monitors seemed unsatisfied with the reliability of the secondary 
sources which they used. The police reports were found to be unreliable, devoid of 
detail and were often inaccurate regarding the names of people and the location of 
events, for example. The UMP found that police Unrest Reports were most 
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problematic in relation to events in which deaths and serious injuries did not occur 
(Aitchison, 1993). These · problems were heightened during the States of 
Emergency, and police reports have improved somewhat over the years. The 
Inkatha Institute thought that the recent police information was reliable, and the 
HRC also said the police were cooperative and generally helpful when contacted 
for information about events. 
The HRC, Natal Monitor and UMP also drew attention to the difficulty of accessing 
reports from, and sharing information with, the Inkatha Institute. In most cases, the 
Institute would not make their data available to these organisations. The UMP and 
Natal Monitor in any event, believed the Inkatha Institute's publicly available data 
was inaccurate and misleading. This problem has a long history of political rivalries 
and perceptions of bias, and was one of the main reasons for holding the workshop 
on violence monitoring and research in 1991. These issues are elaborated below. 
Most of the monitors concurred with the criticisms of press reporting of violence 
discussed in Chapter Four. The UMP experienced the least problems with the 
newspaper it used, namely The Natal Witness. This was probably because The 
Natal Wjtness was considered to have maintained high standards particularly 
during the Emergency years (Aitchison, 1993). Because newspapers relied on the 
police Unrest Reports and SAPA reports, the difficulties associated with the latter 
were often transferred to the press. 
Aitchison believed that The Natal Witness was "quite good" from 1987 to 1990. 
Since then, however, problems have developed such as the use of ethnic 
terminology, and more recently, the downplaying of violence.8 The Inkatha Institute 
believed the press had improved significantly in the last two years, since it was 
reporting violence in a more politically balanced, sensitive way. Monitors also 
acknowledged that the public were no longer interested in the violence, which 
impacts on the extent of press coverage. 
8 Interview with Aitchison from the UMP on July 5, 1994. 
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Apart from the UMP, the monitors were critical of the press. They explained that 
reporters did little fieldwork, and relied on incoming news which could be 
damaging, since political party press statements were often inaccurate. Monitors 
also believed that the newspapers reported events in isolation without any context 
or background, which prevented readers from understanding the dynamics of the 
conflict. In the past, monitors said, the press assigned blame for events too hastily 
and were biased. 9 
The press was also accused of using information provided by the monitors badly or 
not at all. 1o Monitors stated that reporters and management in the press are still 
mainly white, which distanced them from circumstances in which violence occurs, 
and shaped the standard of reporting, which they believed was generally bad. 
In conclusion, the Natal Monitor and UMP expressed the most confidence in their 
sources and in their own ability to assess the honesty and reliability of these. For 
the Natal Monitor, it was methodologically important to understand the general 
local level dynamics, in order to assess the accuracy of a source's information. The 
HRC was satisfied with its sources, although they believed securing reliable 
contacts depended on forming extensive networks, which required more time than 
was available to them. For the Inkatha Institute, the very nature of the work made 
the quality and reliability of contacts questionable, and the Institute was 
consequently least satisfied with its contacts, especially because they largely 
reported attacks on IFP supporters only. 
The reliability of sources proved the crucial factor in monitors' assessments of 
whether their data provided an accurate picture of the conflict. The Natal Monitor 
and UMP were confident that their data was accurate. The HRC's satisfaction was 
9 The Inkatha Institute believed the press were until recently, biased towards the ANC, 
and that they gave monitors affiliated to the ANC far more coverage (interview with Gavin 
Woods on February 22,1994). 
10 According to Gavin Woods, studies undertaken by the Inkatha Institute in the past 
showed that the press used about 10% of the information which the Institute supplied them 
with. 
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qualified by the knowledge that they could not always adequately cover all the 
violence in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The Inkatha Institute did not believe its data accurately reflected the conflict, 
although it was better than the majority of other information available. 
Nevertheless, the Institute felt it had contributed to the creation of a more balanced 
public perception about violence. It maintained that public perceptions had been 
one-sided up until three years ago, during which time the ANC was always 
represented as the main victim of violence. 
5. Criticisms of the monitoring agencies and their responses 
There has been little discussion about the monitoring agencies with regard to their 
methodology and the reliability of their data. This is probably ' because most 
monitoring exercises began as humanitarian responses to crisis situations, rather 
than as planned and structured projects. In addition, monitors have filled an 
information vacuum brought about by the States of Emergency. Their contribution 
to violence research has been invaluable. 
In the politically volatile and sensitive times before the 1994 election, it. was not 
surprising that the criticisms which were levelled' at the monitoring agencies 
focused on the issue of bias. This may be a valid comment, but the nature of the 
accusation is such that the accusers sometimes become victims of their own 
criticisms. Rather than contributing to an understanding of the monitoring process, 
these accusations heightened tensions and further polarised those involved. 
The motives for the criticisms may vary, but they stem from a concern about the 
way in which such information affects the public's understanding of the issues. This 
is also a concern of this study, and the allegations of bias against the monitors will 
be reviewed along with the responses of the monitors to ' these. Some 
methodological issues will also be considered. 
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i) Allegations of bias 
There is a history of accusations of partiality between the Inkatha Institute and the 
IFP on the one hand, and several monitors on the other. In particular, the UMP and 
Natal Monitor have clashed with the Inkatha Institute. The Inkatha argument is 
summarised in an extract taken from a Goldstone Commission Submission on 
violence in KwaZulu-Natal in 1992. Smith (1992) suggested that most monitors 
cover only that violence which boosts the position and image of the political 
organisation which the monitor covertly supports, to the discredit of political 
opponents. This allegiance, he maintained, is however, never revealed. This is 
because monitors require an impartial reputation in order that their information be 
accepted as reliable by the media and the public. 
Smith (1992) stated that much monitoring "entails the cynical manipulation of 
information in what really amounts to a propaganda war" (Smith, 1992: 14). Inkatha 
contend that monitors have used the press deliberately to destroy the political 
credibility of the IFP and its leader. This has been achieved through: blaming the 
IFP for most of the violence; omitting ANC-instigated incidents of violence; and 
labelling the conflict as a political battle between the IFP and ANC, while ignoring 
other diverse causes. 
The Inkatha Institute has not been accused of bias with the same intensity. This is 
probably because the Institute acknowledged that it is closely linked to the IFP, 
shares staff members with that political party, and operates in the interests of the 
party. As pointed out in the section on monitoring constraints above, the monitors' 
criticisms of the Inkatha Institute centred around the antagonistic and hostile 
stance of the Institute towards other monitors, and the quality and accuracy of its 
data which monitors have managed to access. 
A second source of criticism of bias was made by the South African Institute of 
Race Relations (SAIRR), after Jeffery (1992) studied reports released by three 
organisations: Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and 
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the HRC. Jeffery's discussion with regards to the HRC is relevant here.
11 
The 
critique focused on a particular report of the HRC: Special Briefing on Massacres 
and the Area Repression Report for April 1992. Jeffery's findings have been 
questioned, but her critique is worth conSidering since it was motivated by one of 
the problems which also motivates this study. She stated that: 
"The manner in which political violence in South Africa is being reported is 
assuming critical importance. In the volatile situation which exists in the 
country, reports on the violence play a crucial role in either defusing 
tensions or exacerbating confrontation" (Jeffery, 1992: 1). 
The aim of Jeffery's (1992) report was to gauge the accuracy of allegations made 
in the documents, given that the HRC has extensive credibility as a monitor of 
human rights abuses both locally and abroad. The study began by stating that the 
reports of the three organisations in question were "one-sided and simplistic [and] 
at worst they amount to disinformation - deliberate attempts to mislead" (Jeffery, 
1992: 7). This assertion was based on the finding that the methodologies used by 
the organisations in question involved the suppression of information, the elevation 
of untested allegation to fact, and a "consistent disregard" of the perspectives of 
other parties involved (Jeffery, 1992: 7). 
Jeffery's (1992) report has been criticised from various quarters, including the 
SAIRR itself, for several reasons. 12 One is that, as stated in the SAIRR's critique of 
11 It is worth noting that subsequent to the report being released, the SAIRR apologised to 
the HRC on the basis that the author was more guilty of showing bias than the HRC was 
(interview with Linda Mclean and Sarah Kearney from the HRC on February 11, 1994). 
12 A number of the SAIRR's staff produced the 'Critique of Spotlight on Disinformation 
about Violence in South Africa by Dr Anthea Jeffery' (pre-publication copy), 1992, 
Johannesburg. It concluded that: 
"Firstly, it is clear that Dr Jeffery does not apply the same rigid criteria to 
information which she uses to support her argument as she demands of the 
organisations she criticises. She ignores information which does not support her 
argument and she elevates to fact information which may not be reliable. 
Secondly, she makes damning judgements of these organisations, aSSigning 
underhan~ motives to the~ without bothering to get their point of view. Thirdly, her 
argument In many cases IS unsound. It is based on insufficient and unreliable 
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her report, the assessment of the accuracy of the organisations' reports was 
conducted without consulting those involved. This is, ironically, one of the criticisms 
which Jeffery (1992) made of the monitoring groups in her own report. Her report is 
nevertheless, an important document because it was motivated by an important 
problem, and made some us~ful conclusions. For example, the category used by 
the HRC to describe certain types of events, namely "vigilante related action" was 
found to be very problematic, as it could be used to lay the blame for events in 
which the ANC (or any other group) was probably the aggressor, at the door of the 
IFP. The use of this category by the HRC has since been discontinued. 
In addition, the report was the first of its kind to draw attention to the fact that very 
little information about the ANC's involvement in the violence ever reached the 
public. To illustrate this, the report referred to events in which ANC supporters 
perpetrated violence against IFP supporters. However, why some of this data 
about the ANC's activities should be considered reliable, when according to Jeffery 
(1992) that used in the reports of the three organisations, is unreliable, is not spelt 
out. 
This created the impression that Jeffery's (1992) critique was attempting to bolster 
the IFP rather than simply point out the one-sidedness of the reports she studied. 
This distracted readers from the issue at hand, drawing attention to the SAIRR, 
rather than the subject under discussion. Consequently, important conclusions 
such as the caution that unsubstantiated allegations should be treated ' very 
carefully, and that all sides of the story should be canvassed rather than only one 
party's version of events, lost some of their impact. 
ii) Methodology 
At the workshop on monitoring research methodology in 1988, several suggestions 
were made regarding data collection and how to ensure the collection of accurate 
inf~rmation. It decontextualises events and policies and makes unfounded leaps 
of Judgement" (Quoted in Aitchison, 1993: 31). 
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information. The recommendations for descriptive monitoring, which applies to the 
organisations being studied here, will be reviewed. 
Collins (1988) and Sutcliffe (1988) pointed to possible areas which may affect the 
accuracy of data. These apply to most research situations, and include the 
representativeness, reliability and validity of data, and the effects of researcher's 
own bias on the situation being studied. 
In terms of representativeness and reliability, they recommended techniques like 
random sampling, the use of triangulation in research design,13 identifying both 
majority and minority views, and gathering information which represents the whole 
community under study rather than just the affected portion. Sutcliffe (1988) 
cautioned that meeting all these criteria was limited by the highly politicised context 
in which violence occurs, as well as the control of information resulting from the 
Emergency. He stated that under these conditions "the interpretations and 
accounts of events often depends on who is telling the story" (Sutcliffe, 1988: 31). 
This made finding explanations. for political violence difficult. 
Referring to conditions during the Emergency, Tomaselli (1988: 21) also noted 
"the sheer impossibility of reflecting the complete truth (even in a statistical, let 
alone interpretative manner) under circumstances in which it is in the state's 
interest to disguise much of what is happening around us". 
Bias stemming from the effects of the researcher on the research situation could 
be minimised by using unobtrusive techniques, such as: participant observation; 
developing relationships of trust before and during data collection; and getting an 
outsider to report on the researcher's influence on the situation. The situation being 
studied might also bias the researcher, especially when working with victims of 
13 Collins (1988: 21-22) describes 'triangulation' as one of the most useful techniques for 
descriptive monitoring. The concept is based on the premise that a social situation will be 
m~st accurately ~esCribed if multiple points of reference are used. Thus monitOring should 
stnve to: cover different levels of data; different groups of people; different pOints in time; 
more than one place; use multiple observers of the same situation; use different methods· 
and use different theoretical perspectives in relation to the same issue. ' 
129 
violence. This could be overcome by keeping research aims in mind at all times, 
and by obtaining the help of an outside researcher who may identify where the 
researcher is being misled, or is becoming biased (Collins, 1988). 
Again, Collins (1988) warned that achieving these ideals was hampered when 
monitoring political . violence. Monitors pOinted out that in a war situation distinct 
sides are drawn, and gaining access to one side often means supporters of the 
other side will resist meetings and refuse to supply information.
14 
The contributions by Sutcliffe (1988) and Muller (1988), as well as some of the 
discussions at the workshop, touched on the issue of the relationship between 
monitors, democratic organisations and "community organisations" (Muller, 1988: 
43). It is uncertain how widely shared these views were, but they shed light on 
some of the perceptions about monitoring at the time. 
One of the objectives of the Unrest Monitoring Project which Sutcliffe coordinated 
(not the same as the UMP referred to in this study), was to "publish occasional 
reports which would be of use to progressive organisations" (Sutcliffe, 1988: 27). 
This was part of a wider aim to empower and strengthen community organisations 
through training and action research. Sutcliffe (1988: 32) states that "Clearly, such 
research projects need to work towards structuring their relationship with the mass 
democratic organisations. In particular, monitoring research needs to be broadly 
accountable to the mass democratic movement.. .". 
This suggested that there was nothing wrong with monitors being directly aligned 
to one of the parties in the conflict, and that this was preferable for the mass 
democratic organisations. Sutcliffe (1988) was keenly aware of the requirements 
for good research as illustrated above, and his view outlined here was apparently 
based on the assumption that all academic research is in some way politically 
aligned, and that the objectivity of academics is not guaranteed by their distance 
from political parties on the ground (Aitchison, 1993). 
14 Interviews with the HRC on February 11 , 1994 and with John Aitchison from the UMP 
on July 5, 1994. 
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There is little evidence from the document of the workshop that this concept was 
considered problematic. Muller (1988: 46) did, however, pose a question about the 
relationship between research carried out by "non-aligned" academics, and that by 
academics specifically to meet the needs of community organisations and activists, 
and which is more valid , or "true". The conclusion was that this question was 
problematic, and neither researchers or community organisations were clear about 
it. 
iii) The monitoring agencies' response to these criticisms 
The monitoring agencies were asked about the problem of bias, and if this affected 
their work and the monitoring process in general. The discussions of each monitor 
will be considered separately. 
The UMP was clear about the fact that its primary sources did not include Inkatha 
structures, and the potential for bias which this implied (Aitchison, 1993). The 
ability to acknowledge this was considered the first step in dealing with the 
problem, as attempts could then be made to correct it. Aitchison (1993) also 
emphasised the difficulties the UMP faced in monitoring violence, in addition to 
those which all social researchers face: 
"Reconstructing a picture of what happened through the pinhole lens of the 
official police Unrest Report or by listening to the gut wrenching yet often 
tendentious testimony of a victim or bereaved relative is not a precise 
scientific activity nor politically neutral. We enter such activity with pre-
existing mind-factored templates and assumptions" (Aitchison, 1993: 32). 
These problems have not, according to the UMP, had a significant impact on the 
reliability of data, and the empirical findings of the UMP have never been 
challenged (Aitchison, 1993). The allegation that monitors are biased is invalid 
according to the UMP. Aitchison (1993) argued that while the influence of a 
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person's beliefs could never be discounted, there was little evidence which proved 
that the monitor's data was inaccurate, and therefore biased. Aitchison (1993: 14) 
believed that perceptions of objectivity have been subject to changes over time and 
that some organisations "did not like" the UMP's findings. As a result, various 
Inkatha and Inkatha Institute spokesmen claimed the UMP or Aitchison himself, 
were biased. 
The Inkatha Institute believed that the other monitors had improved somewhat in 
terms of bias over the years. While personal sympathies were still believed to 
affect monitoring, there was no longer the manipulation of data to generate certain 
messages. In terms of the Institute's own data, the interviewee recognised that 
most sources were within IFP structures an~ that events in which ANC supporters 
were victims, was not well covered. The Institute did have some ANC sources, but 
incidents involving ANC supporters were not included in the Institute's monthly 
reports. The Inkatha Institute expressed the most concern of all the monitors about 
the effects of bias on its own work, and particularly on the monthly bulletins which 
were sporadically circulated. 
The HRC thought the problem and perceptions of bias were rooted in the fact that 
most monitors evolved within UDF structures. Since the unbanning of the ANC, 
some monitors struggled to distance themselves from this identity, according to the 
HRC. The HRC believed the antagonistic stance of the IFP had retarded this 
process and probably entrenched divisions. The HRC did not believe their own 
work was biased, and the criticisms made by Jeffery (1992) were not taken 
seriously, since the SAIRR applogised to the HRC for the allegations made in 
Jeffery's (1992) report. 
The researchers were also conscious of where the HRC's weaknesses lay, and 
were committed to being objective. They warned that monitors have to control how 
close they allow themselves to become to particular people or political parties. 
Working with victims of violence, they said, made this difficult because 
relationships could become personal, and the desire to help these people could 
cloud objectivity. 
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The Natal Monitor believed that objectivity is an unrealistic goal because everyone 
has political sympathies of some sort, and that being aware of these puts a 
researcher in a better position to deal with them. Being a member of a political 
party does not automatically translate into bias, because political preferences are 
not exclusive to members only. The Natal Monitor acknowledged that a 
predominance of sources from one particular group would affect data. The Natal 
Monitor believed this problem was balanced by scanning the press and Inkatha's 
information when this was available, and drawing on the Monitor's few sources 
within Inkatha. The lack of information about Inkatha victims was, according to the 
Monitor, an inadequacy which could not be helped. The Monitor emphasised that 
information about Inkatha was not deliberately left out. 
Comments by the IFP that the Natal Monitor was "nothing less than an attempt to 
give credence to ANC strategies and propaganda in Natal/KwaZulu" (Hodgson, 
1992) were not taken seriously by that monitor. The interviewee argued that 
Inkatha was notorious for having the stance that"anybody who is not for them is 
against them". The Natal Monitor was confident about its methodology and the 
reliability of its information, and believed the academic background of its 
researchers was ~dvantageous for data collection and for dealing with criticism. 
6. Conclusion 
It . is not the intention of this study to pass sentence on any of the monitoring 
agencies, but rather to consider some methodological issues which shape the 
information which they disseminate. Certain factors mitigate against violence 
monitors adopting scientific methods of data collection, and their data therefore is 
not easily subjected to such an assessment. These factors are: 
• Most monitoring exercises did not develop as planned research projects based 
on structured proposals which spelt out data gathering techniques and funding 
arrangements. Concomitantly, monitoring processes were not always subject to 
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the rigours of peer scrutiny, reports and assessments, as are most research 
projects carried out in a research or academic environment. This, along with the 
often limited resources, are probably largely the reasons why the preferable 
methods such as those described by Collins (1988) and Sutcliffe (1988) above, 
were not always used. While monitors themselves mostly have confidence in 
their data, these shortcomings have affected the perceived legitimacy of their 
work. 
• The environment which monitors work in is one which makes detachment and 
objectivity harder to maintain than in most situations. Good monitoring means 
establishing trust with people in communities, which under any circumstances is 
the basis for forming relationships. In cases where contacts become victims, or 
where monitors work directly with victims of violence, maintaining a measure of 
objective judgement must be extremely difficult. 
This chapter has identified some important issues to consider when using the 
monitoring agency data. While data gathering techniques vary between monitors, 
these are not always systematic, and depend to a large extent on the availability of 
time, staff and ultimately resources. This may detract · from the reliability of the 
data. The HRC has the most systematic process, probably because this is the only 
monitor discussed here whose staff concentrate exclusively on monitoring 
violence. 
The sources used by the monitors are extensive and vary in type (for example, 
between primary and secondary data) which is valuable for cross-checking and 
ensuring the reliability of data. This is one of the monitors' greatest strengths. The 
biggest drawback, however, is that in all cases, most primary sources were 
affiliated in some way to a particular political group, or data largely excluded 
victims of a particular group. Although the monitors themselves did not all perceive 
this as a problem, those using this material inevitably feel they are not getting the 
whole picture. Also, despite the monitors' belief that their data is reliable and 
representative, this situation fuels accusations of political bias. These accusations 
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antagonise parties, which hinders cooperation and data sharing, thus making the 
resolution of the problem more difficult. 
Monitors mostly did not regard bias as an important problem for their activity. It was 
not apparent that measures to lessen these perceptions and to widen the net of 
primary sources were prioritised. Monitors seemed to rely on established contacts 
in communities, rather than surveying opinions of randomly selected people in 
these areas. Admittedly, this is a difficult task in a violence stricken region. A 
technique such as that suggested by Collins (1988) of employing an outside 
researcher to assess the impartiality of data was also not mentio"ned by the 
monitors in the interviews. The HRC and to some extent the Inkatha Institute had 
their data checked by someone not involved in the collection process, although 
they were part of the said organisations, rather than outsiders. 
An encouraging fact is that all the monitors acknowledged the potential problems of 
having sources largely from one political group, and the possible bias arising from 
this and from the monitoring process in general. This suggests that, being open to 
public scrutiny, the monitors must have confidence in their work and in their ability 
to defend their methods. Indeed the Natal Monitor and UMP welcomed such 
scrutiny. There was also no evidence that monitors deliberately excluded data 
about certain political groupS.15 Sporadic attempts were also made to access data 
from those sources which were lacking. In many cases, monitors had given up this 
quest, after numerous unsuccessful attempts, humiliating encounters and a loss of 
faith in the reliability of certain data. 
15 In the cas~ of the Inkatha Institute, the monthly bulletin was produced on request of the 
I~P.lnformatlon. Centre, for party political purposes. Consequently, information on ANC 
victims was .dehber~tely excluded. This was not, however, in keeping with the aims of the 
Inkatha Institute's Violence research unit. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS OF REPORTING TRENDS 
1. Aims of this chapter 
Having discussed the contextual issues surrounding violence reporting by the 
press and monitoring agencies, this chapter reports the results of statistical 
analyses which compare reporting trends of these media in KwaZulu-Natal during 
the years 1987, 1990 and 1994. These years were chosen for two reasons. 
First, they best enable a comparison of reporting during and after the States of 
Emergency were in place. This is important because violence reporting was 
severely curtailed during the Emergency. The State of Emergency was lifted in 
February 1990 in the rest of the country, but in KwaZulu-Natal it was only 
repealed in October that year. Nevertheless, with the simultaneous unbanning of 
the ANC and other political organisations, and the release of Nelson Mandela 
from prison in february 1990, it is unlikely that the reporting restrictions were 
enforced as before. 
The second reason for choosing to study these years is that monitoring agency 
material was most readily available during these years, and this information is 
necessary for a good comparison between monitor and press reporting. 
The interviews conducted for this study with journalists and editors about their 
work procedures (discussed in Chapter Four), along with findings of international 
research (Snyder and Kelly, 1977; McCarthy et ai, 1993) revealed that the 
following factors might affect the· likelihood that events are reported by the press. 
These are: 
• The distance of the event from the location of the newspaper. The likelihood of 
reporting decreases as the distance from the press base increases. 
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• The intensity of events, measured by the numbers of people killed and injured 
per event. More intens~ events have a greater likelihood of being reported by 
the press. 
• The time or date at which events occurred - in other words, the political 
context. This factor may lead to both an increase or a decrease in the 
likelihood of reporting. For example, whether or not violence would mar the 
country's first democratic election became an important issue for the media. 
Thus events of violence just before the election in April 1994 became sought 
after news items, which increased the likelihood that violence would be 
reported during this time period. 
• The size of events, measured by the number of participants. The more 
participants in an event, the greater the chance that the incident will be 
reported. 
Apart from the distance of the events from the source of information, these factors 
should not affect press and monitoring agency reporting in the same way. Chapter 
Five reported that the main limitations for monitors was a shortage of staff and 
resources, and to an extent sources of information. These might affect recording 
of events in distant locations, but would not incline monitors to report more 
intense events, or events with more participants, or alter their recording patterns 
in accordance with a changing political environment. This makes the nature of 
reporting by the monitors useful for comparisons with press reporting. 
An analysiS of the influence of these factors on reporting will illustrate how the 
press and monitors contribute to the database. In doing so, the intention is that 
some of the following questions will be answered: In what way did the sources 
contribute to the data set? How did the size and intenSity of events affect the 
probability that they \YOuld be reported by the different sources? How did the 
location of events influence their selection by the press and monitors? Did the 
time period in which events occurred have any impact on reporting trends? 
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Answering these questions will not enable conclusions to be drawn about the 
extent of selection bias, since there is no 'correct' record of the events which 
actually occurred, against which to measure what the sources reported. However, 
it will be possible to comment on the type of contribution which the sources made, 
and the implications for the data set. 
This chapter will do the following: 
• . Explain how the various newspapers and monitoring agencies have been 
grouped to measure their contribution to the database. 
• Describe the distribution of information reported by the sources in 1987, 1990 
and 1994. 
• Discuss the effects of each of the factors outlined above on reporting by the 
press and the monitoring agencies in each of the three years. 
• Draw conclusions about the type of contribution to the database made by the 
sources. 
2. How the sources vvere grouped for analysis 
Data on 3 996 events of violent collective action in KwaZulu-Nalal during 1987, 
1990 and 1994 were used. The majority of these events occurred in 1990 (1 674 
events), followed by 1 190 incidents in 1994 and 1 132 in 1987. 
Twenty six different sources contributed to the data set over the three years 
(Appendix 1). Where sources are named individually, the number of events 
reflected was reported by this source a/one. The category 'combination press' 
refers to events which were reported by more than one newspaper. 'Combination 
monitors' refers to those events reported by several monitoring agencies, while 
'combination monitors and press' includes events reported by both monitors and 
newspapers. 
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Because this study is concerned with the reporting patterns of the press and 
monitors in general, the sources listed in Appendix 1 were grouped into three 
categories for analysis (Table 1). Events reported by newspapers only, are 
captured in the 'press' category. Events reported by monitoring agencies only are 
labelled 'monitors', and those incidents reported by both monitors and 
newspapers fall into the same 'combination' category as that mentioned above.1 
The 'combination' category presents some challenges for analysis. When 
assessing what proportion of events was reported by the press for example, not 
only the events in the 'press' category must be considered, but also those in the 
'combination' category, since events in this latter group were also reported by the 
press. Also, the greater the proportion of events reported by a combination of 
sources, the harder a comparison between press and monitor reporting becomes. 
While a large proportion of events reported by a combination of sources may 
frustrate analysis, the fact that separate sources reported the same events is a 
positive sign. 
The 'combination' category is important because it allows a distinction to be made 
between events which are reported by a collective of source types (ie. the 
monitors and the press), and ·those reported by one source type only (ie. the 
monitor.s or the press). The 'collective source type' events are those captured in 
the 'combination' category. The more there are of these events, the better for 
researchers, because if information from one of the source types cannot be 
1 It is important to note that the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a major ·source of 
information, uses the press in its own data collection process. This presents a potential 
problem, namely that events which originated in the press are recorded in the data set as 
being reported by monitors, since the information stems from the HRC. This problem was 
overcome by coding such events in the 'press' category, even though they were 
physically obtained from the HRC. 
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obtained, the researcher can rest assured that the other set of sources will report 
the incidents. 
The 'single source type' events are those reported by one category of sources 
only. If there are many 'single source' events, researchers need to consider their 
choice of source types carefully, because omitting the information from one 
category of sources would mean that a significant amount of events would not be 
recorded. 
In cases where the proportion of events in the 'combination' category are small, 
few events were reported by both press and monitors. This could be for several 
reasons. It may be the result of reporting bias by either source along the lines of 
the variables which will be analysed in this chapter. The press and monitors could 
also cover different geographical areas, with the result that few events are 
reported by both sources. Alternatively, certain types of events may fall outside 
the monitors' area of concern. 
3. The proportion of events reported by the sources in 1987, 1990, 
1994 
In order to consider reporting trends more generally, the proportion of events 
reported by the sources will first be considered for the three year period as a 
whole. The proportions in each year will then be discussed individually. 
If data for the three years being studied are added together, the · largest 
contribution to the database by a single source was made by a newspaper. The 
Natal Witness reported 20,8% of events over the three year period which were not 
also reported by other sources. The Human Rights Committee monitoring agency 
reported 13,5% of all events over the same period (Appendix 1). 
With regard to the categories of sources, the press reported 48,2% of events 
which were not also recorded by the monitors. The monitors reported 37,5% of 
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events not covered by the press over the three year period. Fourteen percent of 
events in 1987, 1990 and 1994 were reported by both the monitors and the 
newspapers (Figure 1). This illustrates that both the press and the monitors have 
made important separate contributions to the database during this time. 
Figure 1: Total Events Reported 
Proportion of ewnts 1987+1990+1994 
Combination (14.2%) 
Press (48.2%) 
These proportions have not, however, been consistent over the three year period. 
In 1987, the press alone, reported well over half the total events in that year 
(Figure 2), with monitors reporting substantially fewer. 
Reporting trends of individual sources rather than categories of sources in 1987, 
reveal that The Natal Witness and the Unrest Monitoring Project (UMP), both 
Pietermaritzburg based sources, reported the most events (Appendix 1). This is 
probably the case because 77,6% of conflict events in 1987 occurred in the 
Midlands region of the province which includes the town of Pietermaritzburg 
(Figure 3).2 
The predominance of the press category of sources in 1987 may be the result of 
the UMP monitoring only the Midlands area of the province. While The Natal 
Witness is also based in the Midlands, it would nevertheless, have covered 
2 The breakdown of these regions will be explained below in the section which deals with 
the effects of the location of events on reporting patterns. 
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events occurring in the Durban region. This would explain why many events 
reported by the press were not also reported by the monitors. 
Figure 2: Violence Reporting by Year 
Proportion of ewnts reported 
• Press • Mcritors • Combination 
In 1990, the reporting patterns were similar to those in 1987 (Figure 2). The press 
reported nearly two thirds of all events in this year, while the monitors reported 
just over one third. The amount of events which both reported ('combination') 
remained low in 1987 and 1990. Despite the fact that four separate monitoring 
agencies' material was used in 1990, the main contributors of information which 
was not also reported by other sources remained The Natal Witness (22,8%) and 
The Mercury (20,8%) (Appendix 1). 
One possible reason for this may again be that these monitoring agencies limited 
their scope of violence monitoring to the Midlands and Durban regions. This is 
significant because in 1990 conflict spread from the Pietermaritzburg and Durban 
metropolitan areas where it had previously been located, to the rural areas of the 
province. 
A comparison between data in Figure 3 illustrates that in 1990, 11,1 % of events 
occurred in the South region, as opposed to 0,4% in 1987. A similar trend is 
evident in the Zululand and North West regions. 
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Figure 3: Violence in Regions 
Proportioo of events in each ye81 
• ZlJu and • Nath-West 
• Olsban • South 
Midands 
In 1994, the reporting patterns were markedly different from those in the previous 
years (Figure 2). The monitors rather than the press, reported the majority of 
events in that year - nearly one half. The other outstanding feature in this year 
was the substantial increase in the contribution made by the 'combination' 
category. This suggests that nearly one} hird of events were reported by both the 
press and monitors in 1994. 
The substantial percentage of these 'collective source type' events is encouraging 
because should one group of sources not be used, the other would still report 
these events. A closer examination of individual sources' contributions shows that 
the reporting of events not covered by any other sources by The Natal Witness 
and The Mercury, dropped dramatically in 1994 from previous years (Appendix 1). 
Instead, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) made the largest contribution of any 
single source. 
The HRC, unlike monitoring agencies used in previous years, monitors violence 
across the whole of KwaZulu-Natal, and by 1994 violence was occurring 
throughout the province (Figure 3). This may explain the high proportion of events 
covered by both the press and monitors in 1994. Whatever the reasons for these 
reporting trends, this analysis shows that without the monitors' contribution, nearly 
half the events in 1994 would not have been captured. This means that a larger 
proportion of events than before were not reported by the press. 
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4. Factors affecting reporting patterns 
i) The location of events as a determinant of reporting frequency 
To analyse how the location of events affects reporting patterns, two measures 
were developed. For the first measure, the KwaZulu-Natal province was divided 
into five regions based largely on the Joint Services Board boundaries. These 
boundaries were selected because they are familiar to many people in the 
province, and because they correspond with the generalised location of much of 
the conflict (see the Map in Appendix 2).3 
For the second measure, a variable was created which distinguishes simply 
between locations which are close to, and far from, the newspapers. All the 
newspapers used are located either in Durban or Pietermaritzburg. Based on 
journalists' and editors' comments about which areas they considered too far 
away to cover, it was estimated that a 100 km radius around these t'NO towns 
would form an adequate boundary. Events within the 100 km radius around 
Pietermaritzburg and Durban were labelled 'near', while those beyond this radius 
were labelled 'far'. The results of the analyses of these two measures will be 
discussed separately. 
Reporting trends in the five regions of KwaZulu-Natal 
The results in Figure 4 show that in 1987, the press reported nearly all the events 
in the largely rural Zululand, North-West and South regions. This is contrary to 
the hypothesis which states that because these regions are situated far from the 
newspapers' bases in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the press should be less 
likely to report events here. In addition, the readership of The Natal Witness and 
3 When conflict trends in the province are discussed, reference is usually made to 
distinct areas such as 'Zululand' and the 'South Coast' which, although not strictly the 
same as the JSB boundaries, refer to the same areas. Different trends in the conflict can 
also be distinguished in these separate areas. Apart from the Midlands region, where 
conflicts with somewhat different dynamics have occurred in the metropolitan and rural 
areas, the JSB boundaries present a diviSion of the province which suits the general 
trends. 
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The Mercury does not extend to many of these areas, which according to 
interviews with reporters and editors, should further diminish the newspapers' 
obligation to report these events. 
0,4 




~ Montors • Combination 
The predominance of the press as a source in 1987 may be explained by the fact 
that the Unrest Monitoring Project, the agency which contributed the most 
information in 1987, confined its monitoring to the Pietermaritzburg area. For this 
reason, monitors would have made little contribution to the database outside this 
metropolitan region. These results do not suggest that the monitors are less 
important for research purposes than the press. Instead they show that the press, 
despite criticisms by commentators on press reporting of violence, made a vital 
contribution to the database in 1987 by covering events throughout the region. 







In 1990 the trends changed only slightly from those in 1987. Events reported by 
the press alone, were still by far the majority in all five regions (Figure 5). It is 
evident, however, that the monitors' contribution increased in the outlying regions 
from that in 1987. 
A dramatic change in reporting patterns occurred in 1994 (Figure 6). The monitors 
were the single most important source for reporting violence in the distant regions 
of Zululand, North West and South. They reported 65,5%, 44% and 49,2% of 
events respectively. By contrast, the largest proportion reported by the press in 
any of the five regions was recorded in the Midlands and the Durban regions -
regions which include the towns where the newspapers are based. These 
reporting patterns are in direct contrast to those in Figures 4 and 5, and seem to 
fit the hypothesis that the press sources focus more on the areas in which they 
are based. 
Figure 6: Reporting in Regions in 1994 
% 
Dtrb~ South 
Press ~ Montors • Combination 
The discussion in Chapter Four indicated that the States of Emergency made 
violence reporting more difficult for the press. These results do not, however, 
suggest that the Emergency increased the likelihood that events in distant 
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locations would not be reported. The Emergency laws were in place in 1987, yet 
the press alone, reported the few events which occurred in outlying areas. 
The State of Emergency was lifted in October 1990 in KwaZulu-Natal, but 
restrictions were probably not enforced as of February that year, when the ANC 
was un banned and Nelson Mandela was released from prison. The Emergency 
may not, therefore, have restricted the press as much during 1990 as previous 
years, which may explain the large proportion of press reports on violence during 
this time. However, in 1990 more monitors were covering violence in the province 
than ever before,. yet the press still reported the majority of events in all regions. 
In 1994, the Emergency restrictions had been absent for four years, and could 
certainly have had no immediate effect on the reporting of violence. However, 
despite the fact that the press was free to report all incidents of conflict, for the 
first time in the period studied here, newspapers seemed to focus more on the 
urban areas where their headquarters are located. 
Distance from newspaper headquarters as a determinant of reporting frequency 
Figure 7 illustrates similar reporting trends to those discussed above. In 1987, the 
press reported not only the majority of events close to their headquarters, but also 
the vast majority of events far away. The same applies for 1990, although by then 
the monitors recorded 18,4% of events in 'far' areas in that year which were not 
reported by the newspapers. In 1994 the trend is quite different, however. 
Monitors, rather than the press, were more inclined to record events in 'far' areas. 
The proportion of events reported by a combination of press and monitors is 
substantial for events both 'far' and 'near' to the press bases in 1994. This is 
encouraging, since it indicates that many events are being reported by both 
groups of sources. However, the press reported far fewer events in distant areas 
than those close by. This means that without the monitors' information, 57,1% of 
events occurring far from Durban and Pietermaritzburg which are currently part of 
the database, would not have been recorded. 
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Figure 7: Reporting Near and Far Events 
Proportion reported in 1987, 1990, 1994 
1987 Nr Far 1990 Nr Far 1994 Nr 
• Press • Monitors • Combination 
All these results indicate that contrary to expectations, the press reported many 
events in locations distant from their own. In recent times, however, it would 
appear that the monitors report much of the violence in far off areas which the 
newspapers do not cover. 
This trend is important for researchers who may consider using only the press for 
violence research in KwaZulu-Natal in the future. The results nevertheless, show 
that the press and monitoring agencies have both made important individual 
contributions to the database, at different pOints in time. 
ii) The intensity of events as a determinant of reporting freguency 
Analyses considered whether the intensity of events had any affect on reporting 
patterns by various sources. A distinction was made between events of a high, 
medium and low intensity, based on the following criteria: 
• Violent events in which no deaths or injuries occurred are least intense ('low). 
• Events in which between one to four deaths and/or injuries took place are of 
medium intensity. 
• Events with five or more deaths and/or injuries have a high intensity. 
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Figure 8: Reporting Intensity in 1987 
Proportion e\e1ts reported by sources 
Hgh Medum Low 
• Combination • Moritors • Press 
The results in Figure 8 show that in 1987, the press reported by far the majority of 
high intensity events, which fits the hypothesis that the press are likely to focus 
more attention on the most intense events. 
This analyses also shows, however, that the press reported nearly two thirds of 
the low intensity events. This precludes drawing the conclusion that the 
newspapers' priority was intense events in 1987. 
Figure 9: Reporting Intensity in 1990 
Proportion e\e1ts reported by sources 
Medum Low 
• Press • Moritors • Combination 
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In 1990, the reporting trends changed slightly from those in 1987 (Figure 9). The 
press still reported the majority of the most intense events (47,5%), although this 
is a smaller majority than in 1987, as the monitors' coverage of intense events 
increased in 1990. 
With regard to the least intense events, monitors' recorded far more of these than 
was the case in 1987. This is more in line with expectations that newspapers 
would not devote as much time and space to these events, and that monitors 
would be more likely to record these incidents. 
The results in Figure 10 indicate, as did those in the analyses of other factors 
above, that reporting patterns in 1994 differed substantially from those in 1987 
and 1990. In this case, the greatest proportion of high intensity events was 
reported by a 'combination' of sources. This means that these events are likely to 
be reported by·. both press and monitors, which fits the hypothesis that the press is 
likely to report events with many deaths and injuries. 
The press and monitors reported about an equal number of different events in 
which no deaths and injuries occurred (the least intense events). This means that 
although both sources were likely to report intense events, they nevertheless 
made equally. important contributions with respect to the low intensity incidents. 
However, nearly half of all medium intensity events came from monitor sources 
only. 
These results do not conclusively show that the press is more likely to report . 
intense events. Although findings in 1990 and 1994 show signs of this trend, the 
fact that the press consistently reported a substantial proportion of the least 
intense events, which were not covered by the monitors, reduces the strength of 
the argument. 
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Figure 10: Reporting Intensity in 1994 
Proportial events repa1ed by SOll"ces 
H~ 
• Press • Ma'litors • Combinatial 
It is worth noting that several other measures for intensity were developed, but 
produced results so similar to those presented here that an analysis thereof would 
not have contributed to the argument. This is, however, in itself a finding for 
discussion. 
One variable, similar to that used above, sought to examine 'massacres'. These 
were defined as events in which ten or more deaths and/or injuries occurred. The 
rationale was that these events might be even more intense than those in which 
five or more fatalities and injuries were recorded. The results, however, closely 
resembled those already discussed (see the tables in Appendix 3). This shows 
that with regard to deaths and injuries, the number 'five' as opposed to 'ten', more 
accurately reflects perceptions of the more serious or intense events. This means 
that five deaths and injuries per event are as newsworthy as ten are. 
Another variable was developed which sought to investigate whether the inclusion 
of injuries in the intensity measure affected reporting patterns. Measures similar to 
those described above, based on five and ten deaths per event were developed, 
excluding injuries. Results showed little difference to those in Figures 8 to 10, 
which suggests that injuries are not a determining factor in the identification of 
intense events, whether there were five or ten injuries per event (see the tables in 
Appendix 3). Thus, the occurrence of injuries in events of violence does not 
appear to make events more or less newsworthy. 
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iii) The number of participants in events as a determinant of reporting 
freguency 
Arguments in the literature (Snyder and Kelly, 1977; McCarthy et ai, 1993) 
suggest that the size of events, measured by the number of participants, affects 
the likelihood that events will be reported by the press. The hypothesis is that the 
larger events are, the greater the probability of coverage. 
To determine how the press and monitoring agencies' contribution was influenced 
by event size, events were grouped into four categories. Small events refer to 
incidents with less than ten participants. Medium, large and very large events 
include those with ten to forty nine, 50-499, and 500 and more participants, 
respectively. 
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Figure 11: Reporting Event Size in 1987 
Proportion reported by SOlJ"ces 
Medum 
• Press R Mc::ritas 
Large Very large 
• Combination 
Figure 11 shows that over half of all events in 1987 (54,5%) which were small in 
size were reported by the press only. The newspapers also reported by far the 
majority of medium and large events. These latter results confirm the hypothesis 
that the press is inclined to report events with more participants. But the fact that 
the newspapers reported the majority of small events also, suggests that the 
press does not necessarily neglect events with fewer participants. 
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If the types of events which the press did not pick up are considered, however, the 
argument could be made that of these events, most were small in size. The 
greatest contribution by the monitors was in the reporting of small events, in which 
over a third of events reported by these agencies were not picked up by the press. 
This suggests, in line with the hypothesis, that the largest proportion of events 
which were not published in the newspapers, were small in size. 
Reporting trends in 1990 are similar to those in 1987 (Figure 12). The press again 
reported the majority of small, medium and large events. The monitors did, 
however, contribute far more to the medium and large categories in 1990 than in 
1987. 
An interesting contrast with reporting tendencies in 1987 is that monitors reported 
over half (52%) of all events which ·were very large in size. A significant proportion 
of these events were reported by a 'combination' of sources, which indicates that 
the press did also report many of these events. However, these results suggest 
that without the monitors' contribution, over half these events \NOuld not have 
been captured. 
The very large events are not many in number, and it is possible that this trend 
reflects the patterns of the violence reporting in the. Pietermaritzburg area in early 
1990. This violence, which has been called the 'Seven Days War', was 
characterised by organised attacks carried out by large groups of people on the 
residents of several townships. This intense violence which lasted nearly a month 
in total, was covered extenSively by the monitors. In fact, one of the monitors used 
during "this time was set up specifically to aid victims of these attacks.4 This might 
explain the predominance of very large events reported by monitors in 1990. 
4 The Midlands Crisis Relief Committee was set up and run by volunteers in 
Pietermaritzburg in March 1990 to assist victims of violence and record the events of 
violence in the process. This group operated only while this spate of attacks lasted, and 
produced a lengthy publication documenting the details of the violence. 
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Figure 12: Reporting Event Size in 1990 
Proportion reported by sOlI"ces 
• Press • Mentors • Combination 
The analysis of reporting patterns in 1994 shows trends quite different from those 
in 1987 and 1990, as has been the case with other variables studied here. Figure 
13 shows that the majority of small events in 1994, constituting nearly half of all 
these events (48,8%), were reported by the monitors only. 
This directly opposes trends in 1987 and 1990, in which the majority of small 
events were reported by the newspapers. Reporting of medium sized events was 
more equal, with each group of sources contributing about one third of events to 
the database. The newspapers reported the majority of the large events (46,3%), 
with monitors reporting only 14,6% of these incidents. 
These results support the hypothesis that the likelihood of events being reported 
in the press increases with size. In addition, these findings suggest, as have 
others presented here, that reporting patterns may be changing over time. It 
should, however, be noted that the Human Rights Committee, the main monitor 
used in 1994, does not record faction fights. This type of event typically involves 
large groups of people, and may account for the reporting patterns of large and 
very large events. 
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Figure 13: Reporting Event Size in 1994 
Proportion reported by sources 
• Press • Montors • Combinatioo 
The results nevertheless, suggest that size has had some affect on press 
reporting of violence, particularly in more recent times, and specifically in 1994. 
Without the monitors' contribution, over one third of the small events in the data 
set would not have been recorded in 1987 and 1990. Nearly one half would not 
have been captured in 1994, which suggests that the press devote less space to 
these kinds of events. 
iv) The political context or timing of events as a determinant of reporting 
freguency 
In trying to determine whether reporting patterns are related to the broader 
political context, the press and monitors' reporting patterns were analysed by 
month in 1987, 1990 and 1994. Figure 14 shows that for the first six months of 
1987 the press reported the vast majority of events, although the monitors' 
contribution was on the increase. In July, however, this changed dramatically, with 
the monitors reporting slightly more events than the newspapers. This trend 
reoccurred in October, after which the press again reported more than 60% of the 
province's violence. 
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Figure 14: Reporting in 1987 















In order to determine whether the political context had any affect on these 
reporting trends, the situation in KwaZulu-Natal during this time will briefly be 
considered. During the five month period from September 1987 to January 1988 
there was a major increase in the frequency of conflict (Figure 15). Durin"g this 
time, the average monthly number of events was 172 - a significant increase from 
sixty seven events in August 1987 (Louw and Bekker, 1992). Most of these events 
occurred in the Pietermaritzburg area. 
Judging from Figure 15, it would seem that as violence increased in 1987, the 
press contribution decreased and the monitors reported more events instead. This 
is contrary to expectations, since an upsurge of violence, particularly in 1987 
when such severe violence in KwaZulu-Natal was uncommon, should have been 
considered newsworthy by the press. 
This supposition is supported by the opinions of reporters and editors of the 
province's daily newspapers, who said that "newsworthiness" depended largely on 
events or happenings being "new", or different from the norm. 
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Figure 15: Violent Events in 1987 
fIlImber of ewnts by month 
Mach May .uy 
Months 
SeiXember Nowmber 
Interviewed in 1995, the editor of The Mercury said that although violence is an 
important issue for his newspaper, this' importance has become difficult to sustain 
because the conflict has continued for so many years. He added that "a very 
violent incident over one weekend eight years ago YIOuld have got a very big 
story, but this thing gets repeated almost every weekend". 5 Since newsworthiness 
does not seem to have been responsible for the decrease in press reporting, it is 
possible that the States of Emergency had some impact on these trends. 
A question raised by Louw and Bekker (1992) about violence levels in 1987 is 
revealing with regard to the political context: In June 1986 a national State of 
Emergency was declared, and comparative data shows that this succeeded in 
substantially redUCing what had been high conflict levels in the rest of the country . 
(Bennett and Quin, 1989). 
In KwaZulu-Natal, however, violence levels surged, and this period has come to 
mark the start of the province's long history of violent conflict. The question was 
thus why the government, with its extensive Emergency regulations and security 
forces, was unable to control violence in this province and particularly in the 
Pietermaritzburg area? 
5 Interview with John Patten, The Mercury editor, on March 28, 1995. 
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The answer to this question is not as important here as what this might have 
meant for reporting at the time. Whatever the reasons for the rising conflict levels 
in KwaZulu-Natal, it is highly likely that the government would have wanted to 
suppress information about the conflict situation - a central aim of the many press 
restrictions and Emergency laws. 
This may be the reason why press reporting decreased as conflict levels 
increased, in which case it could be concluded that the political context does have 
an effect on violence reporting by the press. This analysis also shows that 
although the States of Emergency may have suppressed press reporting of 
violence, the press remained an important source in 1987. 
Throughout the months of 1990 the press reported more violence than the 
monitors, except for April and May when the monitors reported ~Iightly more 
events (Figure 16). In December also, the newspapers' and monitors' reporting of 


















Figure 16: Reporting in 1990 
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If the frequency of conflict events in 1990 is considered in conjunction with the 
reporting trends during that year, a pattern similar to that in 1987 is evident. In 
March and April 1990, violence levels in~eased dramatically (Figure 17). During 
these same months, Figure 16 shows that the proportion of events reported by 
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newspapers dropped from around 85% to 43,5% in April and 37,9% in May. Thus, 
as occurred in 1987, the press contribution to the database dropped as violence 
increased. 
Figure 17: Violent Events in 1990 
t>.Umber d events by month 
.uy September Nowmber 
Months 
Possible reasons for these reporting trends differ from those in 1987. The State of 
Emergency was lifted in February 1990 in the rest of the country, but in KwaZulu-
Natal it was only repealed in October that year. Nevertheless, with the 
simultaneous unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations, and the 
release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February, it is unlikely that the reporting 
restrictions were enforced as before. It is therefore less likely that the drop in 
press reporting over this period was a result of Emergency restrictions. 
Instead, the media probably devoted more time and space to the other historic 
events which took place during these months, resulting in a decrease of violence 
reports in the newspapers. This trend did not continue throughout the year, 
however. Press reports dominated the database again from June 1990, which can 
also be partly attributed to the political context. 
It is likely that violence remained an important, newsworthy story for the press 
throughout the year. The unbanning of the ANC and other organisations meant 
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these political groups could freely organise and mobilise. The launch of a 
transition process assured aU political parties of a role in national negotiations for 
a new political system, which heightened competition betvveen organisations. 
This competition was keenly felt in KwaZulu-Natal, where ANC aligned 
organisations had been in violent conflict with Inkatha for four years already. 
Figure 14 shows that violence levels were high throughout 1990. The escalation 
of ANC-IFP conflicts in the rural areas of the province confirmed this fierce rivalry. 
After the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was established in July 1990, extensive 
recruitment drives began in the townships around Johannesburg. Subsequent 
conflicts resulted in years of violent confrontations in that area, and massive loss 
of life. All these developments in the political landscape would have been 
considered very newsworthy. 
Thus the political context during 1990 increased the probability that violence 
would be reported, and Figure 16 confirms this, since for most of 1990, the press 
reported about t'NO thirds of aU events. These results support the argument that 
press reporting of conflict is influenced by the timing of events. In addition, these 
analyses also show the importance of using alternative sources which are not 
affected by the political context in the same way as the press is. Without these, 
the fact that violence levels almost doubled from January to April 1990, would 
haye been lost. 
In 1994, the monthly reporting patterns differed vastly from those in 1987 and 
1990, as has been the general trend throughout these analyses. The monitors 
alone, . reported a higher proportion of events than the press In each month except 
for November and December (Figure 18). The combination of press and monitor 
sources - much higher than previous years - made a significant contribution to the 
database in 1994. This means that for several months of the year, the 













Figure 1'8: Reporting in 1994 
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Figure 19 shows that violence levels during 1994 increased sharply in March and 
April, after which they fell to some of the lO\Nest levels recorded in the province in 
years. From April, the newspapers' contribution declined dramatically while the 
monitors provided more information than ever before. This trend corresponds with 
those noted in 1987 and 1990. 
A new pattern in 1994, hO\Never, is that once violence levels had dropped after 
their upward surge, the monitors' contribution continued to increase, reaching a 
high ot" 61,7% in June 1994. The Significant contribution made by the monitors 
throughout 1994 may have been influenced by monitoring agencies having 
received substantial financial assistance during this period from the international 
community. The first democratic elections in South Africa attracted and 
encouraged violence monitoring, particularly from abroad. 
In terms of the political context, 1994 like 1990, saw some of the most significant 
developments in the country's history. The first democratic election was held in 
April 1994, and although the actual days of voting \Nere among the most peaceful 
ever recorded, the months preceding the election \Nere the most violent in 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
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As the election drew nearer, the decision by the IFP to boycott the process 
heightened tensions and fears of violence. On the ground there were attempts by 
the IFP to discourage people from voting and even the disruption of ANC rallies 
less than a month before election day. The prospect that violence would mar the 
country's first election made violence during this period very newsworthy. 
This was reiterated during interviews with journalists and editors of KwaZulu-
Natal's newspapers. The Daily News political reporter said that the political 
climate has an important effect on newsworthiness. The example given was that 
two people killed during the election month would be "bigger news" than two 
people dying two months before the election.6 
These opinions are supported by the results presented here, namely the large 
proportion of events in the 'combination' category and the press's contribution of 
just less than one third of all events until March (Figure 18). The decline in press 
reports to 10% of the total in April 1994, and the importance of the monitors in this 
month, is probably a result of the sheer volume of events at the· time, and a lack of 
space in the newspapers due to the increase in other important election related 
news. 
Figure 19: Violent Events in 1994 
Number of ewnts by month 
July September NcMmber 
Morths 
6 IntelView with Daily News political reporter, on February 18, 1994. 
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The prominence of the monitors' contributions after the elections could be 
attributed to the significant drop in violence levels. This may have inclined the 
press to regard conflict as less newsworthy items for coverage. 
This did not, however, seem to be the case in 1987 and 1990. In these years, 
when violence levels dropped after sudden increases, press reports remained an 
important part of the data set, which suggests that a decrease in violence in itself, 
is not necessarily an explanation for less press coverage. 
Instead, it is more likely that the new democracy which was born in April 1994 
ended any legitimacy which violent conflict may have had in the past, when 
peaceful means of resolving political disputes were unavailable. The new political 
context was one of reconciliation and democratic problem solving, and attention 
has increasingly turned to developing the country along these lines. 
In this context, it is likely that the press's attention shifted in similar directions, and 
hence the predominance of the monitors' reports in 1994. The thoughts of The 
Mercury editor support this argument: 
"During the days of the Emergency, all newspapers were reporting what 
was going on in a more blow-by-blow way than they are today, because it 
was a new phenomenon at that stage. And it was very central to what was 
gOing on in the politics of the country. It was the political issue of the day. . 
"Now that has changed. The violence has to do with political battling for 
control between the IFP and ANC in Natal, but the leaders are actually 
talking to each other, and it's almost as if these are renegade people 
[fighting] down below. So we tend to report the top discussions as more . 
important than the little fights on the ground". 7 
7 Interview with John Patten, The Mercury editor, on March 28, 1995. 
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These results again confirm that the political context during which events occur 
does affect the likelihood that they will be reported by the press. This is probably 
because the very act of reporting in certain contexts and in certain ways is itself a 
political act. Analyses of the effects of the political context are also the first (of 
those undertaken in this section) to provide evidence that the States of 
Emergency suppressed press reporting of violence. 
This section has also clearly showed that the press does not always report more 
violence when violence levels actually increase. Instead, the opposite seems to 
be true. This finding confirms the importance of alternative sources of information 
for violence research. 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose ' of ·this chapter has been to assess the data sources used for 
collecting information on violent collective action in KwaZulu-Natal. Since 
newspapers are often the only source available to researchers for gathering event 
data, and given the problems which have been raised about newspapers' 
reporting of violence, it is important to continuously assess the use of these 
sources. 
Given these difficulties with press data, the monitoring agencies provide a good 
source against which to compare press reporting patterns. To fulfil the aims of this 
chapter, analyses compared reporting by the press and monitors over three years 
to determine the influence of several factors on reporting, and how the different 
sources contributed to the database. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results: 
• Over the three years studied here, both the press and the monitoring agencies 
made important separate contributions to the database at different times. 
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Without the monitors, significant information would not have been collected. 
The same can, however, be said of the newspapers. 
• Reporting patterns changed over time. In 1987 and 1990 the contributions of 
the sources were similar, with the press reporting more events than the 
monitors. In 1994 this pattern was reversed, as the monitors made the most 
significant input to the data set. 
This means that the sources' reporting tendencies have not been consistent 
over the years, and the ana.lyses of the several factors illustrate these 
inconsistencies. One cannot, therefore, conclude from these results that for 
the entire three year period, either the press or the monitors showed specific 
reporting biases. 
• The largest proportion of events reported by the 'combination' category was 
recorded in 1994, and the smallest in 1987. This suggests that with time, the 
sources have increasingly covered the same events, which is encouraging for 
researchers using either source, since this indicates that fewer events are 
being left out. This also suggests that reporting bias as a result of the area 
covered, or the type of events covered, has declined since 1987. 
• The results showed that the press is not always more inclined to report 
violence which occurs near the newspapers' own location. In 1987 and 1990 
the press dominated reporting in distant areas of the province. In 1994 
however, the monitors clearly reported far more events in outlying areas than 
did the press, which may suggest that the press's previous reporting pattern is 
changing. 
• T~ere is also no conclusive evidence that the press is more likely to report 
more intense events over less 'intense ones. While the data shovved that the 
newspapers did report the majority of very intense incidents in 1987, the press 
also reported many of the least intense events in that year. This tendency did, 
however, change over time. In 1990 and 1994 the press reported fewer of the 
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least intense events, which were increasingly covered by the monitors. This 
also suggests that past reporting patterns of the press may be changing. 
• Analyses over the three years studied do not show conclusively, as was 
hypothesised, that the press is more likely to report events which involve many 
participants and are therefore, large in size. The press reported both the 
majority of large and small events in 1987 and 1990. As was the case with the 
reporting patterns for intense events, the reporting tendency changed 
dramatically over time. In 1994, most small events were covered by the 
monitors, while the press reported the majority of large events. This suggests 
that trends may be changing with regard to the reporting of events of varying 
size. 
• Both the press and the monitors are affected by the political context during 
which violence events occurred, but · in different ways. In the three years 
studied, the newspapers' contribution decreased and the monitors' increased 
when violence levels escalated. Because the political environment was 
different during these years, the possible explanations for these reporting 
trends differed. 
Common perceptions are that the press only really report violence when there 
is an upsurge in incidents. These results, however, show that the newspapers 
do not necessarily only focus on violence when levels are high. This is 
probably because their focus is often on other important political changes at 
these times. 
• These results did not provide clear evidence that the States of Emergency 
impacted on the factors chosen for analysis. Except for the analysis of the 
effects of the timing of events on the probability that they \Wuld be reported, 
the Emergency did not appear to have adversely affected reporting of the 
events in distant locations, or events which were small in size. 
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These analyses present many questions about reporting trends of the press and 
the monitors. There are clear signs that reporting patterns changed in 1994 from 
those of previous years, and further analyses over time vvould reveal whether 
there are any consistencies in these trends. Another important finding is that the 
press does not necessarily report more violent conflict when actual levels 
increase. On the contrary, these analyses suggest the opposite: the proportion of 
events reported by the press has tended to decline when violence levels increase. 
For researchers gathering information for event-analysis of conflict, it is clear that 
both groups of sources made important individual contributions to the database. 
For this reason, if information about conflict in specific areas or about specific 
types of events is sought, it is advisable to test the reporting patterns before 




1. The aims of this study revisited 
This study has attempted to understand what factors are likely to affect the 
probability that even~s of violent conflict are reported by the press. In doing so, the 
intention is to contribute to what is presently a small body of literature on the 
validity of the press as a data source for conflict research. 
This question is relevant for three related reasons: 
• Quantitative research into conflict relies heavily on the press as one of the few 
accessible, regular sources of information. Researchers have, however, 
criticised the use of the press as a data source for conflict research. The way in 
which the press report violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal in particular, has been 
criticised by researchers, academics, violence monitoring agencies, and even 
some journalists. This suggests that the press must be used with caution for 
this kind of research. 
• Over the past decade, KwaZulu-Natal has been characterised by intense 
violence. This violent conflict has resulted in extensive loss of life and 
destruction of property. While levels of violence have decreased in recent 
months, the conflict continues, threatening political stability and · indeed, 
democracy in the province. 
A peaceful resolution of this conflict is now crucial, and one way in which this 
can be facilitated is through keeping citizens and government informed about 
the situation. The press has an important role to play in this regard. This leads 
to the third reason why this research question is important. 
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• Freedom of speech and of information are vital for democracies of all kinds to 
succeed. The press is one of the main vehicles for ensuring that these 
freedoms can be exercised in a democracy. Until 1990, these freedoms were 
severely curtailed in this country by numerous laws, coupled with five years of 
repressive States of Emergency. These measures were focused particularly on 
those media which disseminated information about conflict and violence. 
While the Interim Constitution now protects freedom of speech, the body of 
knowledge about the conflict before 1990 may have been affected, and the 
legacy of decades of media restrictions may have future implications for the 
media, and thus for our new democracy. 
The independent variables used for analysing the reporting trends, namely the 
size, intensity and location of violent conflict events and the political environment 
in which they occur, were selected based on the findings of international studies 
which have examined the press as a data source for systematic conflict research, 
as well as on interviews with journalists in South Africa. 
The vvork of Snyder and Kelly (1977), Franzosi (1987) and McCarthy et al (1993 
and 1995) showed that different forms of conflict have different probabilities of 
being reported by the press. According to Snyder and Kelly (1977), intense 
events, measured by their partiCipant size and the numbers of people killed and 
injured per event, were more likely to be reported than those of a lower intensity. 
In addition, Snyder and Kelly (1977) also found that media reporting was sensitive 
to the environment in which events occurred. The time at which events happened, 
in terms of the prevailing political context and the location of events, affected 
reporting probability. 
The selection of these determining factors was confirmed by the views of local 
reporters and editors. Reporters .interviewed from all the daily newspapers in 
KwaZulu-Natal and from the South African Press Association (SAPA) said that 
'newsvvorthy' events included, among others, those in which large numbers of 
people were killed or injured. The broader political climate at the time of the event 
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was also identified as an important influence on 'news value'. Reporters also said 
that a shortage of resources and staff, and a lack of sources, meant that events in 
far off places were not well covered. 
Since the studies which examined the factors affecting reporting probabilities were 
carried out abroad, this thesis also sought to examine whether the same dynamics 
apply to South Africa. As the first study of this kind in South Africa, the results will 
contribute not only to the literature on the subject, but also to an understanding of 
how the press go about reporting violent conflict in this country, and particularly in 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
The statistical analyses were carried out by comparing the relevant reporting 
trends of the press with those of selected violence monitoring agencies in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Interviews with reporters and editors from selected newspapers 
and monitoring agencies in the province provided valuable qualitative, background 
information about how these media operate, and the constraints which they face in 
reporting violence. This information was crucial for a better understanding of 
reporting trends, and in order to comment about the validity of the press as' a data 
source for conflict research. 
2. Conclusions drawn from the analyses of reporting trends 
The most important general finding of the analyses was that reporting trends over 
most of the period covered, did not support the study's hypotheses. Reporting 
patterns did, however, change over time, and in 1994 certain reporting patterns did 
verify the hypotheses. 
The results also suggested that reporting by both the press and the monitoring 
agencies is most affected by the political environment during which events of 
violent conflict occurred. These findings will be reviewed. 
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i) The location of events as a determining factor 
Previous research and the opinions of journalists indicated that the press is more 
likely to report events which occurred in close proximity to the newspaper base. 
Results of this study showed, contrary to the hypothesis, that in 1987 and 1990, 
the press reported nearly all events in the regions most distant from the newspaper 
bases. 
In 1994, however, this trend was reversed. The monitoring agencies reported a 
majority of violent conflict events in these same distant regions. In that year, the 
newspapers made the greatest contribution to the database in the regions where 
the newspapers are based. These results confirm the hypothesis and suggest that 
reporting trends may be changing over time. 
ii) The intensity of events as a determining factor 
According to the hypothesis, the press is more likely to report intense events, 
defined for the purposes of this study as those in which five or more people were 
killed and/or injured per event. The results of the analyses supported the 
hypothesis to 'an extent. In 1987 and 1990, the press did report the majority of the 
most intense events. In 1994, however, the press did not report the majority of 
intense events. Instead, a combination of press and monitoring agency sources 
reported the majority of these events. This nevertheless, still supports the 
hypotheSis because it indicates that both the press and the monitors gave 
significant coverage of the most intense events. 
However, in all the years studied, the newspapers also reported a large proportion 
of the least intense events. In 1994, the greatest contribution b'y the press of 
events not covered by any other source, was in the category of the least intense 
events. It is not possible, therefore, to conclude that during these years, the press 
prioritised intense events at the expense of less intense events. 
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iii) The nymber of participants as a determining factor 
Arguments in the literature suggested that conflict events which are greater in size, 
measured by the number of participants, are more likely to be reported by the 
press. The results of this study showed, contrary to the hypothesis, that in 1987 
and 1990 the press reported the majority of all types of events, where size is the 
distinguishing factor. By contrast, analyses of trends in 1994 supported the 
hypothesis. 
In 1994, nearly half of all events which were small in size were reported by the 
monitoring agencies only. This means that if the press was the only source used, 
half of all events in which few people participated, would not have been recorded. 
This is significant because in 1994, 82% of all violent conflict events. were 'small'. 
In addition, by far the largest newspaper contribution was recorded in the category 
of 'large' and 'very large' events. These results support the hypothesis. They also 
support the argument that reporting trends have changed over time. It would 
appear that more recent reporting trends tend to corroborate the hypotheses, while 
reporting patterns in 1987 and 1990 do not support the hypothesis. 
iv) The political environment and timing of events as determining factors 
The analyses of reporting patterns against the background of political events and 
the levels of violence in KwaZulu-Natal, showed that the political context did affect 
reporting, as the hypothesis suggested it would. 
In 1987, 1990 and 1994, the most significant result of the analyses was that as 
monthly violence levels (measured by the numbers of events per month) 
increased, the press contribution to the database decreased. During these periods, 
the monitors reported more events than the newspapers. This is an important 
finding, because it suggests that an upsurge of violence, which could be 
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considered newsworthy, does not necessarily mean that newspapers' reporting of 
that violence will increase. 
Possible explanations for this trend in each year, differ. In 1987, the drop in press 
reporting when violence levels surged may have been the result of a stricter 
enforcement of State of Emergency regulations at that time. In 1990, this argument 
does not apply, since the Emergency measures affecting the media were no longer 
exercised after February of that year. Instead, it is possible that the press devoted 
more time and space to the other historic events which occurred in the same 
months during which violence levels were highest. These events were the release 
of Nelson Mandela from prison and the unbanning of the ANC and other political 
organisations in February 1990. 
Monthly reporting patterns in 1994 differed from those in previous years, in that the 
monitoring agencies reported a higher proportion of events than the press in all 
except two months. There was, nevertheless, one similarity with trends in 1987 and 
1990: during the months in which violence levels surged, in this case March and 
April 1994, the proportion of events reported by the press decreased. A possible 
explanation for this trend in 1990 also applies for 1994: the drop in press reporting 
may have occurred because the newspapers were more concerned with one of the 
most important events in South Africa's history: the first democratic elections on 
April 27, 1994. 
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This suggests that the political environment in which violent conflict occurs does 
affect the likelihood that events are reported by the press. Another result of this 
analysis also supports thi.s hypothesis. Contrary to patterns in previous years, the 
proportion of events reported by the press in 1994 remained low, once violence 
levels decreased after having reached a peak. This suggests that it is not the 
amount of violence at anyone time which determines reporting trends. Instead, it is 
more likely to depend on events in the broader political environment at the time 
that violence occurs. 
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Press reporting of violence after April 1994 probably remained low because the 
democratic elections ended any legitimacy which violent conflict may have had in 
the past, when democratic means of resolving political disputes were unavailable 
to the majority of South Africans. The new political context was one of 
reconciliation and democratic problem solving, and the media's attention also 
turned in this direction. This argument was verified by some reporters and editors 
who were interviewed as part of this study. Moreover, reporters and editors 
interviewed in 1994 also said that, after nearly a decade of ongoing conflict, 
readers had tired of reading about the political violence. As a result, events of 
violent conflict were not reported as frequently, or in as much detail, as during 
other periods when violence levels may have been lower. 
The aim of this study has been to determine which factors are likely to affect the 
probability that events of violent conflict are reported by the press. The results of 
the analyses of reporting patterns suggest that the political environment in ~hich 
events occur - in other words, their timing - is likely to have the greatest impact on 
reporting probability. This means that if other events of political Significance occur 
simultaneously with violent conflict, this may diminish the press coverage of the 
conflict. The same may apply if violence has persisted for a long time, since some 
journalists believe that this reduces the newsworthiness of the subject, particularly 
in the minds of readers. 
Restrictions on violence reporting, such as those imposed under the States of 
Emergency, would also form part of the political context. An important finding of 
this study is, however, that there is no clear evidence that the States of Emergency 
impacted negatively on press reporting of violence in terms of the variables studied 
here. The only exception is the suggestion that the Emergency restrictions may 
have resulted in the decrease of press reporting of events, when violence levels 
increased in 1987. 
A tentative conclusion regarding the States of Emergency is that while these 
measures were in place, more violent conflict was reported by the newspapers 
than in recent years. This study has established that the political context has an 
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important influence on reporting. In the light of this, it is possible that the political 
context at that time of the Emergency may have contributed to violence being 
perceived as a more newsworthy and relevant subject than it is at present. The 
remarks of The Mercury's editor, interviewed in March 1995, support this: 
"During the days of the Emergency, all newspapers were reporting what 
was going on in a more blow-by-blow way than they are today, because it 
was a new phenomenon at that stage. And it was vel}' central to what was 
going on in the politics of the countl}'. It was the political issue of the day. " 
The fact that reporting on violence was subject to strict controls meant that 
reporters were forced to challenge the law and find loopholes to circumvent the 
restrictions (Merrett, 1991). There was also more emphasis on finding alternate 
sources of information. The results of these analyses suggest, furthermore, that 
press reporting was hardly affected by the intensity, size and location of events 
during the Emergency years. Instead, it is in more recent times that reporting is 
affected by these variables. This may imply that during the Emergency years, the 
political context had the most influence on reporting. This situation so inclined 
journalists to prioritise violence, that factors which have affected conflict reporting 
in other parts of the world , did not apply here at the time. 
3. The suitability of the press as a source for quantitative 
research on violent conflict 
The analyses of reporting patterns suggested that the political environment has an 
important effect on violence reporting, and that in recent years, certain 
characteristics of events may have influenced reporting probabilities. It is 
nevertheless, difficult to conclude from these results that systematic biases exist in 
press reporting of violence, particularly since trends vary over the time period 
studied. 
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In addition, an important finding which was not linked to the hypothesis of 'this 
study, emerged in the course of the analyses, As categories of sources, both the 
press and the monitors made important separate contributions to the database at 
different times, Without one or the other of these source groups, a significant 
amount of information about events of violent conflict would not have been 
recorded. This suggests that systematic studies of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal 
should make use of multiple sourges of data, rather than anyone particular source. 
This finding has significant implications for future research in this field . It may also 
have policy implications for the media and for regional government. 
The secondary information on press reporting of violence, and the opinions of 
journalists and editors from the newspapers in KwaZulu-Natal corroborate this 
conclusion that there is a need for alternative sources of information. The 
discussion of the various restrictions on violence reporting suggested that the 
press still operate with the legacy of legal restrictions. The Emergency regulations, 
according to journalists, encouraged telephone journalism, self censorship, and a 
simplification of the dynamics of the conflict. In addition, investigative journalism 
was suppressed and sources of information were limited by the restrictive 
measures. 
Interviews also confirmed that the local newspapers face all the pressures of the 
newsroom process and market demands common to newspapers throughout the 
world, In the current period of economic difficulties, it appears that the most 
pressure on press reporting will emanate from the requirements that newspapers 
are commercially viable, and that they produce material which the public want to 
read, and which the advertisers wish to sponsor. 
Journalists believed that the effects on their work of the demands of the newsroom 
and of the market, were the central reasons for criticisms that coverage of the 
violence was poor and lacking in detail. In particular, they identified a shortage of 
staff and resources, of reliable sources on violence, and the conditions that stories 
be newsworthy, as the most significant constraints for better violence reporting. 
Interviewees explained that reporters and editors are tired of covering and 
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investigating violence, and that readers also no longer have an interest in the 
subject. 
These interview results suggest that it is unlikely that in recent years the press 
reported all events of violence, or the details and analyses thereof which are 
essential for understanding the problem. The analyses of reporting trends showed 
that the press has nevertheless, made an important contribution to the database on 
violent conflict. While the interview findings do not negate the statistical results, 
they suggest that researchers using the press as a source for studying violent 
conflict should also make use of alternate sources. 
The interviews with the monitoring agencies about their modes of operation and the 
restrictions which they face in recording violent conflict, also substantiate this 
conclusion. Most monitors rejected the major criticism levelled at them that their 
work was biased. They were also open to public scrutiny, and had confidence in 
their methods. There was also no evidence that monitors deliberately excluded 
data about certain political groups, as some criticisms alleged. 
Nevertheless; interviews also revealed that data gathering techniques 'varied 
between monitors, and were not always systematic. These techniques depended 
largely on the availability of time, staff and resources. This could, potentially, affect 
the reliability of their data. In addition, at the time of the interviews, most of the 
monitors' primary sources were affiliated in some way to a particular political group, 
or alternatively, monitors experienced difficulties obtaining data from victims of a 
particular organisation. ,This suggests that despite the monitors' confidence in their 
work, there may be gaps in the monitors' information about violent conflict. 
The statistical analyses which compared press and monitoring agency reporting 
trends, support this conclusion, since, particularly in 1987 and 1990, 'the 
newspapers reported certain types of information which the monitors did not. This 
implies that the use of the monitoring agencies as a source for the study of violent 
conflict in KwaZulu-Natal should also be supplemented with alternative sources. 
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4. Implications for democracy in South Africa 
This study has argued that freedom of speech and information are essential in all 
kinds of democracy. This relationship is particularly important for South Africa 
which has a recent history of extensive restrictions on freedom of speech and 
information, which were instituted during a period of intense violence. While the 
media restrictions were lifted in 1990, the violence continues in KwaZulu-Natal. A 
free flow of information about the violence is important for the peaceful resolution 
of the conflict. The resolution of this conflict in turn, is important for democracy and 
stability in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The results of the analyses of reporting trends suggest that, particularly in recent 
times, the press has reported violence selectively. Press reporting was found to be 
especially sensitive to the political 'context during which events of . violence 
occurred. These analyses did not provide conclusive evidence that the States of 
Emergency had a decisive effect on violence reporting by the press. Instead, this 
study tentatively concluded that given the significant affect of the political context 
on reporting trends, violence may have been more likely to be reported during the 
States of Emergency than since, because at that time, political conflict was 
particularly newsworthy. 
The findings also indicated that the monitoring agencies have made an important 
contribution towards recording and disseminating information about violence. 
Without the monitors' contribution, a significant proportion of information about the 
conflict, especially during 1994, would not have been recorded. 
The monitors played an important role in disseminating information about violent 
conflict in KwaZulu-Natal under an undemocratic government. The analyses 
suggest, however, that even after a democratic government wa~ .elected in April 
1994, and freedom of speech was safeguarded in the Interim Constitution, the 
monitors have continued to report many violent events which the press have 
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omitted. This has been the trend despite the fact that many monitors have 
discontinued their operations in the province. 
These results have implications for democracy in KwaZulu-Natal and in South 
Africa as a whole. South Africans should not be satisfied that the press will keep 
them adequately informed about the violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, now that 
legislative restrictions no longer apply, and freedom of speech is protected by the 
Interim Constitution. This study suggests that press reporting of violence is 
currently most influenced by the demands of the market and the newsroom 
process, which require that published information is newsworthy, current, in tune 
with the demands of the readership, and attractive to advertisers. Given these 
requirements, it is understandable that the political context has the greatest 
influence on the selection of events of violence by the press for publication. 
The role of free speech and information in a democracy is to facilitate a vigorous 
exchange of ideas, the pursuit of truth, informed decision making by the public, and 
the monitoring of government's activities. The results of this study suggest, 
however, that the public cannot rely on the press to fulfil these goals with regard to 
the subject of violent political conflict. In the interests of a free flow of information 
and democracy, it is important, therefore, that alternative sources which cover the 
conflict are supported in their activities, and are regularly consulted. 
This is especially important given the type of democracy which is developing in 
South Africa. In Chapter Two of this study, two main categories were identified 
which distinguish the various models of democracy, namely liberal representative 
and participatory democracy. This distinction is important because as participation 
by citizens in the affairs of government decreases, so the need for free speech and 
information increases. 
South Africa seems likely to follow in the liberal representative tradition, in which 
participation is largely limited to periodic elections for leaders from an elite group, 
who govern on behalf of their electorates. This means that in this country, the need 
for good communication between government and the citizens is especially 
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important. This in turn, means that the press has a vital role as the facilitator of this 
communication. Having established that the press in KwaZulu-Natal reports news 
about violent political conflict selectively, it is important that South Africans take the 
responsibility for ensuring that they are informed, if they are to make any decisions 
which are influenced by this conflict. 
. In addition, given this country's violent and repressive past, it is important that 
South Africans themselves learn the value of tolerance and freedom of speech. 
The failure of the citizens of this country to appreciate these rights poses the 
greatest threat to freedom of the press and to democracy, now that freedom of 
speech is protected by the Interim Constitution. 
5. Implications for future research 
One important implication for future research emanating from this study has 
already been discussed above. It has been shown that both the press and the 
monitoring agencies made significant separate contributions to the database 
studied here. This suggests that multiple sources of information are important for 
studies of violent conflict which adopt a systematic, quantitative methodology. 
A further implication for future research in this field is that there are signs from 
these analyses that reporting patterns have changed over time. It will therefore, be 
important to continue comparing these trends in order to establish more 
conclusively which factors affect violence reporting by the press, in order to reveal 
systematic biases in reporting. For the same reason, it would be beneficial to 




II .. " ,Table 6f;.S~urcis Used.~'"ttie <i()nflict .Trends in KYiiZulu-Natalf»roject ,~;:~~ 
Source 1987 1990 1994 Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Natal Witness 359 31.7 381 22.8 93 7.8 833 20.8 
Combination of 104 9.2 113 6.8 354 29.7 571 14.3 
press and monitors 
Human Rights - - - - 538 45.2 538 13.5· 
Committee (HRC) 
The Mercury 14 1.2 348 20.8 42 3.5 404 10.1 
Combination press 156 13.8 85 5.1 111 9.3 352 8.8 
Unrest Monitoring 324 28.6 23 · 1.4 - - 347 8.7 
Project (UMP) 
Black Sash RMG - - 241 14.4 - - 241 6.0 
Midlands Crisis - - 191 11.4 - - 191 4.8 
Relief Committee 
DP Unrest 20 1.8 118 7 - - 138 3.5 
Monitoring Group 
Daily News 27 2.4 64 3.8 15 1.3 106 2.7 
New African - - 68 4.1 - - 68 1.7 
Cape Times 43 3.8 - - - - 43 1.1 
Sunday Tribune 6 0.5 28 1.7 5 0.4 39 1.0 
Combination of 16 1.4 13 0.8 1 0.1 30 0.8 
monitoring agencies 
The Star 28 2.5 - - - - 28 0.7 
Eastern Province 16 1.4 - - - - 16 0.4 
Herald 
Business Day 10 0.9 - - 1 0.1 11 0.3 
SAPA - - - - 7 0.6 '7 0.2 
Estcourt Midlands - - - - 7 0.6 7 0.2 
News 
Sowetan 6 0.5 - - - - 6 0.2 
Natal on Saturday - - - - 5 0.4 5 0.1 
Zululand Observer - - - - 3 0.3 3 0.1 
Evening Post 1 0.1 - - 1 0.1 2 0.1 
Sunday Times - - - - 2 0.2 2 0.1 
Zulu land Observer - - - - 2 0.2 2 0.1 
IDASA - - - - 2 0.2 2 0.1 
Indicator SA 1 0.1 - - - - 1 0.0 
lIanga 1 0.1 - - - - 1 0.0 
Weekly Mail - - 1 0.1 - - 1 0.0 
Total 1132 28.3 1674 41.9 1190 29.8 3996 100.0 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE FIVE REGIONS OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
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* Thukela is referred to in the text as 'North West' 
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APPENDIX 3 
Ta6le" 1·: Intense EventS:, ~aisacres 'Rep9ited I}j 'the ~res'''and Mopitors ,ili.1981(l 
Source ~ 10 deaths and < 10 deaths and No deaths and Total 
injuries injuries injuries 
N % N % N % N % 
Press 14 66.7 402 57.7 250 60.7 666 58.9 
Monitors 2 9.5 228 32.7 130 31.6 360 31 :9 
Combination 5 23.8 67 9.6 32 7.8 104 9.2 
Total 21 100.0 697 100.0 412 100.0 1 130 100.0 
1;·llSIEi 2: 17f~~siEvenlsi:~acres RiPiJtedJjy~tJ1ii.P(e_"fand Monitofsl iiiit990 ·· 
Source ~ 10 deaths and < 10 deaths and No deaths and Total 
injuries injuries injuries 
N % N % N % N % 
Press 36 56.3 689 64.1 250 46.7 975 58.2 
Monitors 10 15.6 319 29.7 257 48.0 586 35.0 
Combination 18 28.1 67 6.2 28 5.2 113 6.8 
Total 64 100.0 1 075 100.0 535 100.0 1674 100.0 
7~le 3: liteqse Event$.: ~sSa~a.j;,RepOrteij.by th, RriSsariiJ MOiiitOl'S"'m. 1~9!f 
Source ~ 10 deaths and < 10 deaths and No deaths and Total 
injuries injuries injuries 
N % N % N % N % 
Press 3 13.6 168 19.3 122 41 .8 293 24.7 
Monitors 3 13.6 407 46.7 129 44.2 539 45.4 
Combination 16 72.7 297 34.1 41 14.0 354 29.8 
Total 22 100.0 872 100.0 292 100.0 1186 100.0 
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I '~ Tatile'74::"Measutitig IntensitY Using Deithi-Only: Ev~nts Reported By tfie Rres~ 
- anCi Monitors in 1987 ~,! .~ 
." . ~ 
Source ~ 5 deaths < 5 deaths No deaths Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Press 11 68.8 243 60.8 412 57.7 666 58.9 
Monitors 2 12.5 116 29.0 242 33.9 360 31.9 
Combination 3 18.8 41 10.3 60 8.4 104 9.2 
Total 16 100.0 400 100.0 714 100.0 1130 100.0 
' ''·-T~Jjle 5: Measunng IntensitY USing Deaths Only: EventS Rttpoitid Ily 108 .Rress~ 
",:... .,' ~ ',. an" Monitqrs in 1990 ..... 'Ii. .111' ," •• :.Z' 
Source ~ 5 deaths < 5 deaths No deaths Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Press 37 45.1 484 65.7 454 53.1 975 58.2 
Monitors 25 30.5 203 27.5 358 41.9 586 35.0 
Combination 20 24.4 50 6.8 43 5.0 113 6.8 
Total 82 100.0 737 100.0 855 100.0 1674 100.0 
I!.II" Ta~le , 6! Measuting IntensitY Using peathsOnly: Even~ReR9ttea by tHe e~ 
..7 ""h ~!~~ ~~. ," 3 anCi "qnitors in '994~~ : ;;::. '. ,;,. .",~ 
Source ~ 5 deaths < 5 deaths No deaths Total 
N % N % N % N % 
Press 3 8.8 118 17.2 172 36.8 293 24.7 
Monitors 6 17.6 316 46.1 217 46.5 539 45.4 
Combination 25 73.5 251 36.6 78 16.7 354 29.8 
Total 34 100.0 685 100.0 467 100.0 1186 100.0 
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